On October 12, the enemy tank division advanced units reached the line 25 km southeast of Staritsa. All measures taken by the Soviet command to cover Kalinin turned out to be invalid, since the units did not manage to take their places in time. Nobody defended the city before
“I was killed near Rzhev, In a nameless swamp, In the fifth company, on the left, During a brutal raid. I didn’t hear the explosion, I didn’t see that flash, - As if into an abyss from a cliff - And not a bottom, not a tire, And in this whole world, Until the end of his days, Not a buttonhole, not a stripe From my tunic...” A.T. Tvardovsky
On October 13, enemy aircraft carried out continuous attacks on Kalinin night and day. There were many fires in the city. The grain elevator, plants, factories, houses and villages were burning. Residents began to partially evacuate. By evening, the enemy occupied the western outskirts of the city of Kalinin.
"Report of the Military Council of the Western Front from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on the destruction of the enemy group that reached the Kalinin area. Comrade Stalin I report my thoughts on the destruction of the enemy group that reached Kalinin and preventing its movement to Moscow: 1). Within 14 and beat this group the entire aviation of the reserve of the Main Command, the aviation of the Northern-Western Front and partly the aviation of the right group of the Western Front... We ask you to approve Zhukov.
On the night of October 14-15, the 21st Tank Brigade began its mission. But another order was received on behalf of the front commander, signed by the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Major General Golubev. As a result, the brigade sat on the defensive for 24 hours. During this 24-hour period, the enemy managed to concentrate against up to a motorized division supported by tanks.
On October 17, 27 T-34 tanks and 8 tanks from the T tank brigade broke through the German defenses. Only 8 tanks managed to reach the southern outskirts of Kalinin and only one T-34 tank broke into the city. The brigade inflicted some damage on the enemy, caused panic, but was not supported by infantry and was unable to complete its assigned tasks from the air. The significance of the raid of the 21st Tank Brigade is enormous, as it thwarted the Nazi offensive
On October 18, troops of the operational group N.F. Vatutin simultaneously struck unexpected blows at the enemy and began to smash him. During the night our troops gained a foothold and on October 19 repelled all enemy attacks. Within three days, the enemy troops were defeated, and their remnants fled to Kalinin.
ORDER ON THE TRANSITION OF THE FRONT TROOPS ON THE OFFENSIVE WITH THE PURPOSE OF DEFEATING THE ENEMY'S KALININ GROUP. OCTOBER 20 Troops of the Kalinin Front... with the main forces encircle and destroy the enemy grouping in the Kalinin area, between the Volga River and the Moscow Sea, and by the end capture the city of Kalinin, preventing the enemy from regrouping to attack southeast, towards Moscow. Front Commander Colonel General KONEV
Despite the enemy's superiority in forces and means, the front troops defeated the enemy group that broke through from Kalinin in the direction of Torzhok, and forced the fascist German troops in the Kalinin area to go on the defensive; conducting an active defense, they thwarted the enemy's attempt on October 24 to break through from Rzhev to Torzhok and by December 4 they were firmly entrenched on the line east of Selizharov, north of Martynov, west, north and east of Kalinin, the left bank of the Volga, the Volga Reservoir.
Kalinin defensive operation
As a result of the military operations carried out in the Western Front, the Germans were able to advance up to 75 km. The enemy's plan to break through to Moscow from the center and north-west was thwarted. With the forces of the 3rd Tank Group and the 9th Army, the Nazis attacked the right wing of the Western Front in the direction of Rzhev - Kalinin. Soviet troops were retreating. On October 17, during fierce fighting, Kalinin had to be abandoned. With the capture of the city, the threat of a German breakthrough to Moscow increased sharply.
To cover the capital from the northwest, the Kalinin Front was created on October 17 under the command of General I.S. Koneva. On the same day, Soviet troops launched a counterattack in the Torzhok area and drove the enemy back to their original positions.
As a result of the combat operations, formations and units of the Western, Kalinin and Bryansk fronts exhausted the enemy strike groups, caused them significant damage and stopped their advance in late November - early December.
Tula defensive operation
After heavy fighting in the Mtsensk area, German troops continued their attack on Tula on October 23-24. The battle for Tula began on the morning of October 29. During October 30-31, the Wehrmacht's efforts to break through to Tula were unsuccessful. “Attacks of the German 24th Motto Corps on Tula on November 1 and 2 were successfully repulsed. New attempts made by the enemy in the 1st half of November to capture Tula were repelled by Soviet troops.”
Due to unsuccessful attempts to capture the city, on November 18, German troops began an offensive against the left wing of the Western Front. Under heavy blows and in conditions of fierce fighting, the Soviet units retreated. As a result, the gap at the border of the Western and Southwestern fronts reached 50 km. It was not possible to stop the enemy, and therefore there was a danger of his breaking through to Venev and Kashira.
The Soviet command urgently created the Venev line of defense. For two days there were stubborn battles on the approaches to Venev. The enemy was unable to capture the city. But the Soviet troops, by order of the command, left Venev and retreated to cover the Kashira direction.
The stubborn defense of the troops of the 50th Army in the area of Tula and Venev delayed the advance of the 2nd German Tank Army. But in general, the enemy advanced 10-15 km eastward. “Tula found itself surrounded not only from the west and south, but also from the east. On November 27, the Soviet command ordered a counterattack on the right flank of the German tank group. The Nazis were driven out of the settlements nearby Kashira and pushed back 20 km.”
After the defeat at Kashira, the Germans made another attempt to capture Tula. They intended to encircle the city and then capture it. On November 27, German units struck end-to-end and began to push Soviet troops east. However, on November 29, the German offensive was stopped. From November 30 to December 1, Soviet troops carried out a massive counterattack, which eliminated the threat of the capture of Tula from the north-west.
Kalinin defensive operation
From October 13, 1941, fierce battles unfolded in the main operational directions: Volokolamsk, Mozhaisk, Maloyaroslavets and Kaluga. A difficult situation developed on the right wing of the Western Front. The 22nd, 29th and 31st armies held the defense here. Our troops, retreating under pressure from the main forces of the 9th German Army and covering the approaches to Rzhev, retreated in an organized manner to the Ostashkov-Sychevka line. However, our troops failed to gain a foothold at this line either.
The German command planned to create a new “cauldron” with the forces of the 9th Army and the 3rd Tank Group on the northern flank of Army Group Center and clear the road to Moscow from the northwest. The Germans were going to take Kalinin on the move, bypass Moscow from the north, launch an offensive north to the rear of the North-Western Front and, under favorable conditions, strike at Yaroslavl and Rybinsk.
Events developed rapidly. On October 10, from the Sychevka area, delivering the main blow in the direction of Staritsa - Kalinin, the 41st Motorized Corps (1st Tank, 6th Infantry and 36th Motorized Divisions) of the 3rd Tank Group and the 27th Army went on the offensive Corps of the 9th Army. At the same time, the 6th Army Corps of the 3rd Tank Group went on the offensive from the area northwest of the Dnieper to Rzhev, and the 23rd Army Corps of the 9th Army to Yeltsy from the Nelidov area. On the morning of October 11, the forward detachments of the 41st Motorized Corps occupied Zubtsov, in the evening of the same date, Pogoreloe Gorodishche, and on October 12, Staritsa. Our individual scattered units, having lost contact with their headquarters, retreated in disarray to the east.
The deep breakthrough of the formations of the 3rd tank group between Sychevka and Vyazma and the possible exit of the 41st motorized corps to the rear of the armies of the right wing of the front forced the Soviet command to remove I. I. Maslennikov’s 29th army from the front and deploy it along the left bank of the Volga River for covering the Rzhev group from the southeast. At the same time, by order of the Headquarters, 7 rifle divisions were withdrawn from the armies of the right wing of the front for transfer to the Mozhaisk line and the Kalinin region. However, events developed so quickly that significant changes had to be made to these plans.
Meanwhile, the Germans, developing their offensive, struck a strong blow from the area southeast of Rzhev along the right bank of the Volga. The situation was indeed very difficult. German aviation carried out continuous attacks on Kalinin. As a result, fires broke out in many places. German tanks, without encountering serious resistance, advanced along the Staritskoye Highway. There were no defensive structures on the approaches to the city, and there were no army units to organize defense in the Kalinin area (with the exception of courses for junior lieutenants, the Higher Military Pedagogical Institute and fighter squads). The commander of the 30th Army, Major General V.A. Khomenko, did not have any units or formations at his disposal, with the exception of the 5th Infantry Division arriving by rail in the Kalinin area.
Due to the fact that an extremely dangerous situation had developed on the right wing of the Western Front (there was a threat of enemy troops entering the flank and rear of the North-Western and Western Fronts), and the leadership of the combat activities of the troops stationed there from the front headquarters was complicated, he went to the Kalinin direction Deputy Front Commander Colonel General I. S. Konev. The general was instructed to organize the activities of our troops in this direction. “On October 12, as commander of a group of troops,” I. S. Konev later recalled, “I arrived in Kalinin and immediately found myself in a very difficult situation.”
The Headquarters also gave instructions to send five formations (183rd, 185th rifle, 46th, 54th cavalry divisions, 8th tank brigade) and the 46th motorcycle regiment to the Kalinin area. From these formations, an operational group was created, headed by the chief of staff of the Northwestern Front, Lieutenant General N. F. Vatutin.
Commander of the Kalinin Front I. S. Konev
Battles for Kalinin
On October 12, railway trains with units of the 5th Infantry Division under Lieutenant Colonel P.S. Telkov began arriving in Kalinin. The division was weakened. Thus, the 5th division had: 1964 active soldiers, 1549 rifles, 7 heavy machine guns, 11 light machine guns, 14 guns of 76 and 122 mm caliber and 6 anti-tank guns of 45 mm caliber. The three rifle regiments had an average of 430 soldiers.
On the morning of October 13, Major General Khomenko arrived in Kalinin and began preparing the city for defense. He ordered the head of the NKVD department to take into account everything available in the city and transfer it to the armament of the people's militia. Units of the 5th Infantry Division took up defensive positions on the approaches to the city from the south and southwest. The width of the division's defense zone reached 30 km, the depth was 1.5-2 km. There was no time to prepare the defense in engineering terms. Already at 9 o'clock on October 13, the reconnaissance detachment of the 142nd Infantry Regiment entered into battle with enemy tanks west of the village of Danilovsky.
On the afternoon of October 13, the enemy’s 1st Tank Division, which consisted of 12 thousand people, 150 tanks and about 160 guns and mortars, after artillery and air preparation, attacked the 142nd Infantry Regiment. At the same time, the enemy motorized infantry battalion crossed the Volga and captured the village of Cherkasovo. Providing stubborn resistance, the regiment's units were forced to retreat to the southwestern outskirts of the city. The division commander brought the 190th Infantry Regiment into battle. Through the efforts of two regiments, the enemy offensive was stopped. The Germans' attempt to capture the city on the move failed.
On the night of October 13-14, units of the 256th Infantry Division under the command of Major General S.G. Goryachev began arriving in Kalinin by motor transport (consisting of the 934th, 937th Infantry Regiments and the 531st Light Artillery Regiment). The 256th Division was also not full-blooded. The rifle regiments had an average of 700 fighters. By the morning of October 14, the German command brought the main forces of the 1st Panzer Division, the 900th Motorized Brigade and part of the forces of the 36th Motorized Division to the city.
Thus, the enemy in the Kalinin area had a serious advantage in strength. The absence of our troops northwest and southeast of the city allowed the Germans to carry out a flanking maneuver and reach the rear of the 5th Infantry Division. The crossing of the Volga by the Germans created a threat of capture of the northern part of the city. The situation in other directions was also not in favor of our troops. Units of the German 6th Army Corps began street fighting in Rzhev, and the 23rd Army Corps, having captured Olenin, continued the attack on Yeltsy.
On October 14, German troops went on the offensive, delivering the main blow on both banks of the Volga. Stubborn fighting broke out on the western outskirts of Kalinin. Soviet soldiers defended themselves steadfastly. Fighting alongside the fighters of the 5th Infantry Division were courses for junior lieutenants, students of the Higher Military Pedagogical Institute, fighters of fighter squads and militia squads. But the forces were too unequal. The battle formations of the Soviet troops were subjected to massive attacks by enemy aircraft. The Germans broke into the city itself. Units of the 5th Infantry Division, under pressure from superior enemy forces, retreated to the city center and took up defense along the river. Tmaka. Stubborn street fighting in the southern part of Kalinin continued all day and night. By the morning of October 15, the 5th Infantry Division was forced to abandon the city.
At the same time, units of the 256th division fought in the northern part of the city. But after the enemy reached the bridge across the Volga in the city center, there was a threat of German tanks breaking through to the rear of the units fighting on the left bank. As a result, the 934th Infantry Regiment retreated to the Nikolo-Malitsa line and further north, having the task, together with the approaching advanced units of the 8th Tank Brigade of Colonel P. A. Rotmistrov and the 16th Border Regiment, to prevent the enemy from breaking through along the Leningradskoye Highway to Torzhok. The 937th Infantry Regiment of the division took up defense along the eastern bank of the Tvertsa.
Thus, overcoming the stubborn resistance of our troops, the Germans captured the main part of the city. The loss of Kalinin was of strategic importance. German troops were able to develop the offensive using highways to Moscow, Bezhetsk and Leningrad.
To prevent a further breakthrough by the enemy, Konev assigned the 30th Army the task of launching a counterattack on the morning of October 15 and restoring the previous position. The main blow from the southeast was to be delivered by the 21st Tank Brigade, Colonel B.M. Skvortsova, in cooperation with the 5th Infantry Division. They were supposed to capture the railway station, reach the right bank of the Volga west of Kalinin and cut off the enemy group that had broken into the city. However, the 21st Tank Brigade received a different task from the Deputy Chief of the General Staff and therefore could not take part in the battles for the city of Kalinin on October 15. The rest of the army carried out scattered attacks on the enemy on October 15 and 16, which did not lead to success.
Thus, the Soviet troops were unable to solve the task of liberating Kalinin, but through their actions they detained the enemy and inflicted great damage on him. The Germans were forced to abandon the attack along the Moscow highway to Klin and were unable to develop an offensive along the Bezhetskoe highway.
Further fights. Soviet counterattacks
Having captured Kalinin, the German command turns the main forces of the 9th Army from the area of Staritsa and Rzhev in the direction of Torzhok and Vyshny Volochok. The 3rd Tank Group was also supposed to move from the Kalinin area to Torzhok and Vyshny Volochek. With these operations, the Germans planned to cut off the escape route to the east for the troops of the right wing of the Western and Northwestern Fronts, and, in cooperation with the 16th Army of Army Group North, encircle and destroy them.
The most important role in thwarting these plans was played by Vatutin’s task force. In just one day, the 8th Tank Brigade with the 46th Motorcycle Regiment of Major V.M. Fedorchenko completed a 250 km march and on October 14, advanced units entered the battle for Kalinin. To improve the leadership of all units operating northwest of Kalinin, General Vatutin subordinated them to the commander of the 8th Tank Brigade and ordered him to counterattack the enemy in the northern part of the city. During October 15, fierce fighting took place on the northwestern outskirts of Kalinin. Our troops counterattacked the enemy. But the Germans concentrated the main forces of the 1st Tank Division and the 900th Motorized Brigade in this direction and went on the offensive themselves. Both sides suffered heavy losses.
The Germans managed to break through the defenses of the 934th Infantry Regiment of the 256th Division and by the end of the day reached the Medny area. The commander of the 8th Tank Brigade was ordered to reach Polustov (8 km northwest of Medny) and prevent the enemy from further advancing to Torzhok. Colonel Rotmistrov assigned the 8th Tank Regiment to Major A.V. Egorov to carry out this task. By this time the regiment had one KB tank, five T-34s, six T-40s, six T-38s. On October 17, through counterattacks and fire from ambushes, the tank regiment destroyed 5 German tanks and two anti-tank guns. However, some of the tanks and motorcycles broke through and the Germans were only 20 km away from Torzhok.
The commander of the 8th Tank Brigade decides to withdraw the brigade to the Likhoslavl area. The situation was critical. Colonel General Konev, in a telegram addressed to Lieutenant General Vatutin, demanded: “Rotmistrov should be arrested and tried by a military tribunal for failure to comply with a combat order and unauthorized departure from the battlefield with the brigade.” Lieutenant General Vatutin, having assessed the situation and the position of the remaining formations of the task force, demanded from Rotmistrov: “Immediately, without wasting a single hour of time, return to Likhoslavl, from where, together with units of the 185th Infantry Division, quickly strike at Mednoye, destroy the enemy groups that have broken through, and capture Mednoye . It's time to put an end to cowardice!"
This harsh lesson benefited Rotmistrov. In subsequent battles, the 8th Tank Brigade acted very successfully, received the title of Guards, and Pavel Alekseevich Rotmistrov was awarded the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union. After the war, he was awarded the military rank of Chief Marshal of the Armored Forces.
Taking into account the fact that the Kalinin direction acquired independent strategic importance, the Headquarters on October 17 created the Kalinin Front, led by I. S. Konev, from the armies of the right wing of the Western Front (22nd, 29th and 30th armies) and the Vatutin group. Corps Commissar D. S. Leonov was appointed a member of the Military Council of the front, and Major General I. I. Ivanov was appointed chief of staff. In total, the front consisted of 16 rifle and two cavalry divisions, one motorized rifle and two tank brigades. Front troops operated in a zone of 220 km. On October 21, the 31st Army was included in the Kalinin Front. The front did not have its own aviation. It was supposed to be supported by aviation from the North-Western Front. Reliable defense and preventing enemy troops from breaking through to Moscow from the north-west, according to the Supreme Command Headquarters, was one of the main tasks of the troops of the Kalinin Front.
Meanwhile, the main forces of Vatutin’s operational group were leaving for the Kalinin-Torzhok area: the 183rd Infantry Division of Major General K.V. Komissarov, the 185th Infantry Division of Lieutenant Colonel K.A. Vindushev, the 46th Cavalry Division of Colonel S.V. Sokolov and the 54th Cavalry Division of Colonel I. S. Esaulov. In addition, the operational group included: the 133rd Infantry Division under Major General V. I. Shvetsov, the 119th Infantry Division under Major General A. I. Berezin, and a separate motorized rifle brigade under Brigade Commander A. N. Ryzhkov. In total, the task force had more than 20 thousand people, 200 guns and mortars and 20 serviceable tanks. To support the actions of the task force, 20 aircraft were allocated from the air forces of the North-Western Front.
Our troops surrounded the enemy group that had broken through along the Leningradskoye Highway from three sides. General Vatutin planned to encircle and destroy the enemy's 1st Tank Division and 900th Motorized Brigade. On October 18, the troops of the task force went on the offensive. Stubborn fighting took place for several days. The advance of Soviet troops from different directions was unexpected for the enemy. Units of Vatutin’s task force went to the rear of the enemy group that had broken through to Torzhok and cut it off from the city. By October 21, the Germans were defeated. The remnants of the defeated enemy troops fled to the right bank of the Volga. The threat of the Germans reaching the rear of the North-Western Front was eliminated.
Thus, the Germans were able to capture Kalinin, but were unable to use it as a springboard for a further offensive. German troops were unable to develop an offensive on Torzhok, Likhoslavl and Bezhetsk; the threat of encirclement of the 22nd and 29th armies, an enemy breakthrough to the rear of the North-Western Front and the encirclement of part of its forces was eliminated. During the fierce fighting, the Germans suffered heavy losses (especially the 1st Panzer Division and the 900th Motorized Brigade). The German command was forced to transfer additional forces to the Kalinin area.
The raid of the 21st Tank Brigade behind enemy lines had a certain role on the general situation in the Kalinin area. Having completed its formation in the Vladimir area on October 12, the brigade arrived by rail at the Zavidovo and Reshetnikovo stations on October 14, where on the night of October 15 it received an order from the commander of the 16th Army, Lieutenant General K.K. Rokossovsky. The order stated: “...immediately go on the offensive in the direction of Pushkino, Ivantsevo, Kalinin, with the goal of assisting our troops in destroying the Kalinin group of enemy troops by striking the enemy’s flank and rear.”
In Turginov, by order of the commander of the Western Front, the brigade was again reassigned to the 30th Army, whose commander clarified its mission. It consisted of, moving along the Volokolamsk highway, destroying enemy reserves in the area of the villages of Krivtsovo, Nikulino, Mamulino and, together with units of the 5th Infantry Division, capturing Kalinin.
On the morning of October 17, the brigade's tank regiment, consisting of 27 T-34 tanks and eight T-60 tanks, moved to Kalinin. Soviet tank crews met stubborn enemy resistance in Efremov and Pushkin. Along the entire route from Pushkin to Kalinin, the tanks were subjected to air strikes, and when approaching Troyanov and Kalinin they encountered resistance from anti-tank guns. As a result, only eight tanks managed to reach the southern outskirts of Kalinin, and only one T-34 tank (commander senior sergeant S. Kh. Gorobets) broke into the city and carried out a heroic raid on it, reaching the location of the troops of the 5th Infantry Division. The remaining surviving tanks reached the Pokrovskoye area on the Turginovskoe highway.
Thus, the Soviet tank crews caused some damage to the enemy and sowed panic. But the brigade could not complete the assigned task. The enemy had large tank and anti-tank forces in the Kalinin area. Our tankers were thrown into a breakthrough without the support of infantry and aviation. In addition, the brigade's offensive was not supported by active actions of other formations of the 30th Army. The 5th Division was regrouping its forces that day. In this battle, the brigade lost 11 T-34 tanks and 35 people killed and wounded. The regiment commander, Hero of the Soviet Union, Major M.A. Lukin, and the tank battalion commander, Hero of the Soviet Union, Captain M.P. Agibalov, were killed.
During the raid on Kalinin on October 17-18, a T-34 tank with serial number 4 from the 21st Tank Brigade rammed the StuG III self-propelled gun of Lieutenant Tachinski from the 660th battery of assault guns. Both combat vehicles were out of order. The crew was captured
As a result of these battles, on October 23, a directive was issued by the commander of Army Group Center, von Bock, to suspend the offensive through Kalinin. On October 24, the 23rd and 6th Army Corps of the 9th Army, reinforced by two motorized divisions of the 3rd Tank Group, launched an offensive from the Rzhev-Staritsa line to Torzhok. But the Germans were unable to overcome the resistance of the 22nd and 29th armies; at the end of October they were stopped at the line of the Bolshaya Kosha and Darkness rivers and went on the defensive at the achieved lines.
At the end of October - beginning of November 1941, the front in the Kalinin direction stabilized at the line exclusively of Selizharovo - the Bolshaya Kosha River - the Darkness River - the northern and eastern outskirts of the city of Kalinin - the western bank of the Volga Reservoir. The offensive actions of the troops of both sides in the defense zone of the Kalinin Front in November were not particularly successful. The enemy's planned attack on the flank and rear of the North-Western Front was thwarted, and the participation of the 9th Army in the attack on Moscow was ruled out. I. S. Konev noted: “Continuous and bloody battles, which, although they did not bring us tangible territorial successes, greatly exhausted the enemy and caused colossal damage to his equipment.”
The former commander of the 3rd Panzer Group, General G. Goth, noted: “The 3rd Panzer Group, due to a lack of fuel, was stretched between Vyazma and Kalinin and got stuck in this area, getting involved in heavy fighting near Kalinin, and was already experiencing a shortage of ammunition. Large in number, combat-ready enemy forces, concentrated along the left bank of the Volga and north-west of Rzhev, hung over its flank. Thus, the chances of bypassing Moscow from the north and south at the same time were very low.”
Results of the battle
Thus, the energetic attacks of the Red Army in the Kalinin area, although they did not allow the city to be recaptured, did disrupt the completion of the main task, for which the German 3rd Panzer Group was turning from Moscow to the north. Part of the forces of Army Group Center (13 divisions) was tied up in battles in the Kalinin direction, which did not allow them to be transferred to Moscow, where the decisive battles took place.
Soviet troops thwarted the attempts of German troops to make a breakthrough to Torzhok - Vyshny Volochek with the aim of encircling the troops of the right flank of the Western Front and reaching the enemy to the rear of the North-Western Front. The troops of the Kalinin Front took up an enveloping position in relation to the northern flank of Army Group Center.
However, the Soviet command made a number of mistakes in assessing the capabilities of the enemy and its troops. Thus, the command of the Kalinin Front made a mistake when, at a crucial moment in the defensive operation, they undertook the disbandment of the operational group of General Vatutin: part of the formations of the operational group were included in the 31st Army, some were transferred to the 29th and 30th armies and were transferred to the front reserve . It was a real strike force of five formations. The transfer of these formations to the armies disrupted smooth management. The opportunity for immediate action to liberate the city of Kalinin was missed. This led to the failure of the front troops to fulfill the plans of the Headquarters. The Kalinin Front failed to encircle the enemy group in Kalinin in October.
Preparation of defense in Moscow and on the approaches to the capital
Meanwhile, the German 3rd Panzer Group turned towards Kalinin and took the city on October 14. The main objective of this turn was to create a new “cauldron” with the forces of the 9th Army and the 3rd Tank Group on the northern flank of Army Group Center.
To cover the capital from the north-west, on October 17, on the basis of the troops of the right wing of the Western Front (22nd, 29th, 31st and 30th armies), the Kalinin Front (Colonel General I.S. Konev) was created.
Front troops, supported by aviation, attacked the Germans daily in the Kalinin area. As a result of these actions, on October 23, von Bock issued a directive to suspend the offensive through Kalinin. Thus, energetic attacks in the Kalinin area, although they did not lead to the capture of the city, did disrupt the completion of the main task, for which the 3rd Panzer Group was deployed from Moscow to the north.
General "Frost"
Mud on the roads 1941
On October 18-19, heavy rains began. In the combat log of the headquarters of Army Group Center on October 19 it was written: “ On the night of October 18-19, it rained along the entire front of the army group. The condition of the roads deteriorated so much that a severe crisis arose in the supply of troops with food, ammunition and especially fuel. The condition of the roads, weather and terrain conditions significantly delayed the progress of military operations. The main concern of all formations is the supply of material, technical means and food» .
Soviet commanders made similar complaints about the mud.
Only on November 4 did frost strike, the period of thaw ended, and transport stuck in the mud ceased to be a deterrent for the troops of both sides. The German command pulled up reserves and regrouped.
The defense of the approaches to Tula was entrusted to the 50th Army (Major General A. N. Ermakov, from November 22 - Lieutenant General I. V. Boldin). Under pressure from superior enemy forces, its small troops were forced to retreat in a northeast direction, to Tula. The formations of the 3rd Army retreated to the east, to Efremov.
The Kalinin defensive operation in the minds of many researchers and military history enthusiasts is often associated with events that took place after October 14, 1941, when the Germans captured Kalinin. At the same time, the battles for the city itself on October 13–14, due to their relative transience, are described extremely sparingly, and the outcome of these battles seems to be a foregone conclusion. Meanwhile, neither side thought so in those days. The fighting itself was distinguished by the high dynamism and fierceness of the confrontation.
Before the fight
On the morning of October 11, the advanced units of the German 41st Motorized Corps occupied Zubtsov, Kalinin Region, in the evening of the same day they captured Pogoreloe Gorodishche, and by 17:00 on October 12, Staritsa. Units and formations of the Red Army retreated under enemy pressure, putting up fierce resistance. The breakthrough of the defense of the Western Front, commanded by Army General G.K. Zhukov since October 10, in the Kalinin direction significantly complicated the already extremely difficult situation. The appearance of the enemy in the Kalinin area - the most important road junction - threatened to deeply envelop Moscow from the north and northeast and create a threat of encirclement of the troops of the left wing of the North-Western (NWF) and the right wing of the Western (WF) fronts.
A column of German staff vehicles in occupied Staritsa. The city was captured by the Germans on the evening of October 12.
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This development of the situation required an immediate reaction from the Soviet command, and it soon followed. In accordance with the considerations of the Military Council of the Western Front, voiced on October 13, the group of German troops that reached the Kalinin area was supposed to “to beat... with all reserve aviation of the High Command, aviation of the North-Western Front and partially with aviation of the right group of the Western Front”. In addition, according to Zhukov, units of the 5th Infantry Division traveling through Kalinin by rail were supposed to, together with units of the 30th Army of Major General V. A. Khomenko, prevent the capture of the city by German troops.
Already on October 12, the commander of the troops in the Kalinin direction, deputy commander of the Western Front, Colonel General I. S. Konev arrived in Kalinin.
On the same day, railway trains with units of the 5th Infantry Division (commander Lieutenant Colonel P.S. Telkov) began to arrive. The division had 1,964 active soldiers, 1,549 rifles, 7 heavy and 11 light machine guns, 14 guns of 76 and 122 mm caliber, and six anti-tank guns of 45 mm caliber. The rifle regiments (142nd, 336th and 190th) had an average of 430 people.
Scheme of the Kalinin defensive operation.
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On the morning of the next day, the commander of the 30th Army, Major General Khomenko, began operating in the city with an operational group whose main task was to collect all combat-ready units and organize the defense of Kalinin. Thus, the 5th Infantry Division was also subordinated to the army commander.
Judging by the documents, a depressing picture was revealed to the army command in the city. In a report drawn up on October 16, a member of the Military Council of the Army, Brigadier Commissar N.V. Abramov, noted the following:
“When the task force approached Kalinin, everyone fled from Kalinin in great panic in the direction of Klin - Moscow... The local authorities showed exceptional carelessness and irresponsibility. Instead of preparing the entire population for the defense of the city, everyone was confused and, in fact, no specific measures were taken to organize the defense of the city... On October 13, all the police, all the NKVD workers and the fire brigade fled from the city. There were up to 900 police in the city and several hundred NKVD workers... On October 13, the Military Council demanded that the head of the regional NKVD department return everyone to their places, but the NKVD chief only threw up his hands and said that he was now powerless to do anything.”
The last nervous hours spent in Kalinin before the battles with the advancing enemy were described in his memoirs by the commissar of the 5th Infantry Division P.V. Sevastyanov, who conveyed the words Konev said to the division commander Telkov:
“The front commander instructs your division to defend the city of Kalinin... You will defend with the strength that is now available... The rest of your units will arrive - good. If they don’t arrive, it doesn’t matter; it doesn’t relieve you of responsibility for the fate of the city. I don't have any reserves on hand right now. However, I will order that you be reinforced by a marching company and a detachment of students from the Kalinin Higher Military Pedagogical Institute. In addition, the regional committee secretary, Comrade Boytsov, will give you several militia units. Like this. Proceed to carry out the order. I wish you success."
An hour after this conversation, according to Sevastyanov, “The marching company actually came... armed with training rifles with drilled breechs... To some extent, our situation was eased by the regional party committee, which transferred several work detachments to the division. They significantly helped the 142nd Regiment in building defenses in the Migalovsky airfield area, on the immediate approaches to the city.”.
Soldiers of the fighter battalion of the Proletarsky district of the city of Kalinin, autumn 1941
However, the sources of replenishment of the ranks of the city’s defenders were not only workers of Kalinin enterprises. Already in July 1941, six fighter battalions were created in the city, united at the end of August into one consolidated regiment under the NKVD. The regiment consisted of a battalion of UNKVD employees - 300 people, a police battalion - 600 people and four district battalions of 200 people each. By October 12, no more than 500 people remained from the regiment’s personnel in Kalinin, consolidated into one battalion.
As for the weapons of the destroyer battalion, judging by the memories and surviving photographs, its fighters did not have “rifles with drilled breechs.” In their hands, Canadian Ross rifles from the First World War are visible, often found in militia units and fighter formations in 1941. There was also a supply of cartridges for them: a soldier who received such a “Canadian” rifle was entitled to 120 cartridges and two grenades.
Another source of strengthening the city’s defense was the courses for junior lieutenants, formally subordinate to the command of the Northwestern Front. According to the NWF combat log of October 13, “Courses for junior lieutenants of the code service and military-political NWF, in connection with the threat of an enemy attack on the city of Kalinin, are transferred to combat readiness and come under the command of the head of the garrison of Kalinin”.
The crew of a Soviet 152-mm howitzer in the battle near Kalinin.
Photo by B. Vdovenko
The “military-political NWF” meant students of the Higher Military Pedagogical Institute, a separate rifle battalion of which was also planned to be thrown into battle. The battalion was staffed by personnel from the 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th companies under the command of Colonel Zhabrov.
Apparently, companies of a separate battalion of political instructors were interspersed in the defense of the 142nd regiment (commanded by Lieutenant Colonel I. G. Shmakov) of the 5th Infantry Division, which by the morning of October 13 occupied the defense along the line (excluding) Migalovo - Derevnische - Nikolskoye - south -western outskirts of Kalinin. The advance detachment of the regiment (rifle company) was sent along the highway to Danilovskoye.
The forces of the destroyer battalion and militia were gathered here, to the anti-tank ditch in the area of Pervomaiskaya Grove. According to the recollections of NKVD employee N.A. Shushakov, who fought as part of the battalion, “In defense we had rifle units of the 142nd Regiment on the left flank, cadets of the Higher Military Pedagogical School on the right, and between them a fighter battalion. There were 290 battalion soldiers here. 82 people occupied positions at the railway bridge across the Volga, and 120 soldiers guarded objects in the Trans-Volga region.".
Soviet machine gunners in battle, autumn-winter 1941.
http://stat.mil.ru
The courses of junior lieutenants (commander Lieutenant Colonel N.I. Torbetsky) were sent to defend much further east, to the Bortnikovo region, and the 336th Infantry Regiment (commander Major I.N. Konovalov) generally “left the game” for a long time, since it The battalions went to cover the front many kilometers south of Kalinin, in the Troyanovo-Starkovo-Aksinkino area.
The 190th Rifle Regiment (commander Captain Ya. P. Snyatnov) and the 27th Artillery Regiment of the division were still on the way, and on the eve of the battles for the city, Divisional Commander Telkov, as best he could, motivated all his subordinates to hold the railway track at all costs and station until reinforcements arrive. As a result, the division occupied a defensive line, the width of which was 30 km and the depth of 1.5–2 km. With such a length of the strip, the tactical density turned out to be extremely low: 50–60 active bayonets, supported by 1–2 guns or mortars, per kilometer of front.
Regarding defensive structures on the probable direction of the enemy’s attack, a laconic phrase can be noted in the combat log of the 30th Army: “The defense was not prepared in engineering terms”.
German machine gunners at a halt. The autumn of 1941 was early, with frosts and snowfalls, which was an unpleasant surprise for the Germans.
http://waralbum.ru
Meanwhile, units of the 5th Infantry Division and all sorts of detachments assembled in the shortest possible time had to fight not with anyone, but with the elite Wehrmacht formation - the 1st Panzer Division from the 41st Motorized Corps. Its vanguard was already approaching Kalinin under the command of Major Franz Josef Eckinger, which included the 3rd tank company of the 1st battalion of the 1st tank regiment, the 1st battalion of the 113th motorized infantry regiment ( on armored personnel carriers), as well as artillery units: the 2nd division of the 73rd artillery regiment and two platoons of anti-aircraft guns.
This, of course, is significantly less than those “12 thousand people, 150 tanks and about 160 guns and mortars”, which were mentioned for a long time in Russian literature as the divisional forces that simultaneously attacked one Soviet regiment on October 13, but the mobile steel fist created by Dr. Eckinger was fully capable of solving local-level problems. Following from Staritsa, where the main forces of the division were located, in the direction of Kalinin, his group, judging by the entries in the divisional combat log, “struck the retreating enemy column, destroyed the enemy during the advance and captured over 500 vehicles”.
Trucks of Soviet rear columns that came under attack from the vanguard of the 1st Wehrmacht Panzer Division on the approaches to Kalinin. The photo was taken a little later - the road had already been cleared, the burned-out vehicle had been thrown into a ditch
Late in the evening of October 12, at 23:10 Berlin time, the vanguard reached the village of Danilovskoye, southwest of Kalinin. A little to the east, the tankers and motorized infantry were no longer awaiting transporters and rear guards...
Face to face
The first battles of the battle for Kalinin began at 09:00 on October 13. According to the combat log of the 30th Army, the reconnaissance detachment of the 142nd Infantry Regiment began a battle with the advanced enemy units west of the village of Danilovskoye. The enemy, bringing tanks into the battle, began to push back the Red Army soldiers, who began to fight back. After the crews of two anti-tank guns came to the aid of the Soviet soldiers, the Germans turned off the road and began an attack on the Migalovo airfield.
German photograph of the Migalovo airfield. When zoomed in, Soviet aircraft are clearly visible.
http://warfly.ru
However, Soviet aviation managed to leave it before the enemy approached, and the Germans, apparently, received only faulty aircraft. According to the combat log of the 6th Air Defense Fighter Corps, October 13 “The 495th IAP, consisting of five crews on I-16 aircraft, was relocated from the Migalovo airfield (Kalinin) to the Vlasyevo airfield”. A day earlier, on October 12, a squadron of the 27th IAP based in Migalovo flew to Klin.
It should be noted that on October 13, the Red Army Air Force managed to win a landmark victory. Soviet fighters - probably these were pilots of the 180th IAP - shot down the liaison "Storch", which was controlled by the chief of staff of the 8th Air Corps, Colonel Rudolf Meister, and as a passenger the commander of the 36th motorized division Lieutenant General Otto-Ernst Ottenbacher (Gen.Lt. Otto-Ernst Ottenbacher). Both survived, but received severe burns, requiring urgent evacuation to Germany. As a result, just two days later the division came under the command of General Hans Gollnick (Gen.d.Inf. Hans Gollnick).
German soldiers near the I-16 fighter, abandoned, judging by the signature on the back, at the Migalovo airfield
Traditionally, when describing the defense of Kalinin, it is customary to refer to the high activity of German aviation. Indeed, almost all documents relating to the defense of the city contain references to heavy bombing and the fires they caused. At the same time, the actions of Soviet bombers remain in the shadows, which is not entirely fair. For example, all day on October 13, DB-3Fs of the 42nd Long-Range Bomber Regiment of the 133rd Air Division literally hunted supply columns of the 1st Tank Division moving along the Staritsa-Kalinin highway.
On one of the missions southwest of Kalinin, a group of regiment bombers was discovered and attacked by a pair of Messerschmitt Bf 109F-2s from group I./JG 52. In a Soviet study on the history of long-range aviation, this air battle is described as follows:
“Fighters attacked the plane of wingman Lieutenant B. Nehai. Without performing the maneuver, the Nazis decided to attack at close range. At the command of the lower machine gunner, Nekhai pressed the steering wheel away from himself, and the fighter found himself in the fire zone. A series of tracer bullets passed in front of its cockpit, the fighter lifted its nose and found itself above a group of bombers. Machine gun fire followed simultaneously from three aircraft. The enemy vehicle burst into flames."
According to the combat log of the 52nd Fighter Squadron, Non-Commissioned Officer Josef Maier of 1./JG 52 Squadron was the first casualty of I./JG 52 on the Eastern Front. In an air battle with Russian bombers 6 km southwest of Kalinin, he was shot down and killed. This loss once again indicated that Soviet aircraft were not easy prey at all, and attempts by Luftwaffe fighter aircraft to suppress their activity sometimes ended in failure.
Self-propelled gun 15 cm sIG 33 Sfl. auf Pz.KpfW.I Ausf B of the 1st Tank Division, Kalinin area, October 1941.
Horst Riebenstahl. The 1st Panzer Division. A Pictorial History 1935–1945. West Chester, 1986
For the German units that rushed forward, such an impact of Soviet bomber aircraft on the rear was extremely dangerous. As noted in the combat log of the 1st Panzer Division, “due to the poor condition of the roads and the fuel situation, the division is scattered over a distance of 150 km”. The journal of the 3rd Panzer Group contains an entry about “increased activity of enemy aircraft over Kalinin”.
However, despite all these difficulties, the enemy, as noted in the documents of the Soviet 30th Army, occupied Migalovo, Danilovskoye by 12:30, brought up artillery and from 15:30 began artillery and mortar shelling of the railway bridge and the southwestern outskirts of Kalinin.
After capturing the Migalovo airfield, units of the 1st Tank Division continued their offensive along the Staritskoye Highway, overcoming the resistance of the defenders. In the battle near Pervomaiskaya Grove, the commander of the extermination battalion, senior lieutenant of the NKVD border troops G. T. Dolgoruk and commissar A. F. Patkevich were killed. For some time, the attacks of the dismounted German infantry were held back by the dense fire of heavy machine guns of the 142nd regiment (the tanks stopped at the anti-tank ditch, supporting their infantry with fire), but later the attackers managed to break through to the railway embankment.
German aerial photograph of the southwestern part of Kalinin. At the top right, the railway track and the bridge over the Volga are clearly visible. The forest below is Pervomaiskaya Grove, the road above it is Staritskoye Highway.
http://warfly.ru
Here they again met stubborn resistance. The fierceness of the battle for the embankment was also explained by the fact that the 190th Infantry and 27th Artillery Regiments of the 5th Infantry Division were already hurrying to the city along the railway itself. Commissioner Sevastyanov recalled:
“The Germans could not advance a single step further. They lay down on one side of the embankment, we lay on the other, throwing grenades. In this case, of course, the rare grenade did not find its target, but by some miracle the rails were not damaged. We held on like this for several hours, waiting any minute for the train to appear. Imagine our joy when the train finally appeared. It was moving at full speed under heavy fire and thundered right over our heads towards the station.”
Only the 190th Infantry Regiment was able to break through the embankment and unload at the station. The 27th Artillery Regiment came across a section of the route that had already been destroyed as a result of an air raid, and joined the division in marching order much later. One can imagine how difficult it was for the infantry to fight for the city with virtually no field artillery support.
From the evening of October 13, a new player gradually began to be drawn into the battles for the city from the Soviet side: the first units of the 256th Infantry Division (commander Major General S.G. Goryachev) arrived in Kalinin. In the combat log of the 30th Army there is a laconic entry: “18:45, part of the 256th SD began to come under the army’s command - one company arrived.”. However, by 23:45 the 934th Infantry Regiment, consisting of two battalions, had already arrived. Judging by the entries in the journal of the 30th Army, he was immediately involved in plugging the gap in the defense of the Soviet troops in the Nikolo-Malitsa - Cherkasovo sector, where the Germans had previously crossed the battalion-sized forces to the northern bank of the Volga and created a bridgehead for an attack on the northwestern Part of city. Also, battalion-by-battalion, the 937th Infantry Regiment of Goryachev’s division, which arrived in Kalinin, concentrated in the Kalinin city garden as a reserve.
From the enemy side, new actors were also gradually arriving - units of the 900th motorized training brigade of the Wehrmacht advanced in the northern part of the city to the area of Doroshikha station, repelling counterattacks of Soviet units.
German anti-aircraft gunners at the railway bridge across the Volga in Kalinin.
http://waralbum.ru
The main result of the fighting on October 13 for the Germans was the capture at 22:55 of an intact railway bridge across the Volga, carried out, according to the compilers of the next report in the combat log of the 1st Panzer Division, in “a stubborn struggle against a well-fortified and firmly held enemy”. The German units were unable to advance further, since division commander Telkov brought the 336th Infantry Regiment into battle, which finally returned to the city after standing in a remote area.
At night, the forces of the 1st Panzer Division already available to the Germans were joined by a motorcycle battalion and tank companies of the 1st Tank Regiment, and before dawn the next day - the 1st Battalion of the 1st Motorized Infantry Regiment, the 101st Flamethrower Tank Battalion, a significant part artillery of the 73rd Artillery Regiment, not counting sappers and anti-tank artillery. The steel colossus of a full-fledged divisional combat group now loomed over the soldiers of the Soviet 5th Rifle Division.
In the combat log of the 3rd Panzer Group, the entries from October 13 end with a description of the weather and a downright lyrical digression: “Clear autumn weather, frost, at lunchtime the streets are softly illuminated by the sun. The population seems helpful and friendly. The urban area is more civilized than seen before.". However, the events of the next day dispelled these good moods...
The events of the next day, October 14, 1941, are described in the second part of the article.
Sources and literature:
- NARA. T 313. R 231.
- NARA. T 315. R 26.
- Bochkarev P. P., Parygin N. I. Years in the fiery sky. - M.: Voenizdat, 1991.
- On the right flank of the Moscow Battle. - Tver: Moscow worker, 1991.
- The hidden truth of war: 1941. Unknown documents. - M.: Russian book, 1992.
- Khetchikov M.D. Defensive and offensive operations carried out in 1941 on Tver soil: working materials for military historical work. - Tver: Communication company, 2010.
- Riebenstahl H. The 1st Panzer Division. A Pictorial History 1935–1945. - West Chester, 1986.
- http://warfly.ru.
- http://www.jg52.net.
- https://pamyat-naroda.ru.
