According to the demographic forecast of Rosstat, natural population decline will increase and from 2025 will exceed 400 thousand people annually; a slowdown in population decline is predicted only closer to the 2030s. International migration (according to the forecast, the influx of migrants will be less than 300 thousand people per year) in the future will not be able to compensate for the population decline.

In December 2017, the head of the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection, Maxim Topilin, said that the birth rate in Russia is insufficient to ensure population growth, and in the coming years the situation will only worsen, as the number of women of childbearing age in the country will decrease by a quarter or even more.

“The number of women of reproductive age will decrease by 28% by 2032 or 2035.” Unfortunately, it is not possible to assume that in this situation the absolute number of births will remain at the level of 1.8-1.9 million,” said Topilin.

The birth rate in the Russian Federation in 2017 was the lowest in the last 10 years

(Video: RBC TV channel)

Ramilya Khasanova, a researcher at the Institute of Social Analysis and Forecasting at RANEPA, explained to RBC that the birth rate will decline in the next 15 years due to the fact that most current mothers were born in the 1990s, when the birth rate was low.

“The number of women - potential mothers is small, and therefore the number of births is also falling,” the expert explained.

Earlier, the head of the Ministry of Economic Development, Maxim Oreshkin, classified the demographic situation in Russia as one. The minister noted that a sharp reduction in the size of the working-age population will be led by the fact that Russians born at the very end of the 1990s, when the maximum decline in the birth rate was recorded in its composition, are beginning to be taken into account.

“The generation is very small, so the negative dynamics in terms of the working-age population will continue. The situation from a demographic point of view is one of the most difficult in the world: we will lose approximately 800 thousand people of working age every year due to the demographic structure,” Oreshkin said.

In response to the challenge of low birth rates, the president talks about “rebooting” the country’s demographic policy. From January 1, two new monthly benefits appeared in Russia. At the birth of the first child and until he reaches one and a half years of age, families are provided with a monthly payment equal to the regional subsistence minimum per child (on average in 2018 it is 10.5 thousand rubles). From maternity capital funds (the program has been extended until the end of 2021), families can receive monthly payments upon the birth of a second child. Both payments are provided to families whose average per capita income does not exceed 1.5 times the regional subsistence level. In addition, for families with a second and third child, a special program for subsidizing mortgage rates (the state will cover the cost of servicing a mortgage in excess of 6% per annum).

Khasanova assessed the measures taken by the state as positive. “Maternity capital influenced a slight increase in the number of third and second births. It will increase the opportunity for young families to rise out of poverty. The benefit adopted for the first child will most likely not be such an effective way to increase the number of births, but it will affect the birth calendar: those who were planning to give birth in the next few years will hurry up,” she said.

The Russian labor market is losing its attractiveness for migrants; without them, it will not be possible to make up for the decline in the country’s working-age population, experts from the Center for Strategic Research (CSR) warn in the report “Migration Policy: Diagnosis, Challenges, Proposals,” published on January 26. The total decline in the working-age population by 2030 will range from 11 million to 13 million people, experts say. There are no reserves for the growth of internal migration and to attract foreign labor, according to experts, new migration policy measures are needed - work visas, lottery systems similar to the American Green Card, as well as contracts for the integration of migrants.

MOSCOW, January 31— RIA Novosti, Igor Karmazin. According to Rosstat, the birth rate in Russia has fallen to a ten-year low. For the first time in recent years, the country has recorded a natural population decline. RIA Novosti looked into why this happened and what to expect in the coming years.

Back to the 1990s

According to a Rosstat report, 1.69 million children were born in Russia in 2017. This is 203 thousand or 10.7% less than a year earlier. According to this indicator, 2017 turned out to be the worst year in ten years - the last time there were fewer newborns in Russia was only in 2007. A decline in the birth rate is observed in all regions of Russia, except Chechnya. There were active births there, at the 2016 level - 29,890 people. The maximum drop was in the Nenets Autonomous Okrug (minus 16.5%), followed by Chuvashia (minus 15%).

But there are also reasons for optimism. Mortality in Russia also decreased markedly last year: 1.824 million people died in the country over the year. This is 63 thousand less than in 2016—the lowest figure in the 21st century. Infant mortality has also decreased significantly. In 2016, 6 children died per 1,000 births, in 2017 - 5.5.

However, all this did not help to contain the natural population growth. A natural decline was recorded - minus 134.4 thousand people. In 2016 it was plus 5.4 thousand. But the total population of Russia nevertheless increased due to the migration influx. During the year, the country received 200 thousand new arrivals. The main donor countries were Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine.

Such results did not come as a surprise to experts. Valery Elizarov, scientific director of the Laboratory of Population Economics and Demography at the Faculty of Economics of Moscow State University, says that demographic difficulties are inevitable for at least the next 15 years. He cites the socio-economic situation of the 1990s as the main reason.

“The birth rate depends on the number of young women of reproductive age. Last year, the smallest generation in Russia—those born in 1999—turned 18. Throughout the second half of the 1990s and the first half of the 2000s, the birth rate was extremely low. The increase only began after 2006 we had absolutely wild swings associated with socio-economic upheavals. The second half of the 1980s - 1986-1987 - 2.5 million births! Then the decline - by the mid-1990s it was 1.3-1. 4 million births per year. Finally, 1.2 million in 1999,” notes Elizarov.

The expert emphasizes that now the generation of those born during the demographic crisis is approaching the age of childbearing. “Children are now most often given birth at the age of 25-26. Those born in 1992-1993 have approached this milestone, and at that time a decline was already recorded. Now you yourself understand that this is not the end,” says Elizarov.

Wivesmen

At the same time, the explanation of the situation is not limited to the problems of the 1990s. Yes, there are fewer women, but each individual woman gives birth less. The very approach of citizens to building a family has changed, and priorities have shifted. According to the same Rosstat, the average age of a Russian mother is 26 years. This is five years more than in the 1990s. During this time, the interval between the birth of the first and second child in the family also almost doubled. In the 1990s there was an average of three years, and in 2017 it was already 5.6 years. Thus, the birth of the second and subsequent children was pushed back beyond the mother’s 30th birthday.

Professor of the Department of Labor and Social Policy at the Institute of Public Service and Management (IGSU) RANEPA Alexander Shcherbakov points out that the reason should also be sought in the low standard of living and the desire to improve the well-being of the family through work and one’s own labor. In addition, Russian women in general now have much more career ambitions. “We have a paradoxical situation: women think about their gender destiny only secondarily. They more share the male view of life, where career comes first. And modern men are more and more like women. They often do not set themselves the task of financially providing for their family ", warns Shcherbakov.

The country's authorities understand that the situation is very serious and are taking measures. Thus, in November 2017, Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke about a “reset” of the country’s demographic policy. In December, the head of state signed a law on monthly payments to families after the birth of their first child. On average, the amount in 2018 will be, depending on the region, 10,523 rubles, in 2019 - 10,836 rubles, in 2020 - 11,143 rubles. The payment is targeted; the income of each family is taken into account when calculating. The right to receive money is granted to those whose average income per family member does not exceed one and a half times the subsistence level.

In addition, in December, the president signed a law extending the maternity capital program until the end of 2021. At the birth of a second and third child, Russian citizens are entitled to a payment. Its size in 2017 is 453,026 rubles.

They don't want sex

Solving economic issues, however, is not a panacea. Just look at global trends. According to the UN, of the 21 countries with the highest birth rates, 19 are in Africa. All European countries belong to the countries with the lowest birth rates, although it is clear that the economic situation there is much better than on the African continent.

Sexologist and head of the Center for Sexual Health Anna Koteneva believes that the decline in the birth rate is influenced by specific modern morality. “Too much unnecessary information, excessive fuss. Modern man lives according to the principle “here and now”, “after me there’s a flood.” Everyone wants to enjoy life, responsibility, including for children, is perceived as a burden. Selfishness, individualism, independence rule , even infantilism,” she says.

Koteneva adds that current technologies seem to open up limitless opportunities for communication; many moral prohibitions have been lifted. "But the modern generation does not know how to communicate, often does not want it. The value of physiological intimacy has decreased. Previously, sex for young people was something forbidden, mysterious, desirable. Now it is available, but it has become on a par with other pleasures, entertainment, intimate the relationship has become devalued,” says the sexologist.

Be that as it may, forecasts for the near future are not very optimistic. Rosstat warns: natural population decline is expected every year until 2035, and the peak will occur in 2025-2028. This trend will be balanced by migration growth, but the population of Russia, demographers believe, will still decline during this period.

demographic birth rate mortality population

Since the change in the mortality rate in Russia was the most dramatic and has been widely studied, there are several different hypotheses in this regard:

Here is a list of the most popular ones:

1. Alcohol consumption

2. Environmental problems

3. Poverty and poor nutrition

4. The collapse of the healthcare system

5. Reaction to strong changes in social conditions, stress

6. Compensation after a period of low mortality in the second half of the eighties

Let's look at some of them. Studies have shown that the health care system plays a fairly important role, but still not a decisive one. This is explained by the fact that most causes of death in our time are determined not by the quality of the healthcare system, but by self-preservation behavior.

Environmental problems can be ruled out immediately - the decline in production only caused an improvement in the environmental situation.

Alcohol consumption can play a fairly important role, since the percentage of deaths from alcohol poisoning, as well as its consumption, has increased during the reforms. But drunkenness cannot be considered as a cause - it is only a consequence of other factors, mainly spiritual.

Also, the increase in mortality may be caused by the compensation effect after the anti-alcohol campaign - that is, those who were supposed to die from alcohol poisoning in the second half of the eighties began to die only now, after the anti-alcohol measures of that time were lifted.

The dominant point of view is that one of the main reasons for our troubles is the worsening economic situation: for the nation to get healthier, it is necessary to improve the standard of living. However, after analyzing the dynamics of mortality over 25 years (since the mid-70s), one can find that none of the economic indicators explains its trajectory.

A study conducted in the mid-90s in Russia showed that, from a medical point of view, people began to lead a healthier lifestyle, while mortality only increased.

In his book “Demographic Catastrophe in Russia: Causes, Mechanism, Ways to Overcome,” Doctor of Medical Sciences I. Gundarov presented the results of research into the causes of increased mortality in Russia.

Reasons for the decline in fertility

As was written above, when considering the birth rate in Russia, we can trace not one, but two problems. The first is a gradual decline in the birth rate throughout the entire period under review. The second is the sharp decline in the birth rate that began in 1987 and continues to this day.

It is extremely important to note that graph 1 exactly repeats the graph of the third and fourth phases of the demographic transition in its pessimistic second version.

According to the theory of demographic transition, all countries and peoples go through the same stages in their demographic history, each of which corresponds to a certain type of population reproduction.

If we consider the processes taking place in Russia today from the point of view of the theory of demographic transition, then we can assume that today's depopulation is not caused by some external circumstances - for example, reforms, but is a natural process occurring not only in Russia, but also in many other developed countries .

If we compare the birth rate schedule in Russia with the demographic transition schedule, then phase III began at the end of the 19th century, and phase IV - in 1987. Thus, the theory of demographic transition explains both of the above problems.

And although this theory does not say what follows the fourth phase, one can assume two options for the further development of events - either the situation will stabilize after some time (still at an insufficient level), or, what is more likely, it will worsen further.

Politicians, ordinary people, and even many researchers are of the opinion that any woman has a natural desire to have many children, and only the lack of conditions prevents her from realizing this desire, and as soon as the necessary conditions are created, the birth rate will immediately increase. This position is called the “interference paradigm.” Research shows that this approach is completely wrong. The real reason for the low birth rate is not that certain factors prevent a woman from having many children. The 1994 micro-census asked about the desired number of children under ideal conditions, and this number was 1.9 children, which is not enough even for simple population reproduction. That is, even if all interfering factors are eliminated and ideal conditions for the birth of children are provided, the problem of low fertility will not be solved. Consequently, the main reason for the decline in the birth rate should be sought not in some external factors, such as prosperity or confidence in the future, but in culture and public consciousness.

There is widespread public opinion that the fall in income levels as a result of reforms is the main reason for the fall in the birth rate, and the economic factor is considered to be of decisive importance. Unfortunately, this opinion is shared even in the highest circles of power. However, the results of studies conducted both in Russia and in a number of European capitals showed an inverse relationship between the birth rate and the level of well-being. That is, in poor families the birth rate was higher than in rich ones. Moreover, studies have shown that not only the actual, but also the planned number of children in poor families was greater. From this we can conclude that it was not the fall in income levels that caused the birth crisis in Russia.

Meanwhile, one should not discount the economic factor altogether, since it undoubtedly has a certain significance. It is known that through economic measures - increasing benefits, etc., it is possible to increase the birth rate, but, unfortunately, only to the level of the desired number of children in the family, which, for example, today in Russia is 1.9 children per family, that is, below the level of simple reproduction population. Therefore, the question is to raise precisely the level of the desired number of children in the family, and here economic measures are powerless.

Based on numerous studies of reproductive behavior in Russia and abroad, data have been obtained that allows us to believe with great confidence that it is cultural factors that play a decisive role in reducing the birth rate.

Types of population reproduction, or phases of demographic transition, strictly depend on the mode of production in society. Phases I and II correspond to the agricultural mode of production, phase III - industrial, and phase IV - post-industrial.

This is easy to explain - in an agrarian society, children were necessary for survival, as they were workers, helpers, and protectors. The well-being of a family directly depended on the number of children. Moreover, mortality in the agricultural era was very high, and where mortality is high, birth rates are usually high.

In the industrial era, the family ceases to be a production unit; children are no longer necessary for survival, but for procreation and satisfying the emotional needs of parents. Therefore, the desired number of children in the industrial era is 1-3 children per family, and this number gradually decreases, initially remaining sufficient for simple population reproduction, and even a small increase.

But then, as civilization develops, mass small families become increasingly common. This is primarily due to the fact that the entire way of life of a person in our era is associated with non-family activities, and the role of the family in the life of an individual is gradually decreasing, which will be discussed in the next section.

There are different forms of family. The family was originally represented by an expanded form, and this form was most common for thousands of years. An extended family consists of several nuclear families, and a nuclear family is a family consisting only of parents and their children.

But with the advent of industrialization and urbanization, there has been a shift from the “traditional” family to the “modern” family, from the extended family to the nuclear family. Such a transition has a negative impact on the birth rate, since the traditional family is characterized by large families, early and long marriages and childbearing periods, and a ban on abortion and divorce.

Initially, the institutions of education, health care, economics and others were intra-family, but with the process of industrialization, these institutions gradually began to leave the family and became extra-family.

A. Antonov and S. Sorokin in the book “The Fate of the Family in Russia in the 21st Century” name the following differences between an industrial family and an agricultural one:

1. The collapse of the family economy, the separation of home and work, non-family employment of parents in the wage labor system with individual wages, the disappearance of joint activities of parents and children everywhere except for farming families, the transition to family-domestic self-service, family-centrism is replaced by egocentrism, the well-being of the family begins to consist of successes of individual family members.

2. In urban families, who make up the majority, the connection with the land is disrupted, the essence of the family home is sharply transformed, the functions of consumption, hygiene and the implementation of physiological processes prevail, psychological unity with the microenvironment is replaced by disengagement, the emphasis is on separation from neighbors, ethnic alienation and T.

3. In the industrial family, kinship is separated from the economic affairs of the family, maximizing individual benefits and economic efficiency outweigh the value of kinship ties.

4. The replacement of a centralized family-kinship system of an extended type with decentralized nuclear families weakened intergenerational ties and the authority of elders, as well as the instructions of parents and kinship regarding the choice of a spouse, taking into account the property status (“open” system of marriage choice while maintaining material interests and the right of inheritance), transition from prohibiting divorces to allowing them, but within the framework of difficult procedures, mainly on the initiative of the husband.

5. Destruction of the system of high birth rate norms in connection with successes in controlling mortality and removing the taboo on preventing and terminating pregnancy, eliminating the need for full use of the reproductive period and hence, weakening the norms of lifelong and early marriage, lifelong childbearing and marriage, softening the norms of sexual behavior outside of marriage and before marriage.

The individualistic values ​​of modern capitalism ran counter to collectivist, family values, and the institution of the family began to gradually die out.

According to the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, today the world is experiencing another demographic transition, which is characterized by an increase in human life expectancy and a decrease in the birth rate. World fertility rate 1950-1955. was five births per woman, in 2010-2015. - twice smaller. The number of countries in which this coefficient is 2.1 is growing. This is the so-called replacement level, at which a generation of parents gives birth to an equivalent number of children to replace them. In 1975-1980, only 21% of the world population had a birth rate at this level, in 2010-2015 - already 46%. According to UN forecasts, already between 2025 and 2030, two thirds of the world's population will live in countries in which the birth rate will fall below replacement level.

Why is the birth rate declining?

Scientists have concluded that the decline in the birth rate is not associated with a low standard of living. On the contrary, according to statistics, higher birth rates are observed in developing countries than in developed countries. That is, the poorer the country, the more children are born there. This was established back in the 19th century, when the French demographer Jacques Bertillon conducted a study of the birth rate in the districts of Paris, Berlin and Vienna and found that fewer children were born in wealthier families.

The American analytical company Stratfor writes that there are now too many elderly dependents in the world and not enough working population. Therefore, a decrease in the birth rate can lead to negative consequences in the global economy. The company identifies the following reasons for the decline in the birth rate: changes in religious values, the emancipation of women, an increase in their employment, higher costs of child care and education.

A 2017 report by the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs noted that the decline in the overall fertility rate is due to the aging of the world's population. Demographers also attribute the decline to a reduction in child mortality, high access to modern contraception and the increased desire of women to postpone having children in order to get an education and build a career.

American anthropologists led by Paul Hooper in a 2016 article they write that the listed factors exist, but the real reason for the decline in the birth rate is competition for high social status and the possession of prestigious things. The study's authors note that the sharpest decline in fertility occurs in countries with market economies, where there is competition for jobs and a surplus of consumer goods. Anthropologists have argued this hypothesis using the example of the Tsimane tribe living in northern Bolivia. The average Tsimane family has nine children, but for members who have moved to cities closer to the Spanish-speaking population, the average number of children per family drops to three.

Aminat Magomedova, Candidate of Economic Sciences, Associate Professor of the Department of Population, Faculty of Economics, Moscow State University, told AiF.ru about what other reasons exist for the decline in the birth rate. Lomonosov. “There are different approaches to explaining the historical evolution of fertility. Within the framework of the theory of demographic transition, a decrease in fertility is an element of the global demographic process of transition to a more economical reproduction regime. The concept of demographic homeostasis examines the dynamics of fertility in connection with mortality rates. The higher the mortality rate in a society, the more children it takes to even reproduce itself. And as the mortality rate decreases, the birth rate also decreases,” says Magomedova.

One approach is the utility concept, which explains the birth of children by their utility. “Within the framework of the economic utility of children, a change in the direction of transfer of benefits “from children to parents” to “from parents to children” is considered. If earlier children were beneficial as a labor force, it was believed that the more children, the stronger the family economically, but now we understand that it is children who require maximum expenses, time, effort, and energy. There is also an explanation in terms of psychological usefulness. It is believed that even one child can satisfy the psychological need for children in modern society. To do this, you don’t need to have them in large quantities,” says the expert.

Magomedova also notes that the decline in the birth rate is associated with the coming to the forefront of personal interests, the individualization of the sphere of fertility, and the lesser influence of traditions and norms on the decision to have a child. An increase in the share of educated women and an increase in women's employment in post-industrial society lead to postponing the birth of children, and sometimes to refusal to have them.

Let's now look at the myths about the reasons for the decline in the birth rate and point out the real reason for this phenomenon.

Myth one: Declining birth rates are a natural phenomenon and should be accepted as normal. A nuance is important here: yes, the phenomenon is natural for sociogenesis (more on this later), but it does not follow from this that it should be recognized as the norm. Here's a quick tip: diseases are a natural phenomenon, aren't they? But this does not mean that they should be considered the norm - a completely healthy person should be the norm, even if he exists only in theory. Of course, modern postmodernism seeks to philosophically blur the concept of the norm, reaching the point of “illness is simply a different way of existence” (J. Lacan), and liberal ideology requires that everything that does not cause direct physical harm to another individual be considered normal, but let’s not digress.

The essence of the myth: all Europeans are like this - they don’t want to give birth, but are we slurping cabbage soup with bast shoes? There is no need to worry, we will die for the company!

From the fact that a decrease in the birth rate in modern society relative to a peasant society is natural, it does not in any way follow that a decrease below the replacement level should be considered the norm. Decreasing is normal, but not as much! Once again I recommend Thilo Sarrazin’s book “Germany: Self-Liquidation”.

Myth two- reducing the issue to economics: “if they have enough money to raise children, they will have them.” The myth is easily refuted by the fact that in Europe, which was very prosperous in material terms until recently, they do not want to give birth. Social payments are also not a solution to the problem; they do not increase the number of desired children in a family. There is a positive effect: women statistically begin to give birth a little earlier, but for this the benefits must be quite large. The reason is simple: in any case, maintaining a child costs more than the amount of social benefits, and after giving birth, a woman automatically lags behind in career growth and in most cases loses her qualifications somewhat, which affects future earnings. Well, to be honest, caring for a baby, which is required around the clock, is much harder work than a regular job “from 9 to 18,” especially if not in production, but simply in the office (just don’t fall into postmodernism like “both spouses must take maternity leave” - this will not solve problems with the family’s finances, and a man is not evolutionarily “tailored” to caring for babies, his role comes later). In other words, in order for social benefits to be guaranteed to increase the birth rate, they must at least be equal to the average salary in the country, which no state budget can support.

In addition, the payment of cash benefits actually stimulates the birth rate - but precisely among the marginal part of the population, for whom money is, right now, more important than the future of their children. I will quote Vladimir Mukomel, a leading researcher at the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences: “Both foreign and Soviet experience demonstrates that attempts to materially stimulate the birth rate evoke a response either from marginal groups of the population or from representatives of ethnic groups prone to having many children.”

I note that against the backdrop of this myth, there are sometimes calls for a kind of reduction of sociogenesis - they say, since the number of children decreases with an increase in the standard of living, then let's go back to the pampas! Only rural subsistence farming, only hardcore! Usually accompanied by excessive religiosity. Due to the obvious insanity of the concept, we will not analyze it: after all, if its propagandists are so against progress for the sake of poverty, then why are they writing such appeals on a computer on the Internet?

Myth three: declaring migration a panacea for all ills. I will quote Igor Beloborodov, director of the Center for Demographic Research: “Replacement migration carries with it a number of social risks that are already being felt today... Let’s list just a few of them: disruption of the ethno-demographic balance; interethnic conflicts; increase in drug addiction; ethnic crime; deterioration of the sanitary and epidemiological situation; threat of loss of strategic territories, etc.”

To be honest, I don’t see the need to examine this issue in detail; a violation of the ethno-demographic balance is quite enough. And if someone declares that there is nothing wrong with this - all people are equal, etc., then he should honestly, “head-on”, ask the question, without arguing with the formal equality of rights, etc. different peoples: WHY are you promoting a position that inevitably violates the ethno-demographic balance of countries precisely in the direction of decreasing the relative number of representatives of the white race? Using the example of Europe as an example, everything is very clear.

Myth four: Improving the quality of life is much more important than quantitative population growth. The same connection to money as in myth No. 2, but “from the other side”: they say, the quality of children depends only on the amount of money invested, you need to save! I will quote I. Beloborodov once again: “it is often assumed that quality parameters can have a positive connotation only when quantitative indicators decrease. ... The main motive for discussions about the priority of quality over quantity, as a rule, is the desire to expediently spend state and family funds.”

And again: no one argues with the fact that quality of life is an important parameter, but this does not mean that for this reason it is permissible to reduce the birth rate below the level of self-reproduction of the nation - obviously, right? I would like to take this opportunity to note that since fertility is important Total population, then appropriate social guarantees are required for Total population, a guaranteed decent standard of living, and not abstract economic indicators such as GDP, etc.

Fifth myth: family crisis. Let me clarify: it is a fact that there is a crisis in family relationships. And it negatively affects fertility (we’ll look at it in more detail in the next article). However, the myth is precisely what is declared overriding importance this factor. There is an influence, but not critical: modern life makes it possible to raise children alone (which, of course, is bad - but possible), and even more so with the support of family.

Usually this myth is pushed by the guardians of condo-patriarchal values.

Perhaps, the option “family planning” can indirectly be attributed to the same myth (and to the same category of its adherents): they say, sex education is unacceptable, it corrupts children, teaches them to use contraception instead of getting married as virgins and giving birth, giving birth, giving birth. Here we must distinguish the need for adequate sexual information in school (and along with the ethics of intergender and family relationships, etc.) from what liberals mean by this: propaganda of the normality of homosexuality, etc., not to mention the approach to sex only as physiology - I think everyone is aware, and we won’t get distracted. The difference is similar to the difference between the Soviet commission for juvenile affairs and modern juvenile justice.

Sixth myth- about the “decline of spirituality”, i.e. Previously, people were “highly spiritual” and gave birth, but now they have become materialistic and therefore do not want to give birth, but take care of themselves. Is it just the old days, when children were born like on an assembly line, half died in childhood, and those who lived to be forty years old were essentially old, since the average life expectancy at the end of the 19th century in Russia was just over 30 years.

In this case, the standard logical error posthocnonpropterhoc is obvious: yes, a couple of centuries ago people were much more religious, but the high birth rate was also due to the lack of normal contraception, very early marriages, etc. Now you can compare the birth rate in very religious countries, and the birth rate in them will be quite clearly different: religious factors can delay, but not stop, the development of society.

Natural cause- this is de-peasantization, i.e. There is a process of reducing the rural population in cultivated areas. I will quote A.N. Sevastyanov: “if at the beginning of the century the employed population of Russia consisted of 86% peasants, 2.7% intelligentsia and 9% workers, then by the 1990s. the share of workers in the RSFSR increased almost 7 times, the intelligentsia - more than 10 times, and the peasantry, as already mentioned, fell more than 7 times. It must be admitted that the communists brilliantly succeeded in the task that tsarism failed to cope with: the energy of de-peasantization was taken under state control and spent, by and large, on useful, important, grandiose goals. And all this in just seventy years is an unprecedented case in history that distinguishes us for the better from other nations” (note: by intelligentsia here we mean those engaged in mental work).

High birth rates are observed in countries where the majority of the population is rural. The transition to industrial production inevitably leads to a decrease in the birth rate. There are two main reasons, and they act not just simultaneously, but systematically.

Firstly, there is an economic reason. Traditional society implies an appropriate type of farming: some kind of hydroponic farms or even just high-tech land cultivation - this is already an industrial way of farming, and it also has a high “entry barrier” both in terms of age and skills - a seven-year-old cannot work as a combine operator will be able. And in the traditional peasant life, he had long worked as a helper, shepherd, etc. In such a household, having children was economically beneficial: they worked from early childhood. Industrial-type work involves long training, etc., and children in the “family accounting” become an expense item rather than an income item. Compare the situations themselves: “a five-year-old can already graze and feed poultry” (as an example) and “fully provide for a child until at least 17 years old, and in most cases, seriously help at least until graduation” (and I’m silent about the housing issue); clearly? The birth rate causally correlates not with “spirituality”, but with the norm of lack of education (however, “spirituality” and education have an inverse correlation). As soon as a people becomes educated, since work requires education, the birth rate falls within a generation (the first one retains the habit).

Secondly, the lack of industrial development always correlates with the lack of adequate medicine (and corresponding norms adopted by the population), which also applies to contraception. It is important to understand that we are talking not only about technical capabilities, but also about the culture of use: “Postinor” and especially abortion is, you know, not a method of contraception, as some actually practice. And the approach of “delaying an abortion until the deadline” does not have a positive effect on reproductive function. And this is all also a matter of culture, natural application, and a responsible approach to childbirth. In traditional cultures, the approach “once you get pregnant, then give birth” is common (and when the corresponding level collides with the moral norm “not necessary,” then mutations of behavior like “abortion as contraception” result).

Both reasons are interconnected and have a systemic impact. Some researchers focus on urbanization, but this factor is derivative.

So: the scientifically proven reason for the decline in the birth rate is de-peasantization, the transition to an industrial society. This is a natural process of sociogenesis, but a decrease in the birth rate below the reproduction level is the suicide of a nation. The question arises: is it natural not just for a decline in the birth rate in a civilized society, but to such an extent? We'll talk about this next time.