Hitler's Plan for the Summer Campaign 1942 codename. The plans of the Nazi military command. Preparing for the campaign

Summer military campaign of 1919 and the end of the allied intervention civil war in the Arkhangelsk province, northern nature dictated. Frosty and snowy winters and spring-autumn thaws limited the period of active military operations to short

For the summer of 1942, Hitler planned to regain the initiative on the Soviet-German front in order to destroy the vital sources of Soviet power, the most important military and economic centers. The strategic goals of the summer campaign of 1942 were the conquest of the fertile southern lands of Russia (bread), the possession of Donbass coal and the oil of the Caucasus, the transformation of Turkey from a neutral into an ally, and the blocking of the Iranian and Volga lend-lease routes. Initially, the invasion of the grandiose area between the Black and Caspian Seas was called "Siegfried", but, as it was developed and detailed, the plan was called "Blau" ("Blue").

To achieve these goals, it was planned, in addition to the armed forces of Germany, to involve the armed forces of the allies as much as possible.

The plan for the summer campaign of the German army on the Soviet-German front was set out in OKW directive No. 41 of 04/05/1942. (Appendix 2.1)

The main task set by Hitler, while maintaining a position in the central sector, was to take Leningrad in the north and establish contact on land with the Finns, and to make a breakthrough to the Caucasus on the southern flank of the front. This task was planned to be accomplished by dividing it into several stages, taking into account the situation created after the end of the winter campaign, the availability of forces and means, as well as transport capabilities.

First of all, all available forces were concentrated to carry out the main operation in the southern sector with the aim of destroying Soviet troops west of the Don, in order to then capture the oil-bearing regions in the Caucasus and cross the Caucasian ridge.

The capture of Leningrad was postponed until a change in the situation around the city or the release of other forces sufficient for this would create appropriate opportunities.

The primary task of the ground forces and aviation after the end of the thaw period was to stabilize and strengthen the entire Eastern Front and rear areas with the task of freeing up as many forces as possible for the main operation, while at the same time being able to repel the enemy offensive with small forces on the remaining fronts. For this purpose, it was planned to carry out offensive operations of a limited scale, concentrating offensive means of ground forces and aviation in order to achieve quick and decisive successes with superior forces.

Before the start of the main offensive in the south, it was planned to capture the Kerch Peninsula and Sevastopol to clear the entire Crimea from Soviet troops, providing routes for the supply of allied troops, ammunition and fuel through the ports of Crimea. Block the Soviet navy in the ports of the Caucasus. Destroy the Barvenkovsky bridgehead of the Soviet troops, wedged on both sides of Izyum.

The main operation on the Eastern Front. Its goal is to defeat and destroy the Russian troops located in the Voronezh region, to the south of it, as well as to the west and north of the river. Don.

Due to the scale of the operation, the grouping of the Nazi troops and their allies had to build up gradually, and therefore, the operation was proposed to be divided into a series of successive, but interconnected attacks, complementing each other and distributed in time from north to south with such a calculation so that in each of these strikes, as many forces as possible, both of the land army and, in particular, of aviation, are concentrated in decisive directions.

Assessing the resilience of the Soviet troops during encirclement battles, Hitler proposed to carry out deep breakthroughs of mechanized units in order to encircle and tightly block the Soviet troops with approaching infantry units. The plan also required that tank and motorized troops provide direct assistance to the German infantry by delivering blows to the rear of the enemy, taken in pincers, with the aim of completely destroying him.

The main operation was to begin with an enveloping offensive from the area south of Orel in the direction of Voronezh towards the Moscow line of defense. The purpose of this breakthrough is to capture the city of Voronezh, and to hide from the Soviet command the true direction of the main direction of attack to the Caucasus (the distance from Voronezh to Moscow is 512 km, Saratov is 511 km, Stalingrad is 582 km, Krasnodar is 847 km).

At the second stage of the implementation of the plan, part of the infantry divisions advancing behind the tank and motorized formations was to immediately equip a powerful defensive line from the initial offensive area in the Orel region in the direction of Voronezh, and the mechanized formations were to continue the offensive with their left flank from Voronezh along the river. Don to the south to interact with troops making a breakthrough from about Kharkov to the east. With this, the enemy expected to encircle and defeat the Soviet troops in the Voronezh direction, reach the Don in the sector from Voronezh to Novaya Kalitva (40 km south of Pavlovsk) in the rear of the main forces of the Southwestern Front and seize a bridgehead on the left bank of the Don. Of the two groupings of armored and motorized troops intended for an enveloping maneuver, the northern must be stronger than the southern.

At the third stage of this operation, the forces striking downstream of the Don River were to join in the Stalingrad region with the forces advancing from the Taganrog, Artemovsk region between the lower reaches of the Don River and Voroshilovgrad through the Seversky Donets River to the east. The plan was to reach Stalingrad, or at least expose it to heavy weapons, so that it would lose its importance as a center of military industry and a hub of communications.

To continue the operations planned for the subsequent period, it was planned either to capture the bridges in Rostov itself that were not destroyed, or to firmly seize the bridgeheads south of the Don River.

Before the start of the offensive, it was planned to reinforce the Taganrog grouping with tanks and motorized units in order to prevent most of the Soviet troops defending north of the Don River from going south across the river.

The directive demanded not only to protect the northeastern flank of the advancing troops, but also to immediately begin equipping positions on the Don River, with the creation of a powerful anti-tank defense and the preparation of defensive positions for the winter and providing them with all the necessary means for this.

To occupy positions on the front being created along the Don River, which will increase as operations are deployed, it was supposed to allocate allied formations in order to use the released German divisions as a mobile reserve behind the front line on the Don River.

The directive provided for the distribution of allied troops in such a way that the Hungarians were located in the northernmost sectors, then the Italians, and the Romanians furthest to the southeast. Since the Hungarians and Romanians were fiercely at enmity, the Italian army was placed between them.

Hitler assumed that the Soviet troops would be surrounded and destroyed north of the Don and, therefore, after overcoming the Don line, he demanded that the troops move south beyond the Don as quickly as possible, since this was forced by the short duration of the favorable season. Thus, the Nazi strategists were preparing to create a gigantic encirclement of the Soviet troops in a vast area that was extremely inconvenient for their defense. And further on, on the waterless, scorched by the southern sun, smooth as a table, the steppe expanses would begin to dominate the tank and aviation fists of the enemy.

To carry out an offensive in the Caucasus, already on April 22, 1942, an order was issued by the head of the armaments department of the land army and the head of reinforcements on the creation of the command of Army Group "A" with the combat readiness of the headquarters by 20.5.42. Field Marshal List was appointed commander of the army group. Lieutenant General von Greifenberg was appointed Chief of Staff of the Army Group, and Colonel of the General Staff von Gildenfeldt was appointed the first officer of the General Staff. During the formation, for the purpose of disguise, the headquarters is called "Anton headquarters".

The planning of the operation and the preparatory work for them are carried out by Army Group South, the corresponding instructions and orders are transmitted to the future command of Army Group A during their development at the headquarters of Army Group South.

On May 23, the working headquarters arrives in Poltava and, under the code name "Coastal Headquarters of Azov", is placed under the command of Field Marshal von Bock, Commander of Army Group South, whose headquarters previously led military operations on the entire southern sector of the eastern front and was also in Poltava.

On June 1, Hitler leaves for Poltava, accompanied by Field Marshal Keitel. The chief of the "Coastal Headquarters of Azov" takes part in the discussion of the situation at the front by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army Group "South", the Chief of Staff of the Army Group "South" and the commanders of the armies. An order is issued on the tasks of command during operations and preparation for them. Over time, the "coastal headquarters of Azov" is included in the affairs of the armies, later passing under its command.

On June 10, 1942, the operational department of the General Staff of the Supreme Command of the Ground Forces issues an order on the command of the Crimea after the fall of Sevastopol, according to which all ground forces operating in the Crimea are commanded by the commander of 42AK, who, after the transfer of command, is subordinate to the "Coastal Headquarters of Azov". On July 11, an order was issued on the order for the introduction of troops arriving in the second line for the 11th and 17th armies into battle, and on July 5, the operational department of the General Staff reported on the procedure for the transfer of troops from the Crimea to areas 17A and 1TA. First of all, the infantry of the 73rd and 125th infantry divisions should be transferred, in the second place the infantry of the 9th infantry division and in the third place the infantry of the security division. To protect the Crimean region, one German division is left in Sevastopol and Simferopol, the third battalion of the 204th tank regiment of the 22nd tank division, and a sufficient number of Romanian formations.

On July 5, at 14.45, the "Coastal Headquarters of Azov" receives by telephone from the General Staff of the Supreme Command of the Ground Forces the final order to take command. On July 7, the "Coastal Headquarters of Azov" at 0.00 in encrypted form takes over the command of 11A, 17A, with the Wietersheim (57TK) group subordinate to it, 1TA, Romanian formations, the Italian 8th Army (upon its arrival - to the unloading area).

In total, by June 28, 1942, on the Soviet-German front, the enemy had 11 field and 4 tank armies, 3 operational groups, in which there were 230 divisions and 16 brigades - 5,655 thousand people, more than 49 thousand guns and mortars, 3, 7 thousand tanks and assault guns. These forces were supported from the air by the aviation of three air fleets, the Vostok aviation group, as well as the aviation of Finland and Romania, which included about 3.2 thousand combat aircraft.

The largest grouping of Wehrmacht forces, Army Group South, which accounted for 37 percent of infantry and cavalry and 53 percent of tank and motorized formations, was deployed by the last decade of June 1942 on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front. It consisted of 97 divisions, including 76 infantry, 10 tank, 8 motorized and 3 cavalry. (History of the Second World War v.5, p.145)

As a result of the strategic deployment of troops for the summer offensive of 1942 on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, the total number of armies in Army Group South increased to eight; in addition, the 3rd Romanian army followed the march order to Ukraine.

The enemy held the operational-strategic initiative in his hands. Under the circumstances, this was an extremely great advantage, providing the Hitlerite command with the freedom to choose the direction of attack and the opportunity to create a decisive superiority of forces and means in this direction.

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff of the Red Army recognized the possibility of a summer offensive by the German army in the south, but believed that the enemy, who kept a large grouping of his troops in close proximity to Moscow, would most likely deliver the main blow not towards Stalingrad and the Caucasus, but into the flank of the central grouping of the Red Army in order to capture Moscow and the central industrial region, so the Headquarters continued to strengthen the central sector of the front and strengthen the Bryansk Front, the bulk of whose troops were grouped on the right wing, covering the direction to Moscow through Tula.

The Supreme Commander had no doubt that the main task of the Wehrmacht remained the same - the capture of Moscow. With this in mind, the General Staff in July 1942 analyzed the general operational-strategic situation and events on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front. It was necessary to decide which of the two directions - to the Caucasus or to Stalingrad - was the main thing. The distribution of troops and material resources, the use of strategic reserves, the forms of interaction between fronts, the nature of preparatory measures, and much more depended on this decision.

The General Staff took into account that the Caucasian direction is associated for the enemy with the need to overcome a powerful mountain barrier with a relatively poorly developed network of convenient roads. A breakthrough of our defense in the mountains required large available forces, and in the future a significant replenishment of troops with people and equipment. The main striking means of the enemy - numerous tanks could roam only on the fields of the Kuban, and in mountainous conditions they lost a significant proportion of their combat capabilities. The position of the Nazi troops in the Caucasus would also be seriously complicated by the fact that under favorable conditions their flank and rear could be threatened by our Stalingrad front and the troops concentrated in the area south of Voronezh.

On the whole, the General Staff considered it unlikely that the Nazi troops would deploy their main operations in the Caucasus. According to the General Staff officers, the Stalingrad direction was more promising for the enemy. Here the terrain favored the conduct of extensive hostilities by all types of troops, and there were no major water barriers up to the Volga itself, except for the Don. With the entry of the enemy to the Volga, the position of the Soviet fronts would become very difficult, and the country would be cut off from sources of oil in the Caucasus. The lines along which the allies supplied us through Iran would also be broken. (Shtemenko S.M. General Staff during the war years, Military Publishing House 1981, vol. 1, p. 87)

With this in mind, the bulk of the strategic reserves were located in the western, as well as in the southwestern direction, which subsequently allowed the Headquarters to use them where the Nazi command delivered the main blow. Hitler's intelligence could not reveal either the size of the reserves of the Soviet Supreme High Command, or their location.

Due to the underestimation of the southern direction, the Stavka reserves were not deployed there - the main means of influence of the strategic leadership on the course of important operations. The options for the actions of the Soviet troops in the event of a sharp change in the situation were not worked out either. In turn, the underestimation of the role of the southern direction led to tolerance for the mistakes of the command of the Southwestern and partly the Southern fronts.

As a result of the unsuccessful actions of the Southwestern and Southern fronts during the May offensive in the Kharkov direction, the situation and the balance of forces in the south changed dramatically in favor of the enemy. Having eliminated the Barvenkovsky ledge, the German troops significantly improved their operational position and took advantageous starting positions for a further offensive in the east. (diagram of Operation Wilhelm and Friedrich 1)

The Soviet troops, having suffered significant losses, entrenched themselves by mid-June at the turn of Belgorod, Kupyansk, Krasny Liman and put themselves in order. Going on the defensive, they did not have time, as it should, to gain a foothold on new lines. The reserves available in the southwestern direction were used up.

Hitler's inner circle, including the leading figures of the main headquarters of the armed forces, could not fail to learn certain lessons from the failure of the "blitzkrieg" that occurred on the Eastern Front. The collapse of Operation Typhoon in the Battle of Moscow cost the Nazis especially heavy losses in people, weapons and military equipment. It was noted above that fascist Germany managed to make up for these losses, but the combat effectiveness of its army decreased. The certificate of the headquarters of the operational leadership of the OKW dated June 6, 1942 stated: “The combat effectiveness of the armed forces as a whole is lower than in the spring of 1941, which is due to the impossibility of fully ensuring their replenishment with people and materiel” ( "Top secret! Only for command!”: The strategy of Nazi Germany in the war against the USSR: Documents and materials. M., 1967. S. 367.). At the same time, the number and combat effectiveness of many formations of the Soviet Armed Forces increased.

With all their arrogance, the Nazi rulers and strategists were forced to take all this into account. Therefore, continuing to maintain confidence in the superiority of the forces of the German army and striving to achieve victory over the USSR, they no longer dared to conduct an offensive simultaneously along the entire length of the Soviet-German front.

What goals did the Nazis set for themselves in 1942, more precisely, in the spring and summer of this year, when it was planned to launch a new offensive? Despite the apparent clarity of the issue, it requires detailed consideration. Let us turn first of all to the testimonies of those who were close to the preparation of a new offensive, knew about it or even took a direct part in it.

Undoubtedly interesting in this regard are the statements of Colonel-General Walter Warlimont, the former deputy chief of staff of the operational leadership of the Wehrmacht High Command (OKW). He reports in some detail about some of the facts of the planning of the campaign, the implementation of which led the Nazis to the catastrophe on the Volga. In his book “In the Supreme Headquarters of the Wehrmacht. 1939-1945" Warlimont ( Warlimont W. Im Hauptquartier der deutschen Wehrmacht, 1939-1945. Frankfurt am Main, 1962.), in particular, writes: “Even during the period of the greatest strain of forces in the struggle to repel the offensive of the Soviet troops at the headquarters of the German armed forces, the confidence did not weaken for a minute that in the East it would be possible to seize the initiative again, at least no later than the end of winter” ( Ibid. S. 238.). On January 3, 1942, Hitler, in a conversation with the Japanese ambassador, announced his firm decision, “as soon as the weather is favorable for this, to resume the offensive in the direction of the Caucasus. This direction is the most important. Need to get out to oil fields, as well as to Iran and Iraq ... Of course, he, in addition, will do everything to destroy Moscow and Leningrad "( Ibid.).

Elsewhere, Warlimont notes that in January - March 1942, the plan for a summer campaign in in general terms was ready. On March 20, Goebbels wrote in his diary: “The Fuhrer again has a completely clear plan for the spring and summer. His goal is the Caucasus, Leningrad and Moscow ... An offensive with devastating blows in certain areas ”( Ibid. S. 241.).

It is noteworthy that the Caucasus, Moscow and Leningrad appear in Warlimont's statements in both cases. But there is no evidence that in the process of discussing the concept of the campaign, it was originally planned to resume the offensive simultaneously in all three strategic directions, and only later - when calculating the available possibilities - did the specific contours of the plan begin to change their outlines significantly. It is quite obvious that the Nazis could no longer prepare the second edition of the Barbarossa plan. Despite this, Hitler announced on March 15 that during the summer of 1942 the Russian army would be completely destroyed ( Tippelskirch K. History of the Second World War. M., 1956. S. 229.). It can be assumed that such a statement was made for propaganda purposes, was demagogic and went beyond the real strategy. But there was something else here as well. Adventurist in its essence, Hitler's policy could not be based on deep foresight and calculation. All this fully affected the formation of the strategic plan, and then the development of a specific plan of operations in 1942. Difficult problems arose before the creators of the fascist strategy. The question of how to attack and even whether to attack at all on the Eastern Front became more and more difficult for the Nazi generals. Warlimont writes the following on this subject: “Halder ... for a long time studied the question of whether we should finally go on the defensive in the East, since a second offensive is beyond our strength. But it is absolutely impossible to talk about this with Hitler. And what can all this lead to? If we give the Russians a breather and the American threat intensifies, then we will give the initiative to the enemy and we will never be able to regain it. Thus, we have no choice but to once again attempt an offensive despite all doubts ”( Warlimont W. Op. cit. S. 239.).

So, there was no longer confidence in the success of the offensive - the miscalculation of the Barbarossa plan in relation to the assessment of forces Soviet Union was obvious. Nevertheless, the need for a new offensive was recognized by both Hitler and the German generals. The Wehrmacht command continued to strive for the main goal - to defeat the Red Army before the Anglo-American troops began hostilities on the European continent. The Nazis had no doubt that the second front, at least in 1942, would not be opened. And although the prospects for a war against the USSR were looming for some people completely differently than a year ago, the time factor could not be overlooked. There was complete unanimity in this.

“In the spring of 1942,” writes G. Guderian, “the question arose before the German high command in what form to continue the war: to attack or defend. Going on the defensive would be an admission of our own defeat in the 1941 campaign and would deprive us of the chances of successfully continuing and ending the war in the East and West. 1942 was last year, in which, without fear of immediate intervention by the Western powers, the main forces of the German army could be used in an offensive on the Eastern Front. It remained to be decided what should be done on a front of 3,000 kilometers long in order to ensure the success of an offensive carried out by relatively small forces. It was clear that on most of the front the troops had to go on the defensive" ( Results of the Second World War. M., 1957. S. 126.).

The offensive operations of the summer campaign of 1942, according to the testimony of General Halder, were foreseen as early as the winter of 1941/42. and disrupt their communications along the Volga" ( Military-ist. magazine 1961. No. 1. S. 35.). The OKW directive of December 8, 1941, spoke of creating the prerequisites for conducting an "offensive operation against the Caucasus" ( There.). In that memorable winter for the Germans, Hitler forbade the withdrawal of troops beyond the Dnieper and demanded at all costs to hold positions near Leningrad, in the areas of Demyansk, Rzhev and Vyazma, Orel, Kursk and in the Donbass.

The specific content of the plan for the summer campaign of 1942 at a certain stage and to some extent was the subject of discussion among the Nazi generals. The commander of Army Group North, Field Marshal Küchler, initially proposed to carry out an offensive on the northern sector of the Soviet-German front in order to capture Leningrad. Halder ultimately also stood for the resumption of the offensive, but, as before, he continued to consider the central direction decisive and recommended that the main attack on Moscow be carried out by the forces of Army Group Center. Halder believed that the defeat of the Soviet troops in the western direction would ensure the success of the campaign and the war as a whole.

Hitler, unconditionally supported by Keitel and Jodl (OKW), ordered the main efforts of the German troops in the summer of 1942 to be directed south to seize the Caucasus. Due to the limited number of forces, it was planned to postpone the operation to capture Leningrad until the moment when the troops in the south were released.

The fascist German high command decided to launch a new offensive on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, counting on successive operations to defeat the Soviet troops here piece by piece. Thus, although when planning the 1942 campaign, Hitler's strategists for the first time began to waver, nevertheless, as before, the top military and political leadership of the Third Reich came to a single point of view.

On March 28, 1942, a secret meeting was held at Hitler's headquarters, to which only a very limited circle of people from the highest headquarters were invited. General Halder reported in detail the plan for the deployment of troops for the summer offensive, based on the instructions given to him by the Fuhrer.

Warlimont paints a picture of this meeting this way: “No one raised any objections. But, despite this, the displeasure of the chief of the general staff of the land army (Halder. - A.S.) was almost palpably felt, who even earlier had repeatedly spoken out both against the strange layer-by-layer introduction of forces at the beginning of the offensive, and against delivering the main blows during the offensive in divergent directions, and especially against the excessive scale of operations along the front and in depth "( Warlimont W. Op. cit. S. 242.).

Colonel-General Jodl of the Design Bureau, who was not indifferent to the development of Hitler's operational plans, a few weeks after the aforementioned meeting, told Lieutenant-Colonel Scherf, a General Staff officer devoted to him, whom Hitler appointed authorized to write military history, that Operation Siegfried ( Hitler, after the winter defeat of 1941/42, became wary of assigning big names to plans for military operations and on April 5 crossed out the original code name "Siegfried". On June 30, the new code name "Blau" ("Blue") was changed to "Braunschweig" out of fear that the former name could become known to the Soviet side.) due to the lack of forces of Army Group Center and Army Group North will be at great risk if the Russians launch a decisive attack on Smolensk. However, Jodl, like Hitler, seemed doubtful whether the Soviet side had the strength and courage to do so; they believed that with the start of the German offensive in the southern sector of the front, the Russians would automatically begin the transfer of troops to the south ( Warlimont W. Op. cit. S. 242-243.).

Jodl instructed his deputy and responsible officers of the headquarters of the operational leadership of the armed forces to draw up in the form of a directive of the OKW the plans for the command of the ground forces, proposed on March 28 and approved by Hitler. The headquarters decided to limit the content of the directive to only the formulation of "tasks", without linking the main command of the ground forces with any details. However, Hitler, during the report of the "draft" on April 4 by General Jodl, announced that he himself would rework the directive. The next day, his "historiographer" wrote: "The Fuhrer substantially revised draft Directive No. 41 and supplemented it with important points formulated by himself ... First of all, he re-formulated that part of the draft, which refers to the main operation." The result of these efforts was a document dated April 5, which contained "multiple repetitions and long lengths, confusion of operational directives with well-known principles of troop leadership, vague wording of the most significant issues and a detailed explanation of minor details" ( Ibid. S. 243-244.).

It is easy to see that the former Nazi generals are in every possible way fenced off from Hitler, whose associates and like-minded people they have been for so long. This is done in a different historical setting and at least two decades after the events they describe. In his book, Warlimont also follows this trend, as can be seen from the citations. Wehrmacht generals did not put forward any fundamentally new proposals as opposed to Hitler's plans. The atmosphere of servility to the "Fuhrer", which reigned supreme among the German generals, eliminated any possibility of this. The hidden discontent of the chief of the general staff of the ground forces, Halder, did not change anything. His alleged independence of judgment is clearly exaggerated in post-war West German literature. In hindsight, after the end of the war, Halder began to assert that at that time they were offered to throw the main forces of the German troops to capture Stalingrad in order to avoid simultaneous attacks on Stalingrad and the Caucasus. The attack on the Caucasus, in his opinion, should have been of secondary importance for securing the southern flank of the Stalingrad group. It is easy to see that, if this was the case, then such a proposal did not contain anything radically different from Hitler's plan. No wonder in his diary, referring to the meeting at the headquarters of the Wehrmacht on March 28, 1942, Halder writes down such a significant phrase: "The outcome of the war is decided in the East" ( Halder F. Military diary. M.. 1970. Vol. 3, book. 2. S. 220.).

All this shows quite clearly that the summer-autumn campaign of 1942 was planned by the German generals, who stood for the continuation of the aggressive and adventurous war against the USSR. Hitler only detailed and refined this plan, made the final decision regarding the choice of the direction of offensive operations. The majority of Hitler's generals showed a complete inability to understand the criminal nature of the war unleashed by the Nazis after the defeat of Germany in World War II. Thus, Warlimont in his memoirs puts forward his own plan for the continuation of the war in relation to the situation of 1942.

“Without speculation,” he writes, “it will obviously be appropriate here to speak of the prospects that a generous reconciliation with France could still bring. These prospects must have been of particular importance, considering that Germany was now dealing with two major maritime powers. If a devastating blow had been delivered to the enemy's sea lanes and fleet from bases located on the territory of the French state, using a large number of submarines and all air formations suitable for this, then it would have been possible - in accordance with some then and today's estimates - according to at the very least, to delay the landing of the Western allies on the European continent and in North Africa, and thereby create serious obstacles for the enemy in achieving air superiority over the continent. At the same time, the Red Army in the East, which was largely dependent on allied imports by sea, would obviously have been deprived of the opportunity to conduct major operations for a long time as a result of shifting the main efforts to the sea and air war in the Atlantic, especially if to involve the Japanese in the joint conduct of the war, at least at sea" ( Warlimont W. Op. cit. S. 239-240.). This plan, conceived many years after the war, does not deserve serious consideration. Suffice it to say that the combat power of the Red Army - contrary to Warlimont's assumptions - was not determined at all by the supplies of the Western Allies. In addition, the transfer of funds to the creation of a more powerful submarine fleet of fascist Germany was bound to lead to a decrease in the equipment of the Wehrmacht ground forces. The landing of Anglo-American troops on the European continent, as is known, was already delayed until the summer of 1944. As for the actions of the allies in Africa, they were of a local nature. Finally, "generous reconciliation" with France depended not only on the desire of the Nazis. All this suggests that Hitler and the German General Staff - contrary to Warlimont's opinion - more correctly than he defined the main theater of the war. But they did not understand the inevitability of the catastrophe that awaited them.

The idea of ​​the Wehrmacht command for 1942 is most fully set out in Directive No. 41 (see Appendix 14), which was of particular importance: stubborn attempts to implement it determined the actions of the enemy on the Soviet-German front until late autumn and the beginning of winter 1942.

Directive No. 41 largely reveals the essence of the policy of the Third Reich in the second year of the war against the Soviet Union. It is quite obvious that in preparing for a new offensive on the Eastern Front, the enemy by no means abandoned the military-political goals formulated a year and a half earlier in the Barbarossa plan - to defeat Soviet Russia. In general form, this task remains in Directive No. 41. “The goal is,” it says there, “to finally destroy the forces still at the disposal of the Soviets and deprive them, as far as possible, of the most important military-economic centers” ( See: App. 14. S. 567-571.). Hitler spoke about the same on April 3, 1942, in a conversation with Antonescu. “This summer,” he declared, “I decided to continue the pursuit as deep as possible for the final destruction of the Russians. American and British assistance will be ineffective, as new Russian defeats will lead to a loss of contact with the outside world. They have lost the best soldiers and equipment, and now they are only improvising" ( Military-ist. magazine 1961. No. 1. S. 34.).

It should be noted that some authors in the FRG are trying to retroactively narrow down the tasks of the Nazi plan for the summer campaign of 1942. For example, former Hitler General Mellenthin writes: in the bend of the Don River between Rostov and Voronezh, in order to create a springboard for the subsequent offensive on Stalingrad and the oil regions of the Caucasus. The offensive against Stalingrad and the Caucasus was planned to begin much later, perhaps not earlier than 1943. Mellenthin F. Tank battles 1939-1945. M., 1957. S. 142.).

The absurdity of such statements is refuted by the Nazi generals themselves. K. Zeitzler, who after F. Halder became chief of the general staff of the ground forces, testifies: “Planning the summer offensive of 1942, Hitler intended, first of all, to capture Stalingrad and the Caucasus. The implementation of these intentions, of course, would be of great importance if the German army could cross the Volga in the Stalingrad region and thus cut the main Russian communication line running from north to south, and if the Caucasian oil went to meet the military needs of Germany, then the situation in the East would be radically changed, and our hopes for a favorable outcome of the war would be greatly increased. Such was Hitler's train of thought. Having achieved these goals, he wanted to send highly mobile formations to India through the Caucasus or in another way ”( Fatal decisions. M., 1958. S. 153.).

An objective assessment of the plans of the German High Command for the summer of 1942 is incompatible with the unreasonable narrowing of their actual scope and goals. In the document under consideration, as is clear from its text, in addition to the main operation on the southern wing of the front, the Wehrmacht troops were also tasked with “taking Leningrad in the north” and carrying out the operations necessary “to level the front line in its central and northern sections” . Ignoring this part of Directive No. 41 on the part of individual representatives of bourgeois historiography, especially West German, can only be explained by a conscious desire to belittle the scale of the victory of the Red Army and the entire Soviet people in the battle on the Volga. At the same time, one must also see significant differences between Directive No. 41 and the Barbarossa plan.

The ultimate military-political goals of Nazi Germany's aggressive war against the Soviet Union, in connection with the changed situation on the Eastern Front in the winter of 1941/42, seemed unattainable even to the most rabid Nazis within the framework of the next campaign. This led to the well-known inconsistency of the document under consideration and the vagueness of setting in it the main goal of the strategic offensive of 1942. In a general form (without indicating the terms), it sets out the intention to crush the Red Army, and at the same time it also contains an indication that the defensive positions created along the right bank of the Don to ensure the north-eastern flank of the strike group of German troops, should be equipped "taking into account their possible use in winter conditions." The capture of the region of the Lower Volga and the Caucasus, for all its great strategic importance, could not yet lead to the defeat of the USSR. The most powerful grouping of the Red Army was located in the central industrial region. In this regard, we should recall the testimony of Field Marshal Keitel. He said that the German high command, after the capture of Stalingrad by the Nazi army and the isolation of Moscow from the south, intended to carry out a turn with large forces to the north. “I find it difficult to give any time frame for this operation,” added Keitel ( Military-ist. magazine 1961. No. 1. S. 41.).

Thus, the main goal of the enemy offensive on the Eastern Front, according to the above Directive No. 41, was to win victory over the Soviet Union. However, unlike the Barbarossa plan, the achievement of this political goal was no longer based on the strategy of "blitzkrieg". That is why Directive No. 41 does not establish a chronological framework for the completion of the campaign in the East. But on the other hand, it says that, while maintaining positions in the central sector, to defeat and destroy Soviet troops in the Voronezh region and west of the Don, to seize the southern regions of the USSR rich in strategic raw materials. To solve this problem, it was planned to carry out a series of successive operations: in the Crimea, south of Kharkov, and only after that in the Voronezh, Stalingrad and Caucasian directions. The operation to capture Leningrad and establish ground communications with the Finns was made dependent on the solution of the main task in the southern sector of the front. Army Group Center during this period was supposed to improve its operational position through private operations.

Preparing the conditions for the final defeat of the Soviet Union, the enemy decided first of all to seize the Caucasus with its powerful sources of oil and the fertile agricultural regions of the Don, Kuban and the North Caucasus. The offensive in the Stalingrad direction was supposed to ensure, according to the enemy’s plan, the successful conduct of the main operation to conquer the Caucasus “in the first place”. In this strategic plan of the enemy, the acute need of fascist Germany for fuel was very strongly reflected.

Speaking on June 1, 1942 at a meeting of the commanders of Army Group South in the Poltava region, Hitler stated that if he did not receive oil from Maykop and Grozny, he would have to end this war ( See the testimony of Paulus to the International Military Tribunal on February 11, 1946 // Nuremberg trial, M., 1954. T. 1. S. 378; see also: Voen.-ist. magazine 1960. No. 2. S. 81-82.). At the same time, Hitler based his calculations on the fact that the loss of oil by the USSR would undermine the strength of Soviet resistance. "It was a delicate calculation that was closer to its goal than is commonly believed after its final catastrophic failure" ( Liddell Hart BG Strategy of indirect actions. pp. 347-348.).

The choice of the south for the offensive was also determined by a number of other considerations, including those of a specifically military nature.

The enemy troops on the central sector of the front penetrated deeply into Soviet territory and were under the threat of flank attacks by the Red Army. At the same time, the Nazi troops occupied an overhanging position in relation to the southern grouping of Soviet troops. The Red Army had no less forces here than in the western direction. However, the open terrain - the steppe expanses of the Don, the Volga region and the North Caucasus - created the most favorable opportunities for the enemy to use armored formations and aviation. Of certain importance was the fact that in the south it was easier for the Nazis to concentrate the troops of their allies: Romanians, Hungarians and Italians.

The capture of the Caucasus pursued, in addition to the above, other important goals: according to the plans of the enemy, this brought the Nazi troops closer to Turkey and accelerated the decision of its rulers about armed aggression against the USSR; With the loss of the Caucasus, the Soviet Union was deprived of ties with the outside world through Iran; the capture of the Black Sea bases doomed the Soviet Black Sea Fleet to death. Finally, the Nazis hoped, in the event of a successful implementation of the planned offensive, to open their way to the Middle East.

In preparation for carrying out the planned operations, the Nazi leadership carried out a number of preparatory measures. In search of the forces and means necessary for the offensive, the allies of the Third Reich were not forgotten either. Warlimont writes that a few weeks before the final decision on the plan for the 1942 summer campaign was made, the Chief of Staff of the Supreme High Command, General Keitel, visited, on Hitler's instructions, the capitals of Germany's European allies, who were to contribute "every available force" to the operation. As a result, the Nazis managed to get a promise from the rulers of Italy and Hungary to allocate one reinforced army each. In Romania, I. Antonescu placed at the disposal of the German command another 26 divisions in addition to the Romanian troops already operating in the East ( Lebedev N. I. The collapse of fascism in Romania. M., 1976. S. 347.). “Hitler, who in this case refused personal correspondence with the heads of state and government, subsequently limited himself to only demanding that the contingents of the Allied troops be part of the armies under their own command. In addition, already in the directive of April 5, when determining the zones for the offensive of the allied forces, it was stipulated, albeit in veiled terms, that the Hungarians and Romanians, who were allies of Germany, but were at enmity with each other, should be separated from each other by a considerable distance, introducing in between are Italian connections. All these troops were assigned defensive missions, for which they had to be reinforced with German reserves, and above all with anti-tank weapons" ( Warlimont W. Op. cit. S. 244.).

Among the activities of the Hitlerite command aimed at preparing an offensive on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, the plan for the fictitious operation "Kremlin" occupied not the last place. Its purpose is to misinform the Soviet command regarding German plans for the 1942 summer campaign.

Operation "Kremlin" was developed at the direction of the OKH and Hitler by the headquarters of the army group "Center". In the “Order on the offensive against Moscow”, signed on May 29 by the commander of Field Marshal Kluge and the chief of staff, General Wehler, the troops of the Army Group Center were tasked with: “To defeat the enemy troops located in the area west and south of the enemy’s capital, Moscow, surrounding the city, and thereby deprive the enemy of the possibility of operational use of this area "( Dashichev V.P. Bankruptcy of the strategy of German fascism. M., 1973. T. 2. S. 312.). To achieve this goal, the order set specific tasks for the 2nd, 3rd tank, 4th, 9th armies and the 59th army corps. The beginning of both operations ("Kremlin" and "Blau") coincided in time.

The enemy did everything, including radio disinformation, so that the plan of Operation "Kremlin" became known to the command of the Red Army. To some extent, this trick succeeded the enemy.

By the spring of 1942, the Soviet Supreme High Command and the General Staff were faced with the need to develop a new strategic plan - for the next stage of the war. The impossibility of continuing the broad offensive of the Red Army, which remained unfinished, became obvious. A. M. Vasilevsky, who was then deputy, and then chief of the General Staff ( In May 1942, A. M. Vasilevsky was admitted to the duties of Chief of the General Staff, and on June 26 he was approved in this position.), wrote in his memoirs that the winter offensive in April 1942 died out due to the lack of the necessary forces and means to continue it. The troops of the fronts were ordered to go on the defensive.

From the way events unfolded at the front, it was clear that the enemy had begun to recover from the blows inflicted on him and was preparing for active operations. The Soviet leadership had no doubt that with the onset of summer or even spring, the enemy would try to seize the strategic initiative again. The absence of a second front allowed the Nazis to transfer troops from the European countries they occupied to the Eastern Front. All this had to be taken into account when analyzing the situation.

In what direction will the new major offensive of the enemy begin? “Now the Headquarters, the General Staff and the entire leadership of the Armed Forces,” recalled Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky, “tried to more accurately reveal the enemy’s plans for the spring and summer periods of 1942, to determine as clearly as possible the strategic directions in which the main events were destined to play out. At the same time, we all perfectly understood that the further development of the entire Second World War, the behavior of Japan, Turkey, etc., and perhaps the outcome of the war as a whole, would largely depend on the results of the summer campaign of 1942 ”( Vasilevsky A. M. The matter of a lifetime. 2nd ed. M.. 1975. S. 203.).

Military intelligence reported to the General Staff: “Germany is preparing for a decisive offensive on the Eastern Front, which will unfold first in the southern sector and subsequently spread to the north ... The most likely date for the spring offensive is mid-April or early May 1942.” ( History of the Second World War. 1939-1945. M., 1975. T. 5. S. 112.).

On March 23, the state security agencies reported the same to the State Defense Committee: “The main blow will be delivered in the southern sector with the task of breaking through Rostov to Stalingrad and the North Caucasus, and from there towards the Caspian Sea. In this way the Germans hope to reach the sources of Caucasian oil" ( There.).

However, intelligence data was not fully taken into account. The Headquarters and the General Staff proceeded from the fact that the strongest grouping of the Wehrmacht, consisting of 70 divisions, continued to be located on the central sector of the Soviet-German front, still threatening the capital. Therefore, it seemed most likely that the enemy would strike the main blow in the Moscow direction. “This opinion, as I am well aware, was shared by the command of most fronts” ( Vasilevsky A. M. The matter of a lifetime. 2nd ed. S. 206.), - testifies A. M. Vasilevsky.

According to Marshal G.K. Zhukov, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief believed that in the summer of 1942 the enemy would be able to attack simultaneously in two strategic directions - the western and the south of the country. But Stalin also feared most of all for the Moscow direction ( Zhukov G.K. Memories and reflections. 2nd ed. add. M., 1974. Book. 2. S. 64.). Later it turned out that this conclusion was not confirmed by the development of events.

An assessment of the situation showed that the immediate task should be an active strategic defense of the Soviet troops, the accumulation of powerful trained reserves, military equipment and all the necessary materiel, followed by a transition to a decisive offensive. These considerations were reported to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief B. M. Shaposhnikov in the middle of March in the presence of A. M. Vasilevsky. After that, work on the summer campaign plan continued.

The General Staff correctly considered that, while organizing a temporary strategic defense, the Soviet side should not, at the same time, conduct offensive operations on a large scale. Stalin, who was poorly versed in matters of military art, did not agree with this opinion. G.K. Zhukov supported B.M. Shaposhnikov, but believed, however, that at the beginning of summer in the western direction, the Rzhev-Vyazma grouping, which held a vast bridgehead relatively close to Moscow, should be defeated ( There. S. 65.).

At the end of March, the Headquarters again discussed the issue of a strategic plan for the summer of 1942. This was when considering the plan submitted by the command of the South-Western Direction for a large offensive operation in May by the forces of the Bryansk, South-Western and Southern Fronts. “The Supreme Commander-in-Chief agreed with the conclusions and proposals of the Chief of the General Staff,” writes A. M. Vasilevsky, “but ordered, simultaneously with the transition to strategic defense, to provide for the conduct of private offensive operations in a number of areas: on some - in order to improve the operational situation, on others - to preempting the enemy in the deployment of offensive operations. As a result of these instructions, it was planned to carry out private offensive operations near Leningrad, in the Demyansk region, in the Smolensk, Lugovsko-Kursk directions, in the Kharkov region and in the Crimea.

How can one regard the fact that such an authoritative military leader as B. M. Shaposhnikov, who headed the country's highest military institution, did not try to defend his proposals on a question on the correct solution of which so much depended? A. M. Vasilevsky explains this as follows: “Many who are not aware of the difficult conditions in which the General Staff had to work during the past war can rightly accuse its leadership of failing to prove to the Supreme Commander the negative consequences of the decision to defend and come on at the same time. In those conditions when there was an extremely acute shortage of trained reserves and material and technical means, the conduct of private offensive operations was an unacceptable waste of energy. The events that unfolded in the summer of 1942 showed with their own eyes that only a transition to temporary strategic defense along the entire Soviet-German front, the refusal to conduct offensive operations, such as Kharkov, for example, would save the country and its armed forces from serious defeats, would allow we will go over to active offensive operations much earlier and recapture the initiative in our own hands.

The miscalculations made by the Headquarters and the General Staff when planning hostilities for the summer of 1942 were taken into account in the future, especially in the summer of 1943, when a decision was made on the nature of hostilities on the Kursk Bulge "( Vasilevsky A. M. Memories of the historical battle // Stalingrad epic. M., 1968. S. 75.).

Historians of the past war have not yet exhausted their study of the problem of planning the summer campaign of 1942; it needs further in-depth research. At the same time, one should also take into account the general situation that the failures of the Soviet troops in the spring and summer of 1942 were not inevitable ( Vasilevsky A. M. The matter of a lifetime. 2nd ed. S. 207.).

By the beginning of the second year of the war, the Red Army and the rear of the country, which ensured its struggle, had forces and means, if not in everything sufficient, then in the main, to prevent a new deep penetration of the Nazi troops into the vital regions of the Soviet Union. After the successes of the winter offensive of the Red Army, the Soviet people gained confidence in the inevitability of the defeat of Nazi Germany. On the eve of the summer-autumn campaign of 1942, there was no negative impact on the struggle of the Red Army and the entire people of the factor of surprise, which took place at the beginning of the war. Temporary factors gradually lost their effectiveness, while permanent factors exerted a growing influence in all spheres of the struggle. The experience of the participation of Soviet troops in the modern big war has acquired an ever more prominent role. Its first year was a serious test for the entire command and political staff, most of which acquired both hardening and the skill that comes only with practice. In the fire of war, knowledge was improved, the abilities and talents of those who led the combat operations of the troops were tested. The names of many military leaders and political workers became known throughout the country. On the battlefields, the combat and moral might of the Soviet Armed Forces was tested, which, under difficult conditions, thwarted the plan for a "blitzkrieg" war of fascist Germany against the USSR. The mass heroism of Soviet soldiers became the norm for their actions in the Great Patriotic War.

At the same time, by the spring of 1942, the Red Army lacked trained reserves, and the formation of new formations and associations was significantly limited by the level of production of the latest types of weapons. Under these conditions, the most expedient use of available forces and means acquired special significance, since the enemy had greater opportunities to continue the aggressive war. In this regard, the Soviet side received a very real idea of ​​the strength and professional qualities of the Wehrmacht troops, of the features of their actions in offensive and defensive operations.

The Soviet Supreme High Command correctly assessed the overall balance of forces in the USSR's war against fascist Germany, but the immediate prospects for the development of armed struggle depended on the adoption of correct strategic decisions. Expecting that the enemy would deliver the main blow in the central direction, the Headquarters concentrated strategic reserves in the areas of Kalinin, Tula, Tambov, Bori-soglebsk, Vologda, Gorky, Stalingrad, Saratov, believing that, depending on the development of events at the front, they could be used both southwest and west History of the Second World War. 1939-1945. T. 5. S. 143.). However, the actual development of events did not fully justify these calculations.

Thus, the Headquarters planned for the spring and summer of 1942, along with the transition to the defense, offensive operations in the Leningrad region, near Demyansk, in the Oryol direction, in the Kharkov region, in the Donbass and Crimea. The successful conduct of these operations could lead to the release of Leningrad, the defeat of the Demyansk, Kharkov and other groupings of enemy troops. This was due to the desire to bring as close as possible the timing of the expulsion of the fascist invaders from Soviet soil. However, at that time there were not yet sufficient prerequisites for this, and the decision taken by the Headquarters was erroneous.

The ability to solve the practical problems of military strategy, taking into account all the factors that determined accurate and correct foresight, was developed at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command gradually, as experience in warfare was accumulated.

To fully appreciate the significance of the second German summer campaign in Russia, it is necessary to recall the aims of the first summer campaign. As we have seen, they did not consist in conquering all of Russia, but in attacking the main strategic regions to force the Russian armies to defend them and lose defenders in subsequent battles. The strategic goal was tactical extermination.
We also saw that this strategy failed because the speed of advance was slow, the space too large, and the resistance too strong.
If the crushing strategy failed under the more favorable conditions of 1941, how could it succeed under the less favorable conditions of 1942? Hitler answered this question in the negative; and it would be foolish to resort to it again. Instead of a strategy of crushing, a strategy of attrition should have been used. However, there was no question of solving this problem by tactical attrition; even if it were possible, such a course of action would take too much time. Stirring up a revolution against the Bolsheviks was also out of the question. Consequently, the only possibility remained: to undermine the economic power of Russia, to strike at the material basis of its armed forces. It was decided that for this it was necessary to deprive Russia of the Donetsk industrial region, the Kuban granary and Caucasian oil. In short, to deprive Russia of important strategic areas in the quadrangle Kharkov, Stalingrad, Baku, Batumi, which would eventually put the Russian army out of action.

So, Hitler's plan for 1942, apparently, was as follows: cut off and occupy the Voronezh, Saratov, Stalingrad, Rostov quadrangle with an offensive in two parallel directions: in the north along the Kursk-Saratov line and in the south along the Taganrog-Stalingrad line. Under the cover of this blockade, pass through the Caucasus to Baku.
According to two historians, the existence of such a plan is "confirmed by a document that fell into the hands of the Russians and was mentioned by Prime Minister Stalin in a speech on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the October Revolution." The document outlined the procedure for the occupation of the following cities: Borisoglebsk, eastern Voronezh, by July 10, Stalingrad by July 25, Saratov by August 10, Syzran by August 15, Arzamas, south of Gorky, by September 10.
Surprising is the very rapidity of the planned occupation of the cities, but even more surprising is what should be clear even to a novice in strategy: the success of the campaign depended not so much on the capture of important points, but on how much retaliatory action from the Russians could be prevented. As can be seen from the plan, the Russian armies located north of the Voronezh-Saratov line were ignored. Given the space of Russia and the strength of the Russian armies, it was obvious that they could not be exterminated tactically, just as it was impossible to break the Russian people due to their high moral stamina. Therefore, success could only be achieved by strategically paralyzing them, but not by depriving the Russians of the resources needed in the future, such as oil, coal and wheat, should be deprived of the possibility of movement. Therefore, first of all, it is necessary to occupy or besiege Moscow. Just as Paris is the central junction of French railways, so Moscow is the central junction of Russian railways. In 1914, due to the fact that the Germans did not occupy Paris, there was a disaster on the Marne. In 1942, as we shall see below, a failure near Moscow led to a catastrophe on the Volga. If Moscow were in the hands of the Germans, then the constant strategic bombing of Vologda, Bui, Gorky, Arzamas and Penza, located at a distance of 250-350 miles from Moscow and, therefore, easily accessible to bombers, would not only stop the supply of supplies from Arkhangelsk and reserves from the Asian part of Russia, but also lead to a chaotic state of traffic on the railways in the central part of Russia, and maybe stop all traffic.

The armies that were to carry out Hitler's plan were commanded by Field Marshal von Bock. The morale and training of the armies were lower than in 1941, but the firepower had increased. The bulky Panzer Division of 400 tanks was reduced to 250 improved tanks, the air force organized into strike groups that interacted more closely with the ground forces than before. The Germans adopted a new tank tactic that Field Marshal Rommel is credited with creating. It was called “motpulk” and, in essence, was a modernized copy of the Hussite mobile camp. Colonel de Waterville describes her as follows:
“The mass of mobile assets was located in such a way that tanks and self-propelled artillery were an external contour, inside which a vulnerable center was placed: infantry in vehicles, anti-tank artillery, mobile repair shops and all the modern equipment needed by the army in battle ... First of all, it was a combat an organism with enormous firepower, extremely agile and covered in thick armor...”
The main German offensive did not begin until June 28, but important battles preceded it. On May 8, Field Marshal von Manstein, who commanded the German 12th Army in the Crimea, launched an attack on Kerch and took the city by storm on May 13. As this battle drew to a close, on May 12, Marshal Timoshenko launched a heavy blow south of Kharkov to delay the German advance. Rapidly advancing from Lozovaya in the direction of Kharkov and Poltava, on May 16, Russian troops occupied Krasnograd and broke through the outer defense belt of the "overhead" (Kharkov) and two days later started fighting on the outskirts of the city. On May 19, the Germans launched a counteroffensive with large forces. After heavy fighting in the Barvenkovo ​​region, Izyum, Marshal Timoshenko was forced to leave Krasnograd. During the retreat, a significant part of his troops was surrounded and taken prisoner. On June 1, the Germans announced a complete victory, but for them this offensive was an unpleasant event.
Four days later, von Manstein began the bombardment of Sevastopol, preparing to storm the fortress. The outer defensive belt of the fortress was 20 miles long, while the inner one was 8 miles long. The fortress was defended by a garrison of 75 thousand people under the command of General Petrov. On July 1, after a fierce battle, during which 50 thousand tons of artillery shells were fired at the fortress and 25 thousand tons of bombs were dropped, Sevastopol was taken by storm. Thus, the entire Crimea was in the hands of the Germans.
By mid-June, the concentration of German troops on the winter front line west of the Oskol River left the Russians in no doubt that a powerful offensive was being prepared. Von Bock pulled up the following forces here: in the Kursk region - the 2nd Army, the 2nd Panzer Army and the Hungarian Army, all under the command of General von Weich; in the Belgorod area - the 6th Army and the 4th Panzer Army under the command of General von Goth; to the Kharkov region, the 17th Army and the 1st Panzer Army under the command of Field Marshal von Kleist; the Italian army remained in reserve west of Kharkov. South of this army group was General Schwedler's group, which was to be placed at the disposal of Field Marshal von Manstein's 12th Army; the latter, together with the Romanian army, was transferred from the Crimea in the near future.
The Russians assumed that the German offensive would begin on the Voronezh-Rostov front and would develop along the Saratov-Stalingrad line, so they concentrated a strong grouping north of Voronezh and well fortified the Voronezh and Rostov regions, as well as the line of the Donets River.
On June 22, the Germans suddenly struck from the Izyum region and three days later drove the Russians out of Kupyansk. This was followed on June 28 by the long-awaited offensive, which began with a strike east of Kursk. On July 1, the Russian front between Shchigry and Tim was broken through. On July 2, the Germans went on the offensive with large forces between Belgorod and Kharkov. Again, the Russian front was broken through, and by July 5 the Germans reached the western outskirts of Voronezh in the north and the Svatovo-Lysichansk line in the south.
The battle for Voronezh began, and, as we shall see, for the Germans it was one of the most fatal during the entire war.
On July 6 and 7, von Weich's tanks and motorized infantry crossed the Don and broke into Voronezh, which is located in the corner formed by the Don and a small tributary, so that the city is surrounded on three sides by a water barrier. The German infantry, which entered the battle, was attacked from the flank between the rivers. “Russian troops concentrated... north of Voronezh arrived in time to save the day, they may have saved the Russians the whole campaign” .
There is no doubt that this was the case. Over the next ten days, while fierce fighting was going on in the city, the offensive south of Voronezh developed with great speed. Comparing it with the Russian resistance in Voronezh itself produced a strange psychological impact on Hitler.
By July 12, von Goth took Rossosh and Kantemirovka - stations on the Voronezh-Rostov railway, the next day von Kleist's 1st Panzer Army occupied Millerovo. Voroshilovgrad was outflanked and occupied on 20 July. Meanwhile, von Manstein's armies were moving on Rostov, which the Russians evacuated on 27 July.
“The entire Russian front was falling apart... the German army crossed the Don on a broad front. The tone of the Russian communiqués became serious, and growing concern was felt in the radio broadcasts ... There were insistent demands in Russia to open a second front”
The rapid advance towards Stalingrad and the unexpected resistance of the Russians at Voronezh apparently prompted Hitler's decision to leave a barrier in Voronezh from the von Weichs Army Group, and send the von Hoth group directly to the east to act in conjunction with von Manstein against Stalingrad. Only after the fall of Stalingrad was the offensive against Saratov to be resumed.
From a strategic point of view, this mistake borders on insanity. Since no attempt was made to disable the Moscow railway junction, the Russian armies north of Voronezh had complete freedom of movement. The occupation of the Caucasus was the main goal of the German plan. This could be done only in this way: to create a deep defensive area to the north of the Caucasus, that is, as envisaged by the original plan, to occupy the quadrangle of Rostov, Stalingrad, Saratov, Voronezh, which was caused by the need to ensure the depth of defense and space for maneuvering. Having occupied not a quadrangle, but a triangle of Voronezh, Stalingrad, Rostov, the Germans formed a wedge. The northern side of the wedge - the line Voronezh, Stalingrad - was open to the Russian offensive in a southerly direction from the line Voronezh, Saratov. The change in line of operations thus prepared the final defeat.
In accordance with the changed plan, von Weichs' armies dug in at Voronezh. Hungarian, Italian and Romanian divisions were used to protect von Hoth's strategic flank along the western bank of the Don. Meanwhile, von Manstein's group, advancing from Rostov, crossed the Don in the lower reaches of Tsimlyanskaya, while von Kleist rushed south to the plains of the North Caucasus.
During last week In July and the first week of August, von Hoth's troops quickly descended down the Don, and a fierce struggle broke out for bridgeheads at Kletskaya and Kalach, where the Don turns south west of Stalingrad. On August 15, the crossing near Kalach was captured, but only on August 25 was the river forced at Kletskaya. German troops advancing south of the Don were stopped at Kotelnikovo. Only after forcing the river by the troops of General von Goth were they able to continue the offensive. On September 9, the Stalingrad-Borisoglebsk railway was cut, and Stalingrad was heavily bombarded from the air. It seemed to the Germans that the city would soon fall.
While the operations were unfolding in this way, von Kleist's group, which crossed the lower Don, quickly spread over the steppes of the North Caucasus. On August 4, Voroshilovsk fell, on August 8 the Russians destroyed and abandoned the Maikop oil fields, on August 20 Krasnodar was occupied, on August 25 German troops reached Mozdok in the middle reaches of the Terek, 100 miles from the Caspian Sea; The Russians retreated to Grozny. Finally, on September 10, the naval base on the Black Sea, Novorossiysk, fell. Due to difficult terrain, Russian resistance, sprawling communications, and lack of fuel, the Caucasian campaign effectively ended there. Everything was thrown at the capture of Stalingrad. Stalingrad (formerly Tsaritsyn) was a large, sprawling industrial city with a population of about 500,000; it stands on the right bank of the Volga, a few miles above its bend. The advance of the Germans on the city was hampered by the fact that the Volga here has a width of 2 - 2.5 miles and, therefore, is difficult to cross. The city could not be completely surrounded without crossing the river.
The Germans faced the problem of gaining a foothold on the left bank of the Volga. Then a relatively small army could stop all movement along the river and force the garrison of Stalingrad to leave the city by blockade.
With any crossing of the river with a fight, the determining factor is not at all the width of the river, although this is important, but the width of the front of the attacker. If the front is wide, by false attempts to cross in several places, the attackers will divert the attention of the enemy, build a bridge on some undefended or weakly defended sector of the enemy’s defense and create a bridgehead. A wide river, such as the Volga, takes longer to cross than a narrow one, so the front for diverting operations must be wider. The Germans first of all had to create such a front. However, they did not do this, but resorted to a direct blow, trying to take the city by bombardment and storm.

The assault began on 15 September. For a whole month, attack followed attack, but the garrison under the command of General Chuikov put up strong resistance, and the Germans were able to achieve only local, or temporary, successes. The extreme idiocy of such a course of action should have become apparent as soon as it became clear that the city could not be taken on the move. A city is not a fortress, but as long as the garrison holds its ground and its supply lines are in place, turning a city into a pile of rubble is nothing short of the easiest way to create an obstacle that is stronger than any of the purpose-built fortresses.
The losses of the German troops in the senseless assaults were so heavy that on October 15, General Goth received an order to stop the attacks and wipe Stalingrad from the face of the earth with systematic artillery fire and air bombardment. For what? Only one answer is possible: to support the prestige of Hitler, for the city was already in ruins. The industry of Stalingrad was destroyed, the Volga was intercepted, the movement of transports up and down the Volga was suspended. Delivery of oil from Baku to Moscow stopped. Consequently, now it only remained to keep the river blocked, the city itself was tactically of no value.
Thus the Germans lost control of the offensive in Russia, and at the same time they were increasingly losing it in North Africa. Many factors create and maintain initiative, but the main factor is to ensure freedom of movement for oneself or, on the contrary, limit this freedom for the enemy. Both in North Africa and in Stalingrad, essentially throughout Russia, there was one common, all-determining factor - the excessive stretching of German communications, plus the difficulties associated with protecting them.
From Egypt, Rommel's communications stretched 1,200 miles to Tripoli and another 1,300 miles in a straight line to the industrial cities of Germany, which supplied his armies. The length of Gotha's communications through Russia was 1000 miles and through Germany to the central regions - 600 miles. In the first case, as long as the British held Malta firmly, they could operate against the lines of communication of Rommel's army; in the second case, while the Russians held Moscow, they had freedom of maneuver against von Hoth's troops, while the Russian partisan detachments forced the Germans to protect every mile of their communications and, consequently, diverted hundreds of thousands of soldiers from the front.
Nevertheless, in the autumn of 1942, Russia's economic situation was desperate, and, were it not for the constant influx of Anglo-American materials through Arkhangelsk, it is doubtful that the Russians would have been able to take advantage of the ridiculous position in which Hitler had placed his armies.
Since June 6, 1941, as a result of the German occupation, the population under the rule of the Soviet government has decreased from 184 million to 126 million, that is, by more than 30%. Russia suffered huge economic losses. Was lost: food resources - 38%, coal and electricity - 50%, iron and steel - 60%, manganese and aluminum - 50%, chemical industry - 33%.
Therefore, the basic idea of ​​Hitler's strategic plan was correct: to strike at the Russian economy, the basis of its military power. Error after error was made in the implementation of the plan. The size of Russia made it impossible to force the enemy into a general battle; Hitler did not understand that first you need to deprive the enemy of mobility and only then occupy important strategic areas. Russians could be deprived of mobility by occupying the center of Russian communications - Moscow. Instead, Hitler, like Charles XII and more so than Napoleon, lost the initiative.
After great victory near Poltava in 1709 Peter the Great entered Kyiv. A prayer service was served in the Hagia Sophia. The Russian priest Feofan Prokopovich, addressing the tsar and his soldiers, said: “Our neighbors and neighbors will know and say: as if not into our land, but into a certain sea, the forces of the Swane ascended, plunged like tin into the water, and the messenger from them will not return to their homeland” .
This is the secret of Russian power, which Hitler did not take into account in his strategy. It could be undermined only by depriving the Russian armies of mobility, then the space of Russia would turn for them from an ally into a mortal enemy.

A source of information:
Book: World War II. 1939-1945. Strategic and tactical review

MAIN BATTLE Winter campaign of 1942-1943 Battle of Stalingrad (July 17, 1942 - February 2, 1943) Summer-autumn campaign of 1943 Battle of Kursk (July 5 - August 23, 1943) the second half of 1943 on the banks of the Dnieper.

Battle of Stalingrad By the middle of summer 1942, the battles of the Great Patriotic War had reached the Volga. In the plan for a large-scale offensive in the south of the USSR (Caucasus, Crimea), the German command also includes Stalingrad. Germany's goal was to take over an industrial city, the enterprises in which produced military products that were needed; gaining access to the Volga, from where it was possible to get to the Caspian Sea, to the Caucasus, where the oil needed for the front was extracted. Hitler wanted to carry out this plan in just a week with the help of the 6th Paulus Field Army. It included 13 divisions, where there were about 270,000 people. , 3 thousand guns and about five hundred tanks. From the side of the USSR, the forces of Germany were opposed by the Stalingrad Front. It was created by decision of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on July 12, 1942 (commander - Marshal Timoshenko, from July 23 - Lieutenant General Gordov). The difficulty also lay in the fact that our side experienced a shortage of ammunition.

The beginning of the Battle of Stalingrad can be considered July 17, when near the rivers Chir and Tsimla, the forward detachments of the 62nd and 64th armies of the Stalingrad Front met with detachments of the 6th German army. Throughout the second half of the summer, fierce battles were going on near Stalingrad. Further, the chronicle of events developed as follows. On August 23, 1942, German tanks approached Stalingrad. From that day on, fascist aviation began to systematically bomb the city. On the ground, battles did not stop either. It was simply impossible to live in the city - you had to fight to win. 75 thousand people volunteered for the front. But in the city itself, people worked day and night. By mid-September, the German army broke through to the city center, the battles went right on the streets. The Nazis stepped up their attack more and more. Almost 500 tanks took part in the assault on Stalingrad, German aircraft dropped about 1 million bombs on the city. The courage of the Stalingraders was unparalleled. Many European countries were conquered by the Germans. Sometimes they needed only 2 3 weeks to capture the whole country. In Stalingrad, the situation was different. It took the Nazis weeks to capture one house, one street.

In the battles passed the beginning of autumn, mid-November. By November, almost the entire city, despite resistance, was captured by the Germans. Only a small strip of land on the banks of the Volga was still held by our troops. But it was still too early to announce the capture of Stalingrad, as Hitler did. The Germans did not know that the Soviet command already had a plan for the defeat of the German troops, which began to be developed even in the midst of the fighting, on September 12th. The development of the offensive operation "Uranus" was carried out by Marshal G.K. Zhukov. Within 2 months, in conditions of increased secrecy, a strike force was created near Stalingrad. The Nazis were aware of the weakness of their flanks, but did not assume that the Soviet command would be able to gather the required number of troops.

Further, the history of the Battle of Stalingrad was as follows: on November 19, the troops of the Southwestern Front under the command of General N.F. Vatutin and the Don Front under the command of General K.K. Rokossovsky went on the offensive. They managed to surround the enemy, despite the resistance. Also during the offensive, five enemy divisions were captured and defeated. During the week from November 23, the efforts of the Soviet troops were directed to strengthening the blockade around the enemy. In order to remove this blockade, the German command formed the Don Army Group (commander - Field Marshal Manstein), however, it was also defeated. The destruction of the encircled grouping of the enemy army was entrusted to the troops of the Don Front (commander - General K.K. Rokossovsky). Since the German command rejected the ultimatum to end resistance, the Soviet troops proceeded to destroy the enemy, which was the last of the main stages of the Battle of Stalingrad. February 1943, the last enemy grouping was liquidated, which is considered the end date of the battle. 2

Results of the Battle of Stalingrad: Losses in Battle of Stalingrad on each side amounted to about 2 million people. The significance of the Battle of Stalingrad can hardly be overestimated. The victory of the Soviet troops in the Battle of Stalingrad had a great influence on the further course of World War II. She stepped up the fight against the Nazis in all European countries. As a result of this victory, the German side ceased to dominate. The outcome of this battle caused confusion in the Axis (Hitler's coalition). There was a crisis of pro-fascist regimes in European countries.

The Kursk Salient In the spring of 1943, a relative calm settled on the Soviet-German front. The Germans carried out a total mobilization and increased the production of military equipment at the expense of the resources of all of Europe. Germany was preparing to take revenge for the defeat at Stalingrad. A lot of work was done to strengthen the Soviet army. Design bureaus improved and created new types of weapons. Thanks to the increase in production, it was possible to form a large number of tank and mechanized corps. Aviation technology was improved, the number of aviation regiments and formations increased. But the main thing - after the Stalingrad

Stalin and Stavka initially planned to organize a large-scale offensive in the southwestern direction. However, marshals G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky managed to predict the place and time of the future offensive of the Wehrmacht. The Germans, having lost the strategic initiative, were not able to conduct large-scale operations along the entire front. For this reason, in 1943 they developed Operation Citadel. Having brought together the forces of the tank armies, the Germans were going to attack the Soviet troops on the ledge of the front line, which was formed in the Kursk region. With the victory in this operation, Hitler planned to change the overall strategic situation in his favor. Intelligence accurately informed the General Staff about the location of the concentration of troops and their number. The Germans concentrated 50 divisions, 2,000 tanks, and 900 aircraft in the Kursk Bulge area.

Zhukov proposed not to preempt the enemy's attack with his offensive, but, having organized a defense in depth, to meet the German tank wedges with artillery, aviation and self-propelled guns, bleed them and go on the offensive. On the Soviet side, 3,600 tanks and 2,400 aircraft were concentrated. Early in the morning of July 5, 1943, German troops began to attack the positions of our troops. They unleashed the most powerful tank attack of the entire war on the formations of the Red Army. Methodically breaking into the defense, while suffering huge losses, they managed to advance 10-35 km in the first days of the fighting. At certain moments it seemed that the Soviet defense was about to be broken through. But at the most critical moment, fresh units of the Steppe Front struck.

The battle near Prokhorovka was the culmination of a grandiose strategic operation that went down in history as the Battle of Kursk, which was decisive in ensuring a radical change in the course of the Great Patriotic War. The events of those days unfolded as follows. The Nazi command planned to carry out a major offensive in the summer of 1943, seize the strategic initiative and turn the tide of the war in their favor. For this, a military operation was developed and approved in April 1943, codenamed "Citadel". Having information about the preparation of the German fascist troops for the offensive, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to temporarily go on the defensive on the Kursk ledge and, during the defensive battle, bleed the enemy strike groups. Thus, it was planned to create favorable conditions for the transition of Soviet troops to a counteroffensive, and then to a general strategic offensive.

On July 12, 1943, in the area of ​​the Prokhorovka railway station (56 km north of Belgorod), the advancing German tank group (4th Tank Army, Task Force Kempf) was stopped by a Soviet counterattack (5th Guards Army, 5th Guards Tank Army). Initially, the main attack of the Germans on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge was directed to the west - along the operational line Yakovlevo - Oboyan. On July 5, in accordance with the offensive plan, German troops as part of the 4th Panzer Army (48th Panzer Corps and 2nd SS Panzer Corps) and the Kempf Army Group went on the offensive against the troops of the Voronezh Front, to the positions of the 6th and 7th Guards armies on the first day of the operation, the Germans sent five infantry, eight tank and one motorized division. On July 6, the advancing Germans were dealt two counterattacks from railway Kursk - Belgorod with the 2nd Guards Tank Corps and from the Luchki area (northern) - Kalinin with the forces of the 5th Guards Tank Corps. Both counterattacks were repulsed by the forces of the German 2nd SS Panzer Corps.

To assist Katukov's 1st Panzer Army, which was fighting heavy battles in the Oboyan direction, the Soviet command prepared a second counterattack. At 11 p.m. on July 7, Front Commander Nikolai Vatutin signed Directive No. 0014/op on readiness for the transition to active operations from 10:30 a.m. on the 8th. However, the counterattack inflicted by the forces of the 2nd and 5th Guards Tank Corps, as well as the 2nd and 10th Tank Corps, although it eased the pressure on the brigades of the 1st TA, did not bring tangible results. Without achieving decisive success - by this moment the depth of advance of the advancing troops in the well-prepared Soviet defense in the Oboyansky direction was only about 35 kilometers - the German command, in accordance with its plans, shifted the tip of the main attack in the direction of Prokhorovka with the intention of reaching Kursk through the bend of the Psyol River .

The change in the direction of the strike was due to the fact that, according to the plans of the German command, it was in the bend of the Psel River that it seemed most appropriate to meet the inevitable counterattack of the outnumbered Soviet tank reserves. In the event that the village of Prokhorovka was not occupied by German troops before the approach of the Soviet tank reserves, it was supposed to suspend the offensive altogether and temporarily go on the defensive in order to use the favorable terrain for themselves, preventing the Soviet tank reserves from escaping from the narrow defile formed by the swampy floodplain the Psel River and the railway embankment, and prevent them from realizing their numerical advantages by covering the flanks of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps.

By July 11, the Germans took up their starting positions to capture Prokhorovka. Probably having intelligence about the presence of Soviet tank reserves, the German command took action to repel the inevitable counterattack of the Soviet troops. The 1st division of the Leibstandarte SS "Adolf Hitler", equipped better than other divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, took a defile and on July 11 did not attack in the direction of Prokhorovka, pulling up anti-tank weapons and preparing defensive positions. On the contrary, the 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich" and the 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf" providing its flanks fought active offensive battles outside the defile on July 11, trying to improve their position (in particular, the 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf" covering the left flank "expanded the bridgehead on the northern bank of the Psyol River, having managed to transport a tank regiment to it on the night of July 12, providing flanking fire on the expected Soviet tank reserves in the event of their attack through the defile).

By this time, the Soviet 5th Guards Tank Army had concentrated in positions northeast of the station, which, being in reserve, on July 6 received an order to make a 300-kilometer march and take up defenses at the Prokhorovka-Vesely line. The area of ​​concentration of the 5th Guards Tank and 5th Guards Combined Arms Armies was chosen by the command of the Voronezh Front, taking into account the threat of a breakthrough by the 2nd SS Panzer Corps of the Soviet defense in the Prokhorovka direction.

On the other hand, the choice of the specified area for the concentration of two guard armies in the Prokhorovka area, in the event of their participation in a counterattack, inevitably led to a head-on collision with the most powerful enemy grouping (2 m SS Panzer Corps), and given the nature of the defile, it excluded the possibility of covering the flanks of the defending this direction of the 1st division of the Leibstandarte SS "Adolf Hitler". The frontal counterattack on July 12 was planned to be delivered by the forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army, the 5th Guards Army, as well as the 1st Tank, 6th and 7th Guards Armies. However, in reality, only the 5th Guards Tank and 5th Guards Combined Arms, as well as two separate tank corps (2nd and 2nd Guards), were able to go on the attack, the rest fought defensive battles against the advancing German units. Against the front of the Soviet offensive were the 1st Leibstandarte SS division "Adolf Hitler", the 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich" and the 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf".

The first clash in the Prokhorovka area took place on the evening of 11 July. According to the memoirs of Pavel Rotmistrov, at 5 pm, together with Marshal Vasilevsky, during reconnaissance, he discovered a column of enemy tanks that were moving towards the station. The attack was stopped by the forces of two tank brigades. At 8 am, the Soviet side carried out artillery preparation and at 8:15 went on the offensive. The first attacking echelon consisted of four tank corps: 18th, 29th, 2nd and 2nd Guards. The second echelon was the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps.

At the beginning of the battle, Soviet tankers got some advantage: the rising sun blinded the Germans advancing from the west. The high density of the battle, during which the tanks fought at short distances, deprived the Germans of the advantage of more powerful and long-range guns. Soviet tankers got the opportunity to accurately hit the most vulnerable places of heavily armored German vehicles. To the south of the main battle, the German tank group "Kempf" was advancing, which sought to enter the advancing Soviet grouping on the left flank. The threat of coverage forced the Soviet command to divert part of its reserves to this direction. At about 13:00, the Germans withdrew the 11th Panzer Division from the reserve, which, together with the Totenkopf Division, attacked the Soviet right flank, on which the forces of the 5th Guards Army were located. Two brigades of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps were sent to help them, and the attack was repulsed. By 2 p.m., the Soviet tank armies began to push the enemy to the west. By evening, Soviet tankers were able to advance 10-12 kilometers, thus leaving the battlefield in their rear. The battle was won.

The battle for the Dnieper of the Soviet troops in Ukraine in August - December 1943 was carried out with the aim of liberating the Left-Bank Ukraine, Northern Tavria, Donbass and Kyiv, as well as creating strong footholds on the right bank of the Dnieper. After the defeat at Kursk, the German command developed the Wotan defense plan. It provided for the creation of a well-fortified Eastern Wall from the Baltic to the Black Sea, which ran along the Narva-Pskov-Gomel line and further along the Dnieper.

This line was, according to the plan of the German leadership, to stop the advance of Soviet troops to the west. The main core of the defenders of the Dnieper part of the "Eastern Wall" in Ukraine were units of the Army Group "South" (Field Marshal E. Manstein). The troops of the Central (General K. K. Rokossovsky), Voronezh (General N. F. Vatutin), Stepnoy (General I. S. Konev), South Western (General R. Ya. Malinovsky) and Southern (General F. I. Tolbukhin) fronts. The balance of forces at the beginning of the battle for the Dnieper is given in the table. Soviet troops German troops Personnel, thousand 2633 1240 Guns and mortars 51200 12600 Tanks 2400 2100 Aircraft 2850 2000

The battle for the Dnieper consisted of two stages. At the first stage (in August - September), the Red Army units liberated the Donbass, Left-bank Ukraine, crossed the Dnieper on the move and captured a number of bridgeheads on its right bank. The battle for the Dnieper began on August 26 with the Chernigov-Poltava operation (August 26 - September 30), in which the troops of the Central, Voronezh and Steppe fronts participated. It took place simultaneously with the Donbass operation. The troops of the Central Front were the first to go on the offensive. The greatest success was achieved by the troops of the 60th Army (General I. D. Chernyakhovsky), who managed to break through the German defenses in a secondary sector, south of Sevsk. The front commander, General Rokossovsky, promptly reacted to this success and, having regrouped his forces, threw the main shock units of the front into the gap. This decision turned out to be a major strategic win. Already on August 31, the troops of the Central Front managed to expand the Breakthrough to a width of up to 100 km and a depth of up to 60 km, forcing the Germans to begin withdrawing troops to the Desna and Dnieper. Meanwhile, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts joined the offensive.

In early September, the offensive of the Red Army unfolded throughout the Left Bank Ukraine, which completely deprived the German command of the ability to maneuver reserves. Under these conditions, it began the withdrawal of its troops across the Dnieper. In pursuit of the retreating, the advanced units of the Red Army reached the Dnieper on the 750-kilometer section from Loev to Zaporizhia and immediately began forcing this water barrier. By the end of September, on this strip, Soviet troops captured 20 bridgeheads on the right bank. The calculations of the German leadership for a long-term defense of the Left Bank were frustrated. In October - December, the second stage of the battle began, when a fierce struggle was fought to expand and hold bridgeheads. At the same time, reserves were being brought up, bridges were being built, and forces were being built up for a new strike. During this period, the troops operating in Ukraine became part of the four Ukrainian fronts formed on October 20. On this stage The Red Army carried out two strategic operations: Nizhnedneprovsk and Kyiv.

The Lower Dnieper operation (September 26 - December 20) was carried out by the troops of the Steppe (2nd Ukrainian), Southwestern (3rd Ukrainian) and Southern (4th Ukrainian) fronts. During the operation, they liberated Northern Tavria, blockaded the Crimean peninsula and captured the largest bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnieper from Cherkasy to Zaporozhye (450 km long and up to 100 km deep). However, their attempts to break through from this bridgehead into the Krivoy Rog iron ore basin were stopped by mid-December by the fierce resistance of the German units, which received reinforcements from the West and other regions of Ukraine. The Nizhnedneprovsk operation was notable for the large losses of the Red Army, which amounted to 754 thousand people. (about half of all losses of Soviet troops in the battles for Ukraine from August to December 1943).

The Kiev operation (October 12 - December 23) of the Voronezh (1st Ukrainian) Front was also difficult. It began with battles north and south of Kyiv for the Lyutezhsky and Bukrinsky bridgeheads. Initially, the Soviet command planned to attack Kyiv from the south, from the Bukrin area. However, the rugged terrain prevented the advance of the troops, especially the 3rd Guards Tank Army of General P.S. Rybalko. Then this army was secretly transferred to the Lyutezh bridgehead, from where it was decided to deliver the main blow. On November 3, 1943, Soviet troops launched an offensive north of Kyiv, which was liberated on November 6. The Germans failed to gain a foothold on the Dnieper line. Their front was broken through, and Soviet mobile formations liberated Zhytomyr on November 13. Despite the German counterattack in the area, Manstein failed to recapture Kyiv (see Kiev operation).

By the end of 1943, the battle for the Dnieper was over. By that time, the Eastern Wall in the Ukraine had been broken through almost along its entire length. Soviet troops captured two large strategic bridgeheads (from Kyiv to Pripyat and from Cherkasy to Zaporozhye) and dozens of operational tactical bridgeheads. The hopes of the Wehrmacht command to give their troops the opportunity to rest and regroup forces at the “winter line” under the protection of a large water barrier turned out to be unrealizable. The battle for the Dnieper became a rare example in the history of wars of such a large-scale and rapid forcing of such a wide water barrier against the fierce resistance of large enemy forces. According to the German general von Butlar, during this offensive, "the Russian army demonstrated its high fighting qualities and showed that it had not only significant human resources, but also excellent military equipment" . The importance that the Soviet leadership attached to the breakthrough of the Eastern Wall is evidenced by the fact that 2438 soldiers received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for crossing the Dnieper (20% of the total number of those awarded this title for the war). The losses of Soviet troops during the liberation of the Left-Bank Ukraine with Kiev, Donbass, Northern Tavria, as well as the struggle in the bridgeheads, exceeded 1.5 million people. (including irrevocable - 373 thousand people), about 5 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns (without the Kiev defensive operation), about 1.2 thousand aircraft (without the Kiev defensive operation).