Soviet gun 76 mm. Longest millimeter. Front and charging box

275 Firing angles Angle ВН, degrees from −8 to +25° Angle GN, degrees 60° Media files on Wikimedia Commons

Developed in 1942-1943 by prisoner engineers under the leadership of M. Yu. Tsirulnikov, this gun replaced the 76-mm regimental gun mod. 1927 and was actively used at the final stage of the Great Patriotic War. A total of 5,192 guns of this type were built in 1943-1946, which were in service with the Soviet Army in the post-war period and were supplied to the armed forces of the People's Republic of Poland, the People's Republic of China and the DPRK, and took part in the Korean War. In the USSR they were replaced by a new generation of light recoilless artillery systems in the late 1950s.

Story

Prerequisites

By the mid-1930s, less than ten years after the adoption of the Red Army, the 76-mm regimental gun mod. 1927 has already become obsolete. This artillery system was essentially a further development of the Dangliz mountain gun, the first project of which was developed back in 1893. The main disadvantages of the gun included small angles of vertical (VN) and horizontal guidance (HN), low carriage speed, and low rate of fire due to an outdated piston bolt. The relatively weak ballistics of the gun also caused criticism, limiting its maximum firing range and armor penetration. The latter was especially important in light of the appearance abroad of models of armored vehicles that were resistant to hits from armor-piercing shells, high-explosive grenades and shrapnel “on strike”, fired from a 76-mm regimental gun mod. 1927 Attempts to modernize it showed the impossibility of qualitatively improving the characteristics of the gun while maintaining the existing carriage, and in 1936 work in this direction was stopped. A fundamental decision was made to design a new weapon.

In 1937, the leadership of the Red Army, who was responsible for armaments of the army, was subjected to repression (in particular, M. N. Tukhachevsky and the head of the GAU N. A. Efimov were arrested, convicted and later executed by shooting). The new leadership of the GAU, which replaced him, represented by G.I. Kulik, concerned about the deplorable state of affairs in the field of armament of the Red Army, in 1938 decided to resume work on regimental guns. The People's Commissariat of Armaments announced a competition for the creation of a regimental gun, the tactical and technical requirements (TTT) for which, approved on February 14, 1938, repeated the terms of the order to the Kirov plant in 1936. The design of the new artillery system, in addition to the design bureau of the Kirov plant, was entrusted to the design bureau of the Leningrad plant No. 7 "Arsenal" and the design bureau of the Gorky plant No. 92 "Novoye Sormovo".

The design bureau of the Kirov plant, under the leadership of I. A. Makhanov, continued work on the L-10 and in September 1938 demonstrated the weapon in a tank gun version. At the beginning of 1939, a weight and size model of the regimental gun was presented. However, in 1939, the management of the Kirov plant design bureau was arrested, including the designers I. A. Makhanov and I. I. Amelkevich, which led to the stoppage of work on the L-10.

When creating their designs, the design bureaus of the Arsenal and Novoye Sormovo plants took as a basis the projects they had been developing since 1936 for 76-mm mountain guns, which were close to regimental guns in a number of parameters. At the end of 1938 - beginning of 1939, the design bureau of the Arsenal plant, under the leadership of L. I. Gorlitsky, completed the project of a “horse-regimental” gun 7-5 based on a mountain gun mod. 1938 (7-2). The barrel with the bolt, the sight, the wheels and, in general, about 30% of the parts were taken from the latter. However, the design of the 7-5 did not fully correspond to the TTT - the single-beam carriage inherited from the mountain gun limited the GN angle to only 6° instead of the required 60°. In this regard, work on the cannon was carried out simultaneously 7-4 , which had a different carriage design with sliding frames. The prototype 7-4 was manufactured in early April 1940. Neither the 7-5 nor the 7-4 were accepted into service - the first gun due to the small angle of the gun, and the second due to the complexity of the gun design and the higher readiness of the competing F-24 gun project.

The design bureau of the Novoye Sormovo plant, under the leadership of V. G. Grabin, also designed its own regimental gun F-24 based on a mining tool developed since 1936 F-31. Both guns were almost identical, differing mainly in that the regimental gun, unlike the mountain gun, could not be disassembled into packs. But this approach did not suit the State Agrarian University, whose leadership, after reviewing the project, ordered it to be radically remade. Among the requirements put forward were the creation of a carriage with sliding frames, the abandonment of a variable height of the line of fire due to the bending of the combat axis due to the complexity of such a design, as well as the use of a cartridge and chamber from a mountain gun mod. 1938. Working drawings with a mock-up of the converted gun were reviewed by the GAU on October 16, 1939, and the first prototype of the F-24 was manufactured in January 1940 (a total of 4 prototypes of the gun were manufactured). The F-24 gun passed field tests and showed good performance, but for reasons that are not entirely clear, it was never put into service (at the same time, in 1940, the production of guns model 1927 was discontinued). However, work on this artillery system was not in vain - its design was used as the basis for the project of the 57-mm ZIS-2 anti-tank gun.

An obvious drawback of the experimental regimental guns developed according to the 1938 TTT was their large mass in firing position, reaching 985 kg. This limited their mobility on the battlefield; regimental guns mod. 1927, with a smaller mass of about 900 kg, is criticized as being too heavy for its intended purpose. In addition, in terms of their ballistic qualities, they were quite close to classic divisional guns, from which they differed in a slightly lower initial speed and the ability to fire at a large elevation angle with a variable charge.

1942 competition

At the same time, the design bureau of plant No. 92 designed its own version of the regimental gun called the ZIS-21-11, which was essentially a ZIS-3 divisional gun with a barrel cut to 20 calibers and a reduced shield. In May 1942, the gun was tested at the Gorokhovets training ground, which revealed the unsatisfactory performance of the recoil devices. After correcting the defects, the gun underwent repeated testing, but in August 1942 it was decided to abandon the adoption of the ZIS-21-11, since its armor penetration compared to the gun mod. 1927 increased slightly - by 12.5 mm at a distance of 500 m.

One of the main reasons for the refusal to continue the development of regimental guns according to the 1942 TTT was the development and adoption of 76-mm cumulative shells, which had armor penetration of about 70 mm at all distances. As a result, there was no longer a need to increase the initial speed of regimental guns.

Creation

In April 1942, work on a new regimental gun began at OKB-172 under the leadership of M. Yu. Tsirulnikov. OKB-172 was formed in 1938 as the “OTB UNKVD of the Leningrad Region” and was a “sharaga” - a design bureau in which engineers sentenced to various terms of imprisonment worked. The head of OKB-172, M. Yu. Tsirulnikov, was also a prisoner, sentenced in 1939 to 8 years in the camps. Initially, the OTB was located in Leningrad and specialized in the creation of naval artillery, but after the start of the war it was evacuated to Molotov (Perm) to plant No. 172, receiving its new name (it is worth noting that at the same time the plant also had its own design bureau in which they worked civilian engineers - design bureau of plant No. 172). In Molotov, OKB-172 was engaged in work in the field of field and tank artillery, in particular, in 1942, the design bureau developed a modification of the 45-mm anti-tank gun, which was put into service under the name 45-mm anti-tank gun mod. 1942 (M-42).

In the preliminary design of the new gun, Tsirulnikov proposed placing a 76-mm barrel with weak ballistics on the carriage of a 45-mm anti-tank gun mod. 1942. This solution made it possible to obtain a fairly light artillery system using well-proven elements in production. On the other hand, it did not correspond to the technical specifications for the 1942 regimental gun, which required a higher muzzle velocity of the projectile compared to the mod. 1927 As a result, in 1942 the project did not arouse much interest from the GAU. However, with the cessation of work on other regimental guns and the abandonment of the previous TTT, the OKB-172 idea came into place, the promising system received the factory index OB-25 and its design intensified. In February 1943, this stage was completed, and the production and testing of prototypes began. The third prototype of the gun was allowed to undergo field testing, which took place at the Gorokhovets training ground from June 26, 1943. The tests ended unsuccessfully - poor accuracy, problems in the operation of recoil devices were revealed, and the combat axis was bent. After the shortcomings were eliminated, military tests of four prototypes followed in July 1943; At the same time, in order to determine the optimal design, barrels with different rifling steepnesses were tested - 15, 20, 25, 30, 35 calibers. By August 12, military tests were successfully completed, and on September 4, 1943, the gun was put into service under the official name “76-mm regimental gun mod. 1943" . On June 19, 1943, M. Yu. Tsirulnikov, by a special Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, was released early with his criminal record expunged.

Production

Serial production of the 76-mm regimental gun mod. 1943 was carried out from January 1, 1944 to 1946 at factories No. 172 and No. 106. Factory No. 172 produced most of the total number of guns produced, 5192 units.

Production of 76-mm regimental guns mod. 1943, pcs.
Manufacturer	1944	1945	1946	Total
Plant No. 172	2730	1434	-	4164
Plant No. 106	464	494	30	988
Total	3194	1928	30	5192

Experimental developments and further development of regimental guns

In 1944, the design bureau of plant No. 172 developed 76-mm regimental guns M3-1 And M3-2. The M3-1 had a 22.1-caliber barrel, as well as an original carriage design based on the idea of ​​a “load-bearing shield”, which was borrowed from the German Pak 41 anti-tank gun with a conical barrel of 75/55 mm caliber. The M3-2 gun had a barrel length of 30.2 calibers, and the carriage was structurally similar to the similar component of the 45-mm anti-tank gun mod. 1942. Both guns were equipped with a horizontal wedge quarter-automatic breech. The M3-1 gun underwent field tests in November 1944, which revealed poor performance of the recoil devices. From October 1944 to March 1945, field tests of the M3-2 gun took place, which also recorded problems with recoil devices and poor extraction of cartridges. Refinement of both guns was recommended, but due to the end of the war, these guns were not accepted for service.

Since 1949, work has been carried out at TsNII-58 to create a 100-mm regimental recoilless gun under the code "0974" to replace the gun mod. 1943. The gun was supposed to have a mass of about 500 kg, VN and GN angles of 37° and 60°, respectively, and a rate of fire of up to 12 rounds per minute. The gun was not accepted for service due to the start of work on a new 100-mm regimental recoilless rifle S-100 weighing about 180 kg. However, the S-100 suffered the same fate; the military preferred an alternative design from another developer - the 107 mm B-11 recoilless rifle.

Organizational and staffing structure

According to the wartime states, OB-25s were available in the regimental artillery batteries of the following units:

• Rifle division regiments - 4 guns.
• Cavalry regiments - 4 guns.
• Artillery battalions of rifle brigades - 4 guns.

Also, during the war, there were cases of using the OB-25 in battalion artillery and even as an anti-tank weapon in anti-tank artillery brigades.

Combat use

76-mm regimental gun mod. 1943 is intended for direct support and escort of infantry and cavalry with fire and wheels. In battle, the gun was assigned the following tasks:

• suppression and destruction of enemy personnel and firepower (machine guns, guns, mortars), located both openly and behind light field shelters;
• suppression of all types of fire from bunkers and bunkers by direct fire at embrasures;
• making passages for their infantry and tanks in wire fences and obstacles;
• fighting enemy armored vehicles using cumulative projectiles.

The gun was intended almost exclusively for direct fire. During the offensive, regimental guns had to move with their crews in the combat formations of the advancing infantry and quickly suppress enemy fire weapons that impeded the advance - machine gun nests, artillery pieces and mortars, and various firing points. In defense, the guns also had to be in infantry combat formations, firing at the advancing enemy infantry, and, if necessary, at tanks and armored vehicles. The specificity of the actions of regimental guns led to large losses of both materiel and crews; at the same time, along with battalion artillery (45-mm cannons) and mortars, regimental guns were the only artillery systems that were located directly in battle formations and had the ability to hit identified targets as quickly as possible. Due to their relatively small size and weight, regimental guns were actively used in crossing rivers, conducting landing operations, and in urban battles.

In total, 1185.1 thousand rounds of 76-mm cannons mod. 1943 - 714.3 thousand shots in 1944 and 470.8 thousand shots in 1945.

In the post-war period, OB-25s were used by North Korean units during the Korean War. Based on the results of combat use, the gun's firing range was insufficient.

Description of design

Structurally, the OB-25 is a light gun with weak ballistics on a sprung carriage with sliding frames. The gun carriage with recoil devices was taken with some modifications from the 45-mm anti-tank gun mod. 1942, the bolt and sight are taken from a 76-mm regimental gun mod. 1927, the barrel was redesigned.

Trunk

Recoil devices

Carriage

The gun has a carriage with sliding frames, which is formed by the upper and lower machines. The upper machine consists of a base and two walls, serving as the basis for the swinging part of the gun, guidance mechanisms, upper shield and sight. It is connected to the lower machine with a pin and a grip, thanks to which it can rotate relative to it. When assembled with the swinging part, the upper machine forms the rotating part of the gun. The lower shield and the combat axle with wheels are attached to the lower machine. Part of the lower machine is a tubular sliding bed with coulters. In the extended state, they disengage from the combat axis, and in the closed state, they tightly cover it and create a rigid and stable position of the carriage in the stowed position. In exceptional cases, shooting with open frames was allowed. Sector-type lifting and rotating mechanisms. For one revolution of the VN flywheel, the gun barrel rose by 1°4′, and for one turn of the GN flywheel, the rotating part of the gun rotated by 1°58′. The force on the flywheels was 2 kg (VN) and 3 kg (GN).

Wheel travel and suspension

Shield cover

The shield cover, designed to protect the crew from bullets, small fragments and shock waves from close explosions, consists of upper and lower shields. The upper shield is attached to the upper machine with special brackets, two racks and two rods; thus, it rotates as part of the upper machine as the windage angle changes. The top shield consists of a middle shield and two side shields riveted to it using squares. The right side shield has a top folding sheet. The middle shield, in turn, consists of the frontal part of the middle shield and the middle folding sheet, connected to each other by three loops. In the middle of the frontal part of the middle shield there is a cutout for the barrel and cradle. The middle folding shield has two windows, which serve for observation through the panorama of the sight when aiming the gun at the target; the windows are closed with shutters.

The bottom shield consists of a bottom folding sheet and two side bottom sheets covering the gaps between the wheels and the bottom machine. The folding sheet is attached to the lower sheets on hinges and rises in the stowed position. The bottom sheets are rigidly attached to the lower machine with bolts.

Aim

Front and charging box

To transport the gun and part of the ammunition on horseback, a limber is used, taken with minor modifications from a 45-mm anti-tank gun. The front end is equipped with the same wheels as the gun, has suspension and, if necessary, can be towed by mechanical traction. 8 boxes-trays with three cartridges each fit into the front, respectively, 24 cartridges are transported in it. It can also be used as a loading box (forward and reverse), holding 48 rounds. When pulled by horse, the gun together with the front end has a mass of about 1300 kg and is transported by four horses, and the charging box is transported by another four horses.

Transferring a gun from traveling to combat position

When transferring a gun from a traveling position to a combat position, it was necessary:

1. remove covers;
2. turn off the suspension mechanism;
3. open the beds;
4. turn off the stopper for the travel fastening of the upper machine on the lower one;
5. turn off the stopper of the traveling fastening of the lifting mechanism;
6. lift and secure the top folding shield;
7. lower the lower flap;
8. remove the panorama from the box and insert the panorama into the socket of the sight stem, securing it with a latch and a clamping screw;
9. put the trigger stopper in firing position;
10. move the rollback indicator slide to its most forward position.

The gun was transferred from traveling to combat position within 1 minute.

Modifications

For the entire period of serial production, the 76-mm regimental gun mod. 1943 was produced in a single version on a field carriage. But in 1944, the possibility of creating a tank version of it was considered. After production of the T-70 and T-80 light tanks ceased in October 1943, domestic combat vehicles of this class were no longer supplied to the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. In 1944, on the initiative of the British side, supplies of Lend-Lease tanks Mk.III "Valentine", which found recognition and were highly valued in the USSR, ended, but were considered completely obsolete in their country. However, the remaining light tanks continued to fight, and in urban battles they proved so successful that the military leadership again raised the topic of a light tank that would meet the requirements of the current moment. One of the issues discussed during pre-design work was the armament of the new vehicle. 45-mm guns, even the most advanced and successful ones like the VT-43, did not have a significant effect from their fragmentation shells; their armor penetration when using sub-caliber shells reached 70-100 mm normal at close distances of the order of 200-300 m. Therefore, the 76-mm gun mod. 1943, in its recoil very close to the 45-mm M-42 anti-tank gun (and the VT-43 tank gun with the same ballistic solution), was seriously considered as the main armament of the future vehicle. The power of its high-explosive fragmentation grenades equalized a light tank with a medium T-34 with a 76-mm cannon or self-propelled guns for direct infantry support SU-76. The BP-350M cumulative projectile made it possible to hit enemy medium tanks in all projections, and heavy ones in the side without the use of acutely scarce tungsten. There were no fundamental difficulties along this path, but the problem arose on a slightly different plane. The Soviet military could not decide what was required from the new light tank - the presence of amphibious properties or its further development for purely land purposes with armor 30-45 mm thick. Therefore, in 1944, development did not progress beyond preliminary sketches, although one of these developments was armed with a 76-mm regimental gun mod. 1943 But things never got to the point of making even a prototype.

Ammunition and ballistics

Compared to the 76-mm regimental gun mod. In 1927, the range of OB-25 ammunition was not rich and included only 4 types of shells. OF-350 high-explosive fragmentation shells and O-350A fragmentation shells were used to fire at enemy personnel, fire weapons and fortifications. The OF-350 projectile, when the fuse was set to fragmentation action, upon explosion, created 600-800 lethal fragments (weighing over 1 g), creating a continuous damage area measuring 8x5 m (90% of targets are affected) and an actual damage area measuring 30x15 m ( 50% of targets are hit). When the fuse was set to delayed action, a funnel 30-50 cm deep and 70-100 cm in diameter was created. The shells were equipped with KTM-1 or KTMZ-1 fuses (the latter had a moderator and, with the cap not removed, could be used for firing on ricochets at impact angles of no more than 22°). In shots with OF-350 and O-350A shells, the Zh-344 charge with grade 4/1 gunpowder weighing 0.15 kg was used, the pressure in the barrel bore was 1100 kg/cm². In terms of accuracy of fire, the OB-25 was inferior to the cannon mod. 1927 - when firing an OF-350 projectile at a distance of 1000 m, the median lateral deviation was 0.7 m (for the OB-25) versus 0.4 m (for the gun model 1927).

Cumulative (in wartime terminology - armor-burning) shells were of two types - steel BP-350M (armor penetration up to 100 mm) and steel cast iron BP-353A (armor penetration about 70 mm). Both projectiles were equipped with an instant-action BM fuse. In shots with the BP-350M projectile, the Zh-344 charge was used (pressure in the barrel bore 800 kgf/cm²), in shots with the BP-353A projectile - its own charge of 4/1 gunpowder weighing 0.12 kg (pressure in the barrel bore 780 kgf /cm²). HEAT shells were intended for firing exclusively at armored vehicles, the recommended firing range was up to 500 m. Firing with HEAT shells at distances over 1000 m was prohibited due to its ineffectiveness due to the large dispersion of shells. The low level of fire (that is, the short range of a direct shot, when the curvature of the trajectory can be neglected when aiming), as well as the significant flight time, about 2-4 seconds, additionally made it difficult to conduct accurate fire at targets more than 500 meters away, especially moving ones.

Ammunition nomenclature
Type	Shot index	Projectile index	Fuze types	Projectile weight, kg	Explosive mass, g	Initial speed, m/s	Table range, m	DPV-2, m
High-explosive and fragmentation shells
High-explosive long-range steel grenade	UOF-344	OF-350	KTM-1, KTMZ-1	6,2	710	262	4200	350
Steel cast iron long range fragmentation grenade	UO-344A	O-350A	KTM-1, KTMZ-1	6,21	540	262	4200	350
HEAT shells
Cumulative steel	UBP-344M	BP-350M	BM	3,94	490	311	1000	400
Cumulative steel cast iron	UBP-344A	BP-353A	BM	5,28	623	238	1000	300

Project evaluation

In modern military historical publications there are various assessments of the weapon, both critical and positive. Critical publications draw attention to the gun’s weak ballistics and small angle of attack, which resulted in a relatively short firing range and the impossibility of firing along overhead trajectories. The use of an obsolete piston bolt significantly reduced the gun's rate of fire. It is noted that these shortcomings are due to the fact that the design of the gun was a kind of improvisation - the gun was created in a short time with the widest possible use of elements already tested in mass production. Also, the OB-25 did not fully satisfy the military leadership, which was reflected in the continuation of work on new regimental guns and the rapid curtailment of serial production of the OB-25 after the end of the war. At the same time, the positive qualities of the gun are its small dimensions and weight, good mobility, and good capabilities for combating armored vehicles due to the presence of cumulative shells in the ammunition.

Compared to its predecessor, the 76-mm regimental gun mod. 1927, OB-25 has significant advantages in mobility (less gun mass and higher transport speed) and fire angle (which gives better fire maneuvering capabilities and fighting tanks), but is inferior in maximum range and accuracy of fire. It is noted that a long firing range for a regimental gun, intended primarily for firing at targets located in the line of sight of the crew, is not a significant advantage.

Foreign analogues

Foreign analogues of the 76-mm regimental gun mod. 1943 are represented by German, Japanese and Belgian guns. Although 75-76 mm artillery was also actively used by the armies of other countries (in particular, the USA and Italy), in terms of ballistic qualities and place in the organizational structure, it was not a complete analogue of the light Soviet, German, Belgian and Japanese artillery systems designed for direct support of infantry with fire and wheels at the regimental or battalion level of the army hierarchy. Main characteristics of the gun mod. 1943, its predecessor gun mod. 1927, German infantry guns le.IG.18, IG.37 and IG.42, as well as the Japanese 70-mm battalion howitzer "Type 92" and the Belgian regimental mortar Canon de 76 FRC are shown in the following table:

Characteristic	arr. 1943	arr. 1927	le.IG.18	IG.37	IG.42	Type 92	Canon de 76 FRC
A country

76-mm regimental gun mod. 1927 - the first Soviet artillery and Soviet-designed weapon to be mass-produced. A distinctive feature of the design of this gun was that it was aimed at maximizing the cost of production and the use of low-skilled labor. Over fifteen years of production, about 18,000 guns of this type were manufactured. The 76 mm regimental gun of 1927 served as the prototype for several tank and self-propelled artillery guns. The cannon took part in all the wars waged by the Soviet Union at that time, and was in service with several foreign countries.

The birth of the 76-mm regimental gun mod. 1927

An analysis of the combat use of artillery during the world and civil wars showed the need to provide continuous artillery support for the infantry throughout the battle. For direct support and escort of infantry with fire and wheels, the army needed a new weapon.
A weapon of this type had to meet the following requirements:

• have sufficient power to combat enemy personnel located both in light field type shelters and openly;
• have the ability to suppress fire from all types of long-term fortifications by firing direct fire at their embrasures;
• destroy piers and make passages in wire fences;
• if necessary, fight enemy armored vehicles;
• the main method of firing was to be direct fire from open firing positions, although, if necessary, it was possible to fire from closed firing positions;
• the gun must be light enough to keep up with infantry;

The most common light field artillery weapon of the former tsarist army, the 7.62-mm cannon of 1902, did not satisfy the last condition, since rolling by crew forces to a distance of more than fifty meters was difficult. In addition, the gun had a low howitzer capacity, i.e. the projectile’s flight path was quite flat. This had a positive effect on shooting at embrasures, but was a drawback when fighting hidden infantry.
Mountain cannons could be disassembled into parts and transported in packs, but in the event of a surprise attack by the enemy, time was required to assemble them. Anti-assault gun mod. 1910 was the lightest, but had insufficient mechanical strength.

The most promising gun seemed to be the 76 mm short gun of 1913. In order to modernize it and bring its performance characteristics to modern requirements, in the twenties the forces of the Ordnance Arsenal Trust carried out work, which resulted in the appearance of a 76-mm short gun mod. 1913/25. The gun was manufactured in 1926 by the Bryansk plant and was tested at the test site with quite satisfactory results.

The main difference from the 76-mm cannon of 1913 was that the cannon was designed for the “three-inch” cartridge - the 76-mm cannon of 1902. Moreover, the gun must have separate loading and a variable reduced charge, something that hitherto Russian and Soviet artillery could boast of mainly howitzers.

In April 1926, at a meeting of the Artillery Committee, it was decided to continue work to improve the 76-mm gun of 1913. Among the new modernization projects, one project was the project of engineer Sokolov, the other two belonged to the Ordnance Arsenal Trust. The most successful feature of the OAT project was the suspension of the gun carriage. The gun barrel was the barrel of a short 1913 cannon, but with a chamber bored out to accommodate a three-inch cartridge case shortened by 51 mm.

During tests carried out at NIAP at the end of January 1927, it was found that when the initial projectile speed increases to 430 m/s, the presented guns lose stability and have a large throw when firing at low elevation angles. Therefore, it was decided to remain with the original ballistics, corresponding to the ballistics of the 76-mm mountain gun mod. 1909. In general, the tests of the guns were successful, and the new gun was put into service as a 76-mm regimental gun mod. 1927. In addition to the changes affecting the carriage, this gun had a chamber lengthened from 203 to 334 mm. All further work was transferred to Krasny Putilovets, whose Artillery Department was supposed to be engaged in serial production of the gun.

The government order for regimental guns in 1928 amounted to 400 guns. In 1929, the Artillery Committee, by its decision, obliged to accept as a standard cartridge the unitary cartridge of the 7.62 mm cannon of 1902, with a standard reduced charge. To prevent the regimental gun from being loaded with a shot with a full charge of the divisional gun, the flange of the cartridge case containing the reduced charge was reduced.
Thus, the cartridge case of a shot intended for a divisional cannon could not enter the recess in the gripping sockets of the regimental cannon. In addition, the regimental gun could fire with separately loaded cartridges, equipped with a standard charge, assembled from shortened cartridges intended for blank firing.

Changes made to the design during mass production

The first series guns had wooden wheels; the speed of towing a gun on good roads did not exceed 15 kilometers per hour. Since the ancestor of the 76-mm regimental gun of 1927 was the mountain gun of 1909, it inherited a collapsible barrel from it. The production technology for such barrels is quite complex and, as a result, expensive. But since there was no need for a detachable barrel for a regimental gun, and they didn’t want to change the production technology, they began to connect the casing and pipe in a hot state, which led to the fact that the barrel became impossible to disassemble. The technology for producing cheaper barrels - monoblocks - was mastered only in 1930.

Technical data of the 76-mm regimental gun mod. 1927

Ammunition and armor penetration.

Nomenclature of ammunition and armor penetration table.

(76-mm regimental gun model 1927. Firing tables. M, GAU. 1943)

The design of the gun was considered insufficiently modern. And in 1938, an order was issued to design a regimental gun with sliding frames and an elevation angle increased to 65 degrees. Moreover, the weight of the gun should not exceed 800 kg.

In pre-war times, the production of 76-mm regimental guns of 1927 was concentrated at the Putilov plant. In 1942, plant number 172 took over the production baton. With the development of production of the 76-mm regimental gun of 1943, the production of 76-mm regimental guns of 1927 was discontinued.

Combat use.

In the pre-war years, the 76-mm regimental gun of the 1927 model still remained in service, although it was considered a weapon of an outdated design that did not fully meet modern requirements. In the regimental artillery it was supplemented with a 120-mm mortar - a very effective artillery weapon for mounted fire, partly compensating for the shortcomings of the regimental cannon in the regimental artillery.

At the beginning of the war, the Red Army had 4,708 regimental guns. In the western border districts there were 2296 guns and 1675 120-mm mortars. Despite the outdated design at the beginning of the war, the 76-mm regimental gun mod. 1927 showed itself to be quite good; a certain supply of rounds had been accumulated for the gun during the pre-war years, and the shortage affected it to a lesser extent.

The gun satisfactorily coped with the usual tasks of regimental artillery, be it direct fire at the embrasures of firing points or the destruction of enemy personnel. But accompanying infantry battle formations with wheels was made difficult by the significant mass of the gun and the lack of devices for transporting ammunition to the battlefield. Moving a gun behind the infantry in a chain required reinforcement of the crew with infantry.

Actual cannon fire on tanks was effective up to 400 meters. But due to the low initial speed, the armor-piercing projectile destroyed tank armor only up to 30 mm thick. And the shortage of armor-piercing shells was not overcome at the end of 1942. The use of shrapnel with an impact tube was effective only against tanks with the lightest armor. The lack of an automatic shutter (piston bolt) reduced the combat rate of fire to 10 rounds per minute.

The single-beam machine provided a horizontal firing angle of only five degrees and significantly limited the fire mobility of the gun.
Effective fire when firing a high-explosive fragmentation grenade at enemy fire weapons and manpower from a closed firing position is up to 4000 meters, and direct fire - 1500 meters. Average shell consumption when firing direct fire, at a range of 600-1200 meters: destruction of light field shelters - 15-20 high-explosive grenades; to destroy an open firing point - 8-12 fragmentation grenades within 10-15 minutes.

Largely thanks to the simplicity of the design and the enormous losses of the material part, for the first time during the months of the war, its production, which was stopped in 1940 in order to find a more advanced design for the regimental gun, was able to be restored in besieged Leningrad.

Search for a new design.

Despite the simplicity of design and maintenance, the low price of the gun was still not entirely satisfactory to the military. In 1942, German tanks increased their armor and against this background the regimental guns already looked downright weak. Therefore, already in the spring of 1942, a competition was announced for the modernization of the regimental gun. The main tasks were:

• increasing the thickness of pierced armor to 55 mm at a distance of half a kilometer;
• the greatest possible unification of the components of the regimental gun with other serial guns;
• reducing the weight of the gun, which should not have exceeded nine hundred kilograms in firing position;

Two projects were submitted to the competition:

• Grabinskaya ZIS-21, which essentially represented a serial ZIS-3 cannon with a barrel shortened to 20 calibers and a modified shield closure
• Project of the Kirov plant, in which the barrel of a 76-mm cannon mod. 1927 was lengthened by nine calibers and balanced with a weight welded to the breech

Both projects were rejected. The ZIS-21 not only did not meet the required performance characteristics in terms of weight, but even surpassed the production gun in this indicator. In addition, during testing, the gun demonstrated a recoil that exceeded the value provided for in the performance characteristics.
When firing, the Leningrad cannon showed itself to be better than its competitors' cannon, but it also did not suit the military.

The first tanks of the familyMedium TankThe M4 received its baptism of fire in the summer of 1942 in Africa, during the Second Battle of El Alamein. Combining excellent mobility, strong armor and firepower capable of fighting any enemy tank, the Sherman laid claim to the title of the best tank on the continent. But progress did not stand still: German troops were saturated with improvedPz.Kpfw.IIIAndPz.Kpfw.IVwith better armor and long-barreled guns. Two years have passed since the start of the Sherman development program, and it was time to think about its modernization.

Three inches or 76 millimeters?

Shermans were not the only new vehicle to make its debut in the North African desert. Together with them, the Gun Motor Carriage M10 tank destroyer went into battle, which contained an M7 cannon with the ballistics of a three-inch M3 anti-aircraft gun. And although the Sherman concept from the very beginning provided for the possibility of using such a caliber, it was impossible to simply rearrange the gun: both the weight and size of the gun had to be cut down in order for it to fit into the turret of a medium tank.

M10 tank destroyer with three-inch gun, rear view

The basis for the new gun was the three-inch T12 anti-aircraft gun, calling it “75 mm T13”, which caused a lot of confusion in the correspondence. I had to rename the gun to “76 mm T1”. The caliber was changed from imperial to metric, the barrel length was cut from 57 to 52 calibers, and it now fit into the standard M34 Combination Gun Mount.

In order to preserve ballistics for the gun, special M62 shells with an increased powder charge were developed, which, however, were not compatible with the three-inch gun. A 14.9-pound (8.76-kg) shell fired from the new gun at a speed of 2,600 feet per second (792.5 m/s) penetrated a 112-mm plate at an angle of 20° from 500 yards (457 meters). , and “took” a 99-mm plate from 1000 yards (914 meters). In addition to armor-piercing shells, the 76 mm T1 cannon fired M42A1 high-explosive fragmentation shells and M88 smoke shells. The unitary cartridge of the new gun combined 75 mm shells with a standard M26 cartridge case.

Installing a cannon in the Medium Tank M4 was, in principle, a simple matter. In addition to replacing the ammunition rack and mantlet armor, the tankers wanted a three-time M51 (T60) telescopic sight to complement the M47 periscope with one and a half times magnification. This enabled the crew to fire at distances of up to three kilometers. The tank with the new gun carried 83 shells, 2,000 rounds of machine gun ammunition, and 600 rounds of ammunition for the Thompson assault rifle.

Medium Tank M4 with a 76mm T1 gun in a Combination Mount M34 at Aberdeen Proving Ground, August 1942

By August 1, 1942, two T1 guns arrived at the Aberdeen Proving Ground for testing. One was placed in a tank with registration number W-3060572, the other was tested on a stand, and then on a tank with registration number W-3015305. Since the recoil length was only 12 inches (305 mm), the tank maintained good elevation angles: from −12.5° to +25° in the improved Combination Gun Mount M34A1 installed on this tank.

On August 17, 1942, the Armor Board recommended adopting the tank into service as a limitedly standardized one, under the designation M4A1 (76 M1). Initially, it was planned to produce a series of 1000 tanks with a 76-mm cannon.

At the beginning of 1943, the Pressed Steel Car Company plant began assembling an experimental series of M4A1 (76 M1) tanks. In February, two tanks arrived at the Fort Knox test site for additional testing, during which problems began to surface one after another. The modified turret with a 363-kilogram counterweight in the stern could not simultaneously accommodate a 76-mm cannon and “telescopic sight, with magnification, which will allow you to fully realize the potential capabilities of the 76 mm gun”.

Testers also rated the position of the gunner, his seat and his instruments unsatisfactorily. The testers also did not like the cannon fencing with a 310-kilogram counterweight, since the loader first had to quickly remove it to evacuate it from the tank. The testers recommended either making the fence lighter or making the loader his own hatch in the turret roof. The gunner was also unlucky: the operation of the vertical aiming flywheel was assessed as “flimsy and sluggish,” which made accurate aiming of the gun impossible. The gun stopper in the “stowed” position blocked the driver’s view. In addition, the gun could not be brought into firing position without getting out of the tank.

M4A1(76 M1) during testing at Fort Knox, February 1943

The test report ended with a long list of design flaws that needed to be eliminated in order for the new gun to work acceptable. Naturally, such a sobering assessment influenced the adoption of the tank for service. As a result, on April 5, 1943, the Armored Council rescinded its recommendation. Aberdeen Proving Ground, Armored Council and Tank Destroyer Board each received one M4A1 (76 M1), the rest were converted into regular tanks with a 75mm gun.

Waste of time, or tanks of the T20 family

While the drama unfolded around the new 75-mm gun, the military did not sit idly by. In August 1942, at a conference at Fort Knox with the presence of generals of the armored forces, delegations from the General Staff, the Department of the Head of Armaments and the Armored School, tactical and technical requirements for the new tank were formulated. It was supposed to weigh no more than 30 tons and have three interchangeable turrets: for a 75-mm gun with an automatic loader, a 76-mm M1 and a three-inch M7 gun. Also, American engineers had to test several new types of transmissions.

It was proposed to build six experimental tanks: two, designated T20, were built with a new transmission, two others, designated T22, were equipped with a converted version of the Sherman transmission, and the remaining two, designated T23, used an electric transmission developed by General Electric » for the Heavy Tank T1E1 tank.

Tanks with the “pure” indices T20, T22, and T23 were supposed to be equipped with 76 mm guns, modifications with the E1 postfix were equipped with 75 mm guns, and the E2 designation was reserved for the version with the three-inch M7 gun. Most of the tanks from this family were never built, since the samples with the 76 mm gun performed more than worthy, and the T22E1 tank was the only one to receive a turret with a 75 mm gun. The remaining tanks of submodifications E1 and E2 were not built.

Having received a contract for the tank in May 1942, Fisher Body (a division of General Motors) completed the prototype only a year later, due to constantly changing requirements from gunsmiths and the army.

Nevertheless, the proposed production program was promising: already in August 1942, the American military let its Canadian neighbors know that the tank would go into production in 1943, and hinted that it would be good to start producing a single model instead of the Medium Tank M4 in the USA and the Ram Mk .II in Canada. However, the deadlines gradually shifted: by July 1943, the Canadians were informed that the tank would be put into service in early 1944. Moreover, the Americans honestly admitted that there were no specific plans for the construction of tanks other than the existing prototypes, and the Medium Tank T20 in its existing modification will not go into production.

The Americans did not hesitate to actively advertise the advantages of the new tank. The British were told that it would be so much better than all the M4 and Cromwell variants that no army would want to fight with them, knowing that the T20 series tanks existed. Anticipating massive orders from the American and British armies, the Canadians accepted the idea that they themselves would not receive new tanks until late 1944 or early 1945. This production bottleneck seriously worried the British, and they even considered the Heavy Tank T14 as a safer option from a production point of view.

Diagram of the turret roof of the T20 series tanks. Due to the same diameter of the turret ring, the possibility of using new turrets on the old chassis was considered in the early stages of the project

The British's cautious forecasts came true. The T20 family was plagued by all sorts of troubles: the tank turned out to be 2.5 tons heavier than expected, and its transmission and chassis constantly broke down during testing. In addition, the tank also overheated, and the version with torsion bar suspension T20E3 completely burned out during testing. After the engine failure, the T22 version was also removed from testing.

The Medium Tank T23 family was luckier. These prototypes were equipped with new turrets, which were developed after the failure with the M4A1 (76 M1). The first prototype featured a Combination Gun Mount 79 in a cast turret based on the standard Medium Tank M4 turret. The second turret was welded, with a large mantlet that covered the entire forehead in the manner of the German Pz.Kpfw.III. The installation of a 76 mm gun in this turret was called Combination Gun Mount 80. Both turrets had the same design of ammunition baskets, which housed 42 shells. The testers liked the second version of the turret more, but in the end, it was also made cast.

The T23 looked promising, and an order for 250 tanks was approved in May 1943. Later, in order to save funds for the production of the Medium Tank T25E1 and Medium Tank T26E1 tanks, the order was reduced to 200 units, but then raised again to 250. The first production Medium Tank T23 was assembled in October 1943. Its improved turret contained the same Combination Gun Mount T80, but now there was also a commander’s cupola with a pin for an anti-aircraft machine gun, a smoke grenade launcher and a gun mantlet thickened to three inches. The tank was sent to Fort Knox for testing, where bad news came: the T23 was unfit for service. The electric transmission was difficult to handle; to repair it, it was necessary to retrain all the technicians in the army, as well as replace the entire stock of spare parts. In war conditions this was unacceptable. Medium Tank T23 shared the fate of its fellows and did not make it to the front. The T23E3, a tank with torsion bar suspension, was also rejected by the military.

Dancing around the tower

However, the development of the T23 was not completely futile. Back in the spring of 1943, the Americans sensed something was wrong with the T20 and decided to play it safe. It was proposed to make the turrets with 76-mm cannons for the T23 compatible with the hulls of the M4 tanks, since they had the same turret ring diameter. This combination was called the Medium Tank M4E6. The new development was not limited to simply changing the turret, but was subjected to a deeper modernization: “wet” ammunition racks were added to the tank, the thickness of the frontal armor of the hull was increased, new hatches were installed, and many other minor changes were introduced. The honor of testing the new 76-mm gun again fell to the M4A1 tank, which entered testing at the Aberdeen Proving Ground towards the end of June 1943.

M4E6 medium tank undergoing testing

The gun also changed during this time. The recoil surface was lengthened by 305 mm, making it possible to move the gun forward and better balance it. An improved version of the gun was called M1A1.

Compared to the previous attempt, quite a lot has changed in the tower. Problems with vertical guidance were solved by using a spring-loaded gear with a slot in the guidance mechanism. The stabilizer was also changed so that it could cope with the new gun. The coaxial machine gun was moved forward two inches. The diameter of the turret basket was increased, and a slot for the loader appeared in the floor. In addition, he was finally given his own double hatch in the roof of the tower. Carryable ammunition was reduced to 63 shells.

The same one, left view

The tank's weight had increased to 69,000 pounds (31,300 kg), and the Continental R957-C1 engine, already the most unreliable of the Sherman family of engines, was having trouble keeping up. It was decided to change the gearbox ratios. Top speed in fifth gear dropped from 24 mph (36.6 km/h) to 19.6 (31.5 km/h). The Armored Council was categorically against this decision, as they did not want the new tank to lag behind its lighter counterparts.

Comparison tests showed that there was no reason to worry: the production M4A1 completed the 1.5-mile (2.4 km) hill run in 5 minutes 32 seconds, and the M4E6 did it 14 seconds faster. On virgin soil the opposite happened: the M4A1 covered 5.6 miles (9 km) in 45 minutes and 31.5 seconds, while the M4E6 took 46 minutes and 45 seconds. This meant that the tank did not have enough power. Testers demanded a further reduction in gear ratios.

On the left is a standardized M2 muzzle brake, on the right are experienced muzzle brakes for the M1A2 gun T8, T8E1 and T8E2

The design of the new tower was criticized by the Medical Research Laboratory. It was still awkward to use the telescopic sight because it was too far forward. It was difficult to aim the gun at the target due to significant play in the sight installation. The M9's rangefinder was not accurate beyond 2,000 yards (1,829 meters). The crew seats were also not without problems: the gunner's was called "big and awkward", and the commander's seat was not adjustable. The trigger pedals were not installed properly. The crew's actions were constrained by instruments. The loader's hatch was too small. The stops for the turret hatches also needed improvement.

However, despite the problems described, the test results were considered positive. The new installation was standardized under the name Combination Gun Mount M62.

On the left is an experienced forged aluminum muzzle brake T8E3, on the right is an experienced cast muzzle brake T8E1

But this was not the end of the development of 76 mm tank guns. The M1A1 cannon was replaced by the experimental 76 mm T3 with a muzzle brake. Tests showed that the idea was correct, but the first samples of the T8 muzzle brake, created in the likeness of the German one, did not please the Americans. The brake was modified by removing 3 pounds (1.4 kg) of weight, receiving the T8E1 modification. Cast T8E1 was compared with forged T8E2 and aluminum T8E3, also forged. The latter turned out to be the most unsuccessful, and the characteristics of T8E1 and T8E2 were approximately equal. Since the T8E1 muzzle brake was easier to manufacture, it was standardized under the name M2.

The gun went into production under the name M1A2. It increased the steepness of the rifling to one full turn of 32 calibers instead of one turn of 40 calibers on the M1A1. It was interesting that threads for attaching the muzzle brake began to be cut on the guns even before its development was completed. Because of this, you can now see many photos of Shermans with exposed threads on the end of the barrel or a counterweight that protected the threads from damage. The M1A2 guns required an additional counterweight on the breech to balance the 30 kg weight of the muzzle brake. The old M1A1 gun barrels also received threads for a muzzle brake - this modification was called M1A1S.

Comparison of the fragmentation effect of 75 mm (left) and 76 mm (right) high-explosive fragmentation shells when falling to the ground at an angle of 30°. Dark gray color means one deadly fragment per 0.37 m2, light gray - per 0.93 m2

On August 17, 1943, the American Army wished to complete the production of tanks with 75 mm guns by January 15, 1944, completely switching to 76 mm guns. The armored forces demanded 1,001 tanks with new guns as soon as possible to be tested in real battles. Even for the powerful US military industry, replacing thousands of 75mm tanks was not an easy task, and the Armored Council was categorically against completely replacing vehicles with old guns.

Firstly, the 75-mm cannon had a much more powerful high-explosive fragmentation projectile. With a smaller caliber, the projectile body was 567 grams heavier and contained 312 grams more explosives. This meant that the 75mm M48 round produced twice as much hazardous fragmentation as the 76mm M42A1 round. The number of fragments that could pierce a steel plate 9.5 mm thick was generally incomparable: 78 for the M48 versus five for the M42A1! When firing at unprotected targets, the M48 shell covered an area with fragments one third larger than the M42A1.

Scheme of penetration of the Tiger tank by American guns. Unlike the 76 mm gun, the Sherman's 75 mm gun could not penetrate the front of a tank from 1,000 yards (914 m)

However, the armor penetration of 76 mm shells more than compensated for the lack of fragmentation effect. The gun penetrated up to 108.2 mm of armor at point-blank range at an angle of 30°, compared to 79.5 mm for the 75 mm gun, and the difference grew with distance. Thanks to the higher projectile speed, the concrete-piercing effect of the 76-mm cannon, even with the same high-explosive fragmentation projectile, was significantly higher, especially at short distances.

Plans for a complete renewal of the tank fleet had to be put on hold. At a meeting on September 20, 1943, the military admitted that they would have to fight with Shermans with a mixed force of 75 mm, 76 mm and 105 mm guns. By the end of October, the planned number of tanks with 76 mm guns was reduced to 25%.

Sectional view of the turret of the T23 tank. As it was improved, the turret basket became smaller and then disappeared completely.

Production of vehicles with 76-mm cannons began in January 1944. According to tradition, the first to roll off the assembly line were 100 M4A1 tanks produced by the Pressed Steel Car Company. They were armed with the M1A1 cannon, but then switched to the M1A2. There were also variants with the M1A1C cannon. In March, production of M4A3 tanks with a 76-mm cannon began at Chrysler factories, and in May the first 30 Medium Tank M4A2(76)W vehicles were assembled at the Detroit Tank Arsenal plant.

English look

In the armies of the British Commonwealth, tanks armed with a 76-mm cannon received an additional designation “a”. Thus, the tank with the number T.262414, which was tested by the Experimental Wing, was called the Sherman Mk.IIa. By this time, the British already had their own tank with a more powerful 76 mm caliber gun, the Sherman Mk.Vc, also known as the Sherman Firefly. However, the British decided to try out the American tank.

The British immediately did not like the lack of a muzzle brake - apparently, the tank was equipped with an early M1A1 cannon. It tilted up to −10° without touching the body when turning, and the maximum angle of elevation was 25°. According to the British, the gun was poorly balanced. The balance could be improved by removing the counterweight from the fence, but then the stabilizer stopped working. The fence also did not perform well: the welds began to crack after just a few shots, and the cartridges, bouncing off the fence, ended up in the loader, and not in a special bag under the breech. The bag could hold up to 30 spent cartridges, but the stabilizer stopped working if there were already three or more. Also, with a sufficient number of cartridges in the bag, the gun lifted after each shot. The coaxial Browning machine gun also had a cartridge case bag that could hold 320 cartridges. The gun came with an M70H telescopic sight, but a hole in the mantlet was made for the larger M71D sight, leaving a significant gap around the sight.

Results of shelling of the Sherman's upper frontal plate with 75-mm and 76-mm armor-piercing shells. Only 76 mm M62 shells were able to achieve through penetration

The British liked the flywheels for aiming the gun, but they didn’t like the fact that the vertical aiming mechanism was too weak, and the gun had to be secured while moving, although the driver or his assistant could easily reset the stopper if necessary.

The turret rotation mechanism pleasantly surprised the British. The Oilgear's hydraulic mechanism was sensitive enough to follow a target moving at 5 mph (9.6 km/h) at a distance of 2,000 yards (1,829 meters). Due to the poorly balanced turret, it was impossible to turn it manually at a roll of 15°, but the turning mechanism still worked, although not as well as on level ground.

The trigger mechanism of the gun was duplicated: it was possible to shoot with a mechanical pedal or by pressing a button. The button was removed from the flywheel handle, which the British really didn’t like: the gunner was forced to use either a mechanical trigger or remove his hand from the guidance mechanism while firing.

The gunner's position, by British standards, was cramped: due to the massive turret rotation mechanism, he had nowhere to put his right knee. If you wriggle around so that you can comfortably place your knee, then it becomes inconvenient to use the telescopic sight. The fault here was not the fastidiousness of the British: American tests also revealed this shortcoming.

Oilgear hydraulic turret rotation mechanism

The commander's workplace also drew criticism. The seat was soft, but had significant play, which caused the commander to slide off it. The British did not like the upper position of the commander's seat due to the fact that the commander, standing, stuck out of the turret up to his waist, and he had nowhere to put his feet, but the lower position was satisfactory. The commander could rotate the turret himself, which the British really liked. The new commander's cupola was also well received.

The British did not like the loader's position, but the testers admitted that nothing could be done about it. Moving the seat forward 7 inches (18 cm) would improve performance. The tendency of spent cartridges to fly into the loader's lap had a negative impact on the gun's rate of fire. With the modified fencing, the rate of fire improved: in 30 seconds it was possible to load five shells from the first-stage stack. If the shells were supplied by the driver's assistant, then five shells could be loaded in 15 seconds. The tank carried a total of 71 rounds, 41 of which were accessible with the gun facing forward.

The assistant driver's seat did not cause any negative marks, but it was probably not used. This crew member was absent from the Sherman Firefly tank, and it seems that the British planned to abolish him here too, noting that with the assistant's seat folded it became much easier to reach one of the shell stowages.

In addition to all these disadvantages, the armor-piercing effect of the American 76-mm projectile was worse than that of the 17-pounder Firefly cannon, and the production of shells and spare parts in domestic factories was a clear advantage for the British. As a result, the Sherman Mk.IIa still served in the British army, but in very limited quantities and only in Italy.

Medium Tank M4A2E8 – the workhorse of the Canadian Army in the 1950s

As the tank was used, additional shortcomings were revealed. When driving on uneven terrain, the shells fell out of the stowage, and the driver's assistant had to constantly hammer them back in. There was at least one recorded case in which a shell fell from its stowage and exploded, injuring an assistant and damaging a tank. Fortunately, the rest of the crew were not injured. The "Platypus" track extensions used on tanks of this type were also criticized, as they further stretched the tracks. However, the reviews were not only negative. For example, the British tank crews really liked the commander's cupola, despite the small hatch.

The British experience does not suggest that the rest of the Commonwealth shunned the Shermans with the 76mm gun. For example, the Canadian army replaced its Ram Mk.II with American Medium Tank M4A2E8 after the end of World War II. They fought under the Canadian flag in Korea. After this war, they began to be replaced by Centurions, but some Shermans served in reserve formations until the 1970s.

Sources And literature:

1. N. Moran, The Chieftain's Hatch
2. R.P. Hunnicutt, Sherman, A History of the American Medium Tank
3. Army Operational Research Group Memorandum No.415
4. Terminal Ballistic Data Volume II Artillery Fire
5. Technical Memorandum ORO-T-117 Survey of Allied Tank Casualties in World War II
6. Photo archive Dept. of National Defense / Library and Archives Canada
7. Photo archive of the author
8. Canadian Military Headquarters Archives, London (1939–1947) RG 24 C 2
9. http://www.theshermantank.com

to Favorites to Favorites from Favorites 1

Recently, both popularizers of military history and some creators of alternative histories have expressed complaints about Soviet artillery in general and divisional artillery in particular. For example, there is an opinion that the 76mm caliber was insufficient for a divisional artillery gun during the Second World War, and that it was advisable to switch to a caliber of 85..87mm or even 105..107mm at the turn of 1939..1941. As a conclusion to these considerations, the conclusion is drawn that the introduction of the 76mm ZiS-3 cannon into service in 1942 was erroneous. Some time ago I expressed the same point of view.

When we talk about a divisional artillery gun, we usually mean a fairly powerful gun that fires at a distance of about 10 km. Therefore, we are talking about fire from a closed position. And the Red Army had such a weapon in service: it was a 122mm howitzer of the 1938 model M-30.

It is possible that, to facilitate understanding by history buffs, the M-30 howitzer should be called the “main divisional weapon.” In this case, the 76mm divisional gun is an “auxiliary divisional gun.” What was the ratio of main and auxiliary divisional guns in the Red Army rifle division? For 44 howitzers in the Red Army rifle division there were 16 units of 76mm guns!

For what purpose were 76mm divisional guns used?

Let us remember that the main difference between a cannon and a howitzer is firing along a flat trajectory in general, and direct fire in particular

First of all, 76mm divisional guns were sent not to divisional artillery, but to specialized anti-tank units of the Red Army. In addition, in the division they were a means of strengthening the divisional anti-tank defense in dangerous directions. The supply of this weapon to the anti-tank artillery and to the divisional artillery was as follows:

Secondly, 76mm divisional guns were used where it was impossible to use howitzers due to the overhead trajectory, for example, to suppress machine guns and artillery pieces sheltered from mounted artillery fire.

Thus, it should be recognized that the refusal in 1937..1941 from the 76mm divisional gun in favor of guns of 85mm caliber or more would have entailed an increase in the mass of divisional guns and, probably, a decrease in their aiming speed and rate of fire. All this would not turn the divisional gun into a more effective divisional weapon than the M-30 howitzer, but would reduce its effectiveness as an anti-tank weapon.

A comparison of the states of the Red Army rifle division and the Wehrmacht infantry division gives us this picture

So, by mid-1941, the artillery of the Red Army rifle division had significant fire capabilities, mainly due to 44 units of 122mm and 152mm howitzers. At the same time, the division was quite saturated with anti-tank artillery. It consisted of 54 anti-tank guns. In addition, each regiment had one 76-mm six-gun battery. In total, the three regiments had 18 76-mm guns. Batteries of 76-mm cannons of the light artillery regiment (16 guns) were also used to fight tanks. Consequently, the division had 88 guns to combat tanks. When defending a 10 km zone, the division could create an acceptable density of anti-tank weapons of 8-9 guns per 1 km of front.
Thus, the conventional analogue of the 76mm divisional gun is not the 105mm howitzer. There was no analogue to this gun in the Wehrmacht. The 105mm howitzer was opposed by the 122mm M-30 howitzer. To be fair, it should be noted that the 45mm anti-tank guns of the Red Army could not be dangerous for all tanks of the Wehrmacht (as well as vice versa: the 37mm anti-tank guns of the Wehrmacht could not be dangerous for all tanks of the Red Army)

Tanks 1941
Let us illustrate the ratio of tanks that are vulnerable and invulnerable from the frontal projection for the fire of anti-tank guns of the most popular 37..45mm calibers using the example of the largest tank battle in the history of the Wars of June 23-27, 1941 - in the area of ​​Dubno, Lutsk and Rivne. In this battle, six Soviet mechanized corps faced a German tank group. In the Brody-Rivne-Lutsk section, the Soviet 8th, 9th, 15th, 19th, 22nd and 4th mechanized corps and the German 11th, 13th, 14th, 16th collided and 9th tank divisions.

CONCLUSION

The roots of the Red Army's unsuccessful resistance to the invading troops of Nazi Germany in 1941 lie in no way in the insufficient caliber or quality of divisional artillery systems, but in a completely different plane.

A few quotes:

Grabin, Vasily Gavrilovich. Weapon of Victory

“The distant predecessor of the ZIS-3 was the 76-mm gun of the 1900 model, the first Russian divisional artillery system. It was followed by the three-inch model 1902, a modernized version of it (model 1902/30), then the F-22 model 1936 appeared, which, in turn, was replaced by the F-22 USV model 1939. The ZIS-3 thus completed the long line of domestic divisional guns with a caliber of 76 millimeters. The ZIS-3, with the same weight, was 1.6 times more powerful than the three-inch model of 1902.
..ZIS-3 In all respects, it was far superior to its predecessor, the F-22 USV. It was 400 kilograms lighter, more compact, noticeably faster-firing and three (!) times cheaper

As a result of long-term improvement of technological processes and the growth of professional skills of designers, Grabin’s team managed to significantly reduce the metal intensity and labor costs for the production of one weapon. The technological perfection of the Zis-3 allowed the same plant, on the same machines and with the same personnel, to increase the annual production of 76mm divisional guns, first three times, and then 6 times!

Eike Middeldorf. Russian campaign: tactics and weapons

German infantry weapons
.. Anti-tank defense is without a doubt the saddest chapter in the history of the German infantry. The path of suffering of the German infantry in the fight against the Russian T-34 tanks goes from the 37-mm anti-tank gun, nicknamed the “beater” in the army, through the 50-mm to the 75-mm mechanically driven anti-tank gun. Apparently it will remain completely unknown why, within three and a half years from the first appearance of the T-34 tank in August 1941 until April 1945, no acceptable anti-tank infantry weapon was created. At the same time, excellent tanks, the Tiger and the Panther were created and handed over to the front.
RUSSIAN ARTILLERY IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR
During World War II, Russian artillery was armed with very good modern material. Both in terms of the quality of gun steel and its design characteristics, it met the requirements of that time. The huge number of guns produced in Russia allowed the Red Army to form a large number of artillery units for various purposes.
The main types of guns of the Russian divisional artillery were the 76 mm cannon and the 122 mm field howitzer. A comparison shows that Russian divisional guns were somewhat inferior in caliber to German 105 mm and 150 mm guns. However, Russian guns were well adapted to local conditions. The somewhat lower power of the projectiles was compensated by the higher mobility of these guns. Thus, the Russian divisional artillery was armed with material most suitable for use in Russian conditions.
The 76-mm gun, with its high initial projectile velocity and mobility that met the conditions of the Eastern European terrain, was most suitable for performing tasks of direct infantry support and fighting tanks. To perform such tasks, these guns were sometimes concentrated in large numbers in one area. In other cases, 76 mm divisional guns were used for direct fire and always achieved good results. In defense, they were used mainly in “anti-tank barriers”, making anti-tank defenses so strong that they could only be broken by methodical artillery fire on individual targets. The anti-tank battalions of the Russian divisions were also equipped with 76 mm guns and were organizationally part of the artillery.
The 122 mm field howitzer was a modern weapon and was used to solve a wide variety of problems. Russian artillery, using this weapon, achieved powerful fire impact on German troops. The characteristic features of the 122-mm howitzer were: a carriage with sliding frames, a large horizontal firing angle and high mobility with mechanical traction. Good ballistic properties ensured sufficient fire maneuverability and a firing range of up to 12 km with a projectile approximately one and a half times more powerful than that of a 105-mm German field howitzer. The sufficiently strong sound effect of a shell explosion made it possible to zero in 122-mm howitzers with sound reconnaissance equipment. Thanks to this, 122-mm howitzers were also successfully used to combat enemy artillery.

Development of divisional artillery in the second half of the twentieth century.
Until the disbandment of motorized rifle divisions in the RF Armed Forces, divisional artillery did not actually change. The basis of the divisional artillery of the USSR ground forces in 1981 were the same 122mm howitzers as in 1941. They underwent a slight evolution (from M-30 to D-30), and then became self-propelled (Gvozdika self-propelled guns).


The development of anti-tank artillery came to the 100mm caliber, which made the existence of an additional “auxiliary divisional artillery system” no longer necessary. Howitzers were consolidated into a howitzer artillery regiment (also known as an artillery regiment), and anti-tank artillery into a separate anti-tank artillery division.

CONCLUSION

the statement “the Red Army used a 76mm cannon with a weak projectile as a divisional weapon” is erroneous. in fact, the divisional guns of the Red Army served

1. 122mm howitzer (32 GUN PER DIVISION),
2. younger brother (lighter, more mobile, faster-firing and of course with a weaker projectile 76mm cannon) 16 guns per division
3. older brother (152mm howitzer) 12 guns per division

Specifically, the 76mm Zis-3 gun was not a divisional gun, but a universal-purpose gun (divisional artillery/anti-tank gun). This class of weapons existed only in the Red Army of the USSR and was absent in other armies of the world. The ZiS-3 for the period 1941..1943 was the best technologically possible anti-tank weapon. As a divisional weapon, it was to be used only as an extremely useful and necessary addition to the 122mm howitzer.

When building an alternative divisional artillery of the Red Army, I would suggest the optionZiS-3+ M-30+D-1(with a shift in the release of ZiS-3 to, for example, the end of 1940 and D-1 in 1939 ), and with the same proportions for the named artillery systems: The division has two artillery regiments, a total of 16 ZiS-3 + 32 M-30 + 12 D-1.

for 45mm anti-tank guns - it would be nice to make them in the M-42 version (with a 68-caliber barrel), also for example from 1939..1940.

Among the numerous exhibits of the Leningrad Military Historical Museum of Artillery, Engineering Troops and Signal Corps, there is a unique exhibit - a 76-mm divisional gun of the 1942 model with serial number 4785. This is one of 46 thousand 76-mm field guns of this type manufactured at the factories of the USSR People's Commissariat of Armaments in years of the Great Patriotic War.

The combat fate of this gun, not the most powerful, but formidable in the skillful hands of Soviet soldiers, is unusual. The cannon fired its first shot at the Nazis on the Kursk Bulge near the village of Ponyri in the summer of 1943. For almost two years she took part in battles, supporting with fire the infantry liberating Soviet land, then she fought to liberate Poland, and in the spring of 1945 her “voice” was heard in Nazi Germany. Fortune was favorable to her: she was not crushed in battle or on the march by German tanks, nor was she bombed by dive bombers. The gun fought along front-line roads for 6,204 km, fired 3,969 shots during this time, and destroyed 33 tanks, 21 self-propelled guns, 74 vehicles, 14 artillery pieces, 17 mortars and five aircraft at airfields. On April 21, 1945, at 18:10, the gun crew under the command of Senior Sergeant I.M. Rodionov opened fire on Berlin.

The ZIS-Z divisional gun with an amazing fate from the Leningrad museum is not the only one preserved from those times: in museums and memorials at the sites of past battles and in military units, these guns are carefully preserved as a memory of the immortal feat of the Soviet soldiers who defeated the “brown plague”.

The appearance in the 1890s of the armies of many countries of rapid-fire cannons of 75 - 77 mm caliber, intended for direct support of infantry, is associated with the invention in France in 1884 of Vielle of smokeless, slow-burning gunpowder, which made it possible to eliminate a number of problems associated with the improvement of these guns The caliber of the guns was optimal for the combat missions assigned to them: their shells could destroy light fortifications, destroy enemy personnel and even his field artillery. Larger caliber guns were significantly heavier, which made them difficult to maneuver on the battlefield. In 1892, French designers Puteaux and Duport created a 75 mm cannon with an independent aiming line.

The first domestic 76-mm, or, according to the classification accepted at that time, a three-inch gun, was developed at the Putilov plant in 1900 by engineers L.A. Bishlyager, K.M. Sokolovsky and K.I. Lipnitsky based on the works of the founder of rapid-fire artillery V. S. Baranovsky. The gun had a fastened barrel, a piston bolt and a carriage with recoil devices. The design of a carriage with a hydraulic recoil brake and a knurling device with rubber buffers was proposed by military engineer A.P. Engelgardt. The brake cylinder was attached to a slide, which slid during firing with the gun barrel attached to them along the machine guides, and the rod was located between the beams of the gun machine. In 1902, the Putilov plant proposed an improved version of the three-inch gun, developed under the leadership of the outstanding artillery scientist N.A. Zabudsky. During recoil, the barrel of this gun moved along guides located on top of the cylindrical cradle, and the breech was rigidly connected to a spindle-type hydraulic recoil brake cylinder located inside the cradle. The knurling spring was located in the gap between the brake cylinder and the cradle. The cradle itself was attached using trunnions to the machine with guidance mechanisms located on it. Unitary cartridges with high-explosive and incendiary grenades in a steel case, as well as shrapnel, were used as ammunition for the three-inch model 1902. A piston bolt with two smooth and rifled sectors allowed the prepared crew to fire up to 10-12 rounds per minute.

Three-inch guns turned out to be a very rational design; they worked well on the battlefields of the First World War and the Civil War. The three-inch gun was produced practically without significant changes until 1930, when it was modernized under the leadership of V.N. Sidorenko. 4,477 modernized 76-mm guns of the 1902/30 model were in service with the Red Army at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. The ballistic data of this gun turned out to be so successful that they were used as a basis for the creation of new domestic guns developed in Soviet times.

In 1932, the Main Artillery Directorate of the Red Army issued technical specifications to the Design Bureau of the All-Union Gun-Arsenal Association (KB VOAO) for the development of 76-mm universal and semi-universal divisional guns. At the same time, the design bureau of the Leningrad plant "Krasny Putilovets" began to create a universal cannon, and the design bureau of plant No. 8 began creating a semi-universal one. The idea of ​​​​universal guns capable of firing at air and ground targets was fashionable in the West in the early 30s of the 20th century, and among The leadership of the Red Army were adherents of the idea of ​​universalization.

The VOAO Design Bureau was created as a powerful center for the development of artillery weapons with a well-equipped pilot production and was located in the village of Kalininsky in the territory of the present town of Korolev near Moscow, next to the Moscow Gun Plant No. 8, one of the largest domestic enterprises in this profile. The development of the universal cannon was led by S.E. Rykovskov, and the semi-universal one by V.G. Grabin. The first estimates showed that universal and semi-universal guns would be much more complex, heavier and, as a result, more expensive than specialized anti-aircraft and field artillery guns. But most importantly, they will both have mediocre tactical and technical characteristics. But the “gears” of the planned economy began to turn, and by the end of the year both departments had prepared preliminary designs for new guns. At this time, new plans matured in the leadership of the People's Commissariat, and at the end of 1933, by order of G.K. Ordzhonikidze, the VOAO Design Bureau was liquidated, and the building, equipment and almost completed pilot plant were transferred to L.V. Kurchevsky, the creator of Soviet dynamo-active guns. The new enterprise was given the name GKB-38. There were few people willing to work on dynamo-rocket guns at GKB-38, and the bulk of the specialists moved to work at other enterprises. A group of twelve designers and one technologist, led by V.G. Grabin, was asked to continue work on the semi-universal A-51 cannon at the new artillery plant No. 92, recently built in Nizhny Novgorod.

Artillery production at the plant at that moment was insignificant and was carried out according to documentation developed at other enterprises. There was an acute personnel issue at the plant - there were not enough qualified workers and engineers: three designers and several draftsmen worked in the technical department of the plant. They made corrections to drawings that showed obvious errors. The work of the newly arrived designers at the plant began with helping the plant deliver to the customer a batch of ten guns of the 1930 model. Artillery production was of a semi-handicraft nature, one of the manifestations of which was the production of individual parts and assemblies for guns according to unrecorded design documentation: some experienced workers used drawings brought from their previous place of work for production. The metal utilization rate was low: the mass of the workpiece was often ten times greater than the finished part. Therefore, the designers had enough work in the new place, and their desire to continue work on the creation of the A-51 cannon, which received the F-20 index at the new plant, was understood as their authority strengthened in the workforce. Soon after his arrival, V.G. Grabin, in whom experts saw not only a boss, but also an informal authoritative leader, managed to convince the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry of the need to develop a 76-mm divisional gun, specialized in solving traditional problems. V.G. Grabin considered the creation of universal and semi-universal guns of this caliber for infantry to be a dead end. The People's Commissariat allocated 100 thousand rubles to carry out experimental design work (R&D) on the gun, which received the factory index F-22. The People's Commissariat set a deadline of eight months for the implementation of the design and development work; in this case, the gun was in time for the artillery weapons review scheduled by the State Autonomous Inspectorate at the Sofrinsky training ground.

1-muzzle brake; 2-cradle bracket; 3-movable shield; 4-plug; 5-panorama building; 6-left bed; 7-tire type GK from a GAZ-AA car; 8 - worm flywheel; 9-body with axle; 10-sector; 11-longitudinal level; 12-panorama latch; 13-sight device; 14-flywheel of the protractor worm; 15-panorama basket; 16-transverse level; 17-distance drum; 18-disc; 19-axle shaft; 20 sponge rubber; 21 roller bearing; 22-hub; 23 bead ring; 24-thrust mechanism for swinging the sight; 25 basket clamp screw; 26-reel panorama; 27-lens reflector; 28 - worm flywheel for moving the drum in a vertical plane; 29-panorama eyepiece; 30-pointer; 31 - longitudinal worm flywheel; 32-worm flywheel for remote drum installation; 33-tooth sector of the sight stem; 34-flywheel for the transverse swing mechanism of the sight; 35-union nut; 36-sight body; 37-handle of the transverse swing mechanism, 38-rod; 39-milestone, 40-stopper of the lower folding shield; 41-right bracket (left-mirror view); 42 - right fork; 43-pipe; 44-shovel holder; 45 - handrail; 46-rule; 47.71 - lira; 48-shovel opener; 49-wheel brake housing; 50-screw with a heel and handle; 51 - block; 52-bracket; 53-overlay; 54-gon; 55 - pole and rod holder; 56-right half of the upper shield; 57-shield bracket; 58-left half of the upper shield; 59-box panorama; 60-visor; 61 - a box for a bath brush, a discharger and a wooden pencil case for a form; 62-eye; 63 - pocket for the Luch-2 device; 64-bar; 65-upper limiter of the movable flap of the observation window; 66-latch; 67-movable shield; 68-lower limiter of the movable shield; 69-lower shield; 70-loop; 72-eye; 73-fuse; 74 - glass lid; 75-glass, 76-spring; 77-thrust; 78-constipation; 79-lid with a loop; 80-outer cylinder body; 81-rubber buffer; 82 - hook for fastening the shoe brake chain; 83—rule fixing sleeve, 84—rotation mechanism strut; 85 - right pick-up; 86-battle axis; 87-axis left fork; 88-off lever; 89-bracket for fixing the shaft of the mechanism for fastening the swinging part of the gun in a traveling manner; 90-spring stopper, 91-pin stopper; 92-half-roller; 93 - right pivot foot; 94-left kingpin foot; 95-lubricators; 96-bolt-lock; 97-knurl armor; 98-movable shield; 99-flywheel of the turning mechanism; 100-pin upper machine; 101-worm gear housing; 102-joint drive; 103 - vertical aiming flywheel; 104-pipe; 105-recoil brake; 106-front nut; 107-front cage; 108-front tire; 109-rear nut; 110-rear rim; 111-rear tire; 112-breech; 113 - ejector axis; 114-pusher; 115 - pickup; 116-muzzle brake stop; 117-knurler; 118-guide arc; 119-shutter handle; 120-ejector lever; 121-closing mechanism; 122-cradle body; 123-lifting mechanism bracket; 124-lower lever of the sight's rolling mechanism; 125-shield; 126-trigger pressure; 127-axis; 128-table for determining the amount of liquid in the knurl; 129-trigger lever; 130-spring; 131-handle for locking the swinging part of the gun in a traveling manner; 132-axis balancing mechanism; 133 - shutter wedge; 134-ejector cam; 135 - stopper; 136-clutch; 137-ejector; 138-cocking axis lever; 139-crank; 140-crank axis stopper; 141-socket for screwing in a hook to produce an artificial rollback; 142-drummer cover; 143-copier; 144-trunnion; 145-roller of the travel-style locking mechanism; 146-bushings; 147-slider; 148-rail rollback indicator;

a-protrusion limiting the opening of the beds: b-protrusion behind which the frame stopper slides in a combat manner; c-hole for the bolt-locking the combat axis

By the deadline set by the People's Commissariat, three experimental guns were manufactured at Plant No. 92 and sent to the Moscow region: the semi-universal F-20, the F-22 with folding frames, and the yellow-painted F-22 with solid frames.

All guns met the requirements of the GAU. The universal weight was 1550 kg, which was 200 kg less than the weight established by the technical specifications; the lightest was the F-22 with solid frames - 1450 kg. However, even the lightest of the guns they created weighed 350 kg more in combat position than the divisional gun of the 1902/30 model that was in service with the Red Army. In addition, to reduce weight, the designers used high-alloy steel, while the role model was made of low-alloy and carbon steels.

I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov, K.E. Voroshilov, V.Ya. Chubar, G.K. Ordzhonikidze, V.I. Mezhlauk and representatives of the People’s Commissariat of Defense came to the review on June 14, 1935 at the Sofrinsky training ground. The guns lined up in front of them were their chief designers, who reported to the arriving managers about the presented samples. On the right flank, the first was the 76-mm universal cannon of the Krasny Putilovets plant, developed under the leadership of I.A. Makhanov, next to it was the 76-mm semi-universal divisional gun 25K of plant No. 8, developed under the leadership of V.N. Sidorenko. Next stood three 76-mm cannons from factory No. 92. The rear of the line was completed by guns adopted by the Red Army: a 76-mm F.F. Lender anti-aircraft gun on a truck chassis, a 122-mm A-19 hull cannon and a number of large-caliber guns, including the 203 mm B-4 howitzer. Stalin liked the “yellow” gun, and he returned to it when the rest of the government continued to inspect other guns. He asked V.G. Grabin many questions about the design of the gun and its tactical characteristics. After demonstration firing at the test site, the government decided to continue further work on the F-22 cannon with solid frames. After field and military tests and significant modifications to a number of components (the charging chamber was remade for the unitary cartridge of a 1902/30 model gun, the muzzle brake was removed from the barrel and a number of components were strengthened) in 1936 the F-22 was put into service, and V.G. Grabin was awarded the Order of Lenin. As a result of the abandonment of the muzzle brake and strengthening of the structure, the weight of the gun increased to 1700 kg. During production, the design bureau of plant No. 92 took measures to improve the manufacturability of the F-22. If in 1937 the production of an F-22 weighing 1700 kg required 11,895 kg of metal, then in 1938 it was 8350 kg, and in 1939 it was 6684 kg.

In April 1938, at a meeting with K. Voroshilov, V.G. Grabin learned that the design bureau of the Kirov plant under the leadership of I.A. Makhanov, on the instructions of the GAU, since March 1937, has been developing a new divisional gun to replace the F-22, during testing of which a number of defects, the elimination of which, according to Vasily Gavrilovich’s estimates, should have taken about 10 months. At the same time, V.G. Grabin made a proposal to make it possible to improve the F-22, bringing its characteristics to the level of the GAU technical specifications issued to the Kirov residents. The adoption of the F-22, developed at Plant No. 92, contributed to the unity of the company’s team, which had clearly defined prospects. Compared to 1934, this was a different team: the qualifications of the workers had increased significantly, the design bureau carried out work on new guns, and this work was carried out in close collaboration with factory technologists. The designers acquired the necessary experience in developing guns, and the components they developed were more rational and technologically advanced. When designing guns, the Grabin Design Bureau was one of the first to pay attention to the ergonomics of the crew’s workplaces from the point of view of maintaining high performance during firing and consulted on these issues with the physician-physiologist L.N. Aleksandrov. In 1938, for the first time since its launch, the plant met its planned targets, for which a large group of plant workers were awarded orders and medals.

V.G. Grabin drew up a plan, which he introduced to his comrades after returning to Gorky. Three to four months were allotted for the development of technical documentation for this plan, a prototype was to be manufactured six to seven months after the start of work, and one and a half months were allotted for factory testing. At the same meeting, Vasily Gavrilovich said that the development period for a weapon, in comparison with generally accepted time standards, is short, and according to wartime standards it is unacceptably long, so the team in peacetime must learn to work as they did during war. The new divisional gun received the factory designation F-22USV.

Note. According to the memoirs of V.G. Grabin, in the second half of 1941, plant No. 92 manufactured and delivered to the customer about 1000 ZIS-3 guns.

The faith in the strength of the team turned out to be justified. Seven months later, the first experimental F-22USV cannon was installed in the workshop, which used up to 50% of the F-22 parts and components. Compared to its predecessor, it looked more bulky and heavy. But its weight was 40 kg less than that established by the technical specifications and amounted to 1460 kg. The gun successfully passed the tests, and in 1939 it was put into service and in 1940 it was put into full production at plant No. 92. In total, as of June 22, 1941, the Red Army had 2686 F-22 divisional guns and 1170 F-22USV.

Before World War II, work began in the USSR to create tanks with projectile-proof armor. The leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense had information that similar work was being carried out in Germany. In this regard, the design bureau of plant No. 92 began to create an anti-tank gun capable of hitting promising tanks. An analysis of the capabilities of the 45-mm gun, carried out by the design bureau of plant No. 92, showed that increasing the initial velocity of the projectile to 1000-1200 m/s does not allow obtaining a gun with the necessary characteristics for armor penetration and barrel survivability. A 50-60 mm anti-tank gun with an initial projectile speed of 1000 m/s was considered more promising. The GAU Artillery Committee offered a 55 mm caliber, and the F.E. Dzerzhinsky Artillery Academy - 60 mm. For the design development of the ZIS-2 anti-tank gun (after plant No. 92 was named after I.V. Stalin, new codes began to be assigned to the design bureau’s developments), a caliber of 57 mm was chosen, while the optimal one for it was a projectile weighing 3.14 kg with an initial speed of 1000 m /With. For the ZIS-2 cartridge, we chose a cartridge case from a 76-mm divisional gun with the barrel re-compressed from 76 to 57 mm. The power of the new gun was 160 ton-meters, which was four times more than the “forty-five” of the 1937 model. To reduce the time for issuing technical documentation, the proven design and technological scheme of the 76-mm F-24 regimental gun was chosen as the basis. After a month and a half, the technical documentation for the ZIS-2 was ready, the prototype was manufactured three months after the start of the design. The development was carried out with the knowledge of the People's Commissar of Armaments B.L. Vannikov according to the tactical and technical specifications drawn up by the design bureau of plant No. 92. The work on the 57-mm anti-tank gun was financed by the People's Commissariat of Armaments. The first shots from the new gun were fired in October. The material part of the ZIS-2 worked flawlessly.

By the fall of 1940, the design bureau of plant No. 92 was on the rise: it enjoyed well-deserved authority in the People's Commissariat and the State Autonomous Administration, and work on various artillery systems enriched the team with interesting design solutions.

Successful tests of the 57-mm ZIS-2 anti-tank gun served as an impetus for the development of the ZIS-Z divisional gun. The compact carriage of the ZIS-2 was lightweight, reliable, and ensured high mobility of the gun: while firing and on the move. It, as well as the cradle, recoil devices, and guidance mechanisms, could be used without significant modifications for the new divisional gun. Therefore, after the first firing of the 57-mm ZIS-2 anti-tank gun in the design bureau of plant No. 92, a discussion took place in a narrow circle about the design of a new divisional gun. Vasily Gavrilovich Grabin shared his thoughts about the new weapon with his comrades D.I. Sheffer, K.K. Renne, V.D. Meshchaninov, I.A. Gorshkov and L.D. Kotov.

According to V.G. Grabin, there were the following reasons for the development of a new divisional gun.

Firstly, even a rough calculation showed that by the beginning of 1941 the Red Army would have fewer guns of this type than the Russian army before the First World War, and orders for the production of the F-22USV from the People's Commissariat of Defense were no longer expected. The scale of that war was more modest than the upcoming war, the inevitability of which no one doubted. Therefore, the possibility cannot be ruled out that in the event of war it will be necessary to resume production of the F-22USV, which he considered as a transitional model to a more advanced gun. Consequently, it would not hurt to have a new divisional gun in case of war, which would be superior in its characteristics to the F-22USV.

Secondly, the power and ballistic solutions of the F-22USV divisional gun, mastered in mass production, fully satisfied the requirements for the promising ZIS-Z divisional gun. Therefore, it would be rational to superimpose the 76-mm barrel of the F-22USV onto the ZIS-2 carriage. Based on the practice that had developed by this time, initially the maximum elevation angle of 45 degrees was adopted for the new gun, as providing the maximum firing range. Shooting at high elevation angles will lead to a significant increase in the maximum loads on the carriage (for the ZIS-2 the elevation angle was 25 degrees); to reduce them, they decided to equip the ZIS-Z barrel with a muzzle brake, which would reduce the recoil energy by 30%.

V.G. Grabin’s proposals met with understanding and support from the meeting participants.

The development of the ZIS-Z barrel according to a design scheme similar to the ZIS-2 was entrusted to the designer I.S. Griban and the head of the department V.D. Meshchaninov. The 76-mm barrel tube had to be fitted into the casing of the anti-tank gun. Griban quickly developed a sketch for the pipe and sent it to production, and he himself began drawing up drawings for the barrel. After studying the designs of various muzzle brakes, the brake of the 122-mm A-19 hull gun of the 1931 model was chosen as a prototype for a new gun with variable recoil length. From the blank of the barrel for the F-22USV, according to the sketch of I.S. Griban, the barrel of an experimental gun was made, onto which a modified muzzle brake was installed. The barrel was installed in the ZIS-2 cradle and after the assembly of the gun was completed, the first firing was made from it at the factory range at night with reduced, normal and reinforced charges at zero elevation angle. In the morning, the gun delivered to the workshop was examined: no deformations or structural damage were found.

This made it possible to begin the second stage of work - a detailed study of the main components of the ZIS-Z divisional gun.

The general layout of the gun was entrusted to A.E. Khvorostin, an experienced designer who completed more than one layout of guns in various design bureaus. A.P. Shishkin took up the modification of the upper machine. The installation of the sight was entrusted to B.G. Pogosyants and Z.M. Minaeva. The most difficult task, the development of a variable recoil length mechanism, was entrusted to a recent graduate of the Leningrad Military Mechanical Institute F.F. Kaleganov, who had previously taken part in the creation and debugging of ZIS-2 anti-recoil devices. After considering similar devices, he chose as a prototype the recoil brake design from the same A-19 gun, created under the leadership of V.N. Drozdov.

The task of creating a cannon was simplified by the fact that V.G. Grabin’s design bureau was the initiator of high-speed methods for designing artillery guns, providing for their widespread unification and work in close contact with factory technologists, when the designer, at an early stage of development, took into account the peculiarities of the technological processes mastered by the factory. The joint work of designer A.P. Shishkin with technologists: foundry worker G.I. Kopteyev and machining specialist Gordeev made it possible to submit the upper machine for assembly ahead of schedule. There were no problems with installing the sight: designers B.G. Pogosyants and Z.M. Minaeva with the deputy head of the sighting shop Seliverstov promptly completed this work.

While testing the gun at the test site, the designers noticed that when fired, it behaved quite steadily. This prompted an idea: is it possible to completely abandon the brake with a variable rollback length? The idea was extremely tempting; in this case, there is almost no need to modify the ZIS-2 recoil devices for the ZIS-Z, the carriage of which had been tested many times by that time. It was necessary to check how this would affect the accuracy of fire. The accuracy assessment was checked by traditional shooting at shields with the brake set to a constant recoil length. The first counting group of shots was performed at a distance of 500 m. We obtained excellent results. Repeated firing did not produce any discrepancies and was not inferior to the accuracy of the F-22USV battle. Shooting at a distance of 1000 m showed no worse results. At the same time, when shooting at the maximum range with the selected recoil length, it was necessary either to increase the height of the upper machine, or to dig out a ditch under the cradle between the frames when shooting at the maximum range. At the same time, reducing the elevation angle from 45 to 37 degrees reduced the firing range of a high-explosive fragmentation projectile by 0.7 km (to 13.3 km). But even at this range it was difficult to adjust the firing of the 76-mm cannon.

84-stand of the turning mechanism; 87-axis right fork; 99-flywheel of the turning mechanism; 100-pin of the upper machine; 101-worm gear housing; 102-joint drive; 103 - bevel gear box; 149-tooth sector; 150-sight bracket; 151-bracket for aiming mechanisms; 152 - basting; 153-spacer tube; 154-base of the frontal box; 155-brass bushing; 156-needle bearing; 157-gears; 158-stopper body; 159-frame stopper; 160-pedal hook; 161-press pin; 162-spring pusher; 163 - pedal; 164-fork; 165-way screw; 166-casing; 167-spherical bearing; 168-nut; 169-uterus; 170-adjusting nut; 171-bearing; 172-thrust washer; 173 - inner glass; 174 - spring; 175 - cover; 176-thrust; c-hole for the bolt locking the combat axis; d-hole for installing a rotating mechanism; d-barrel declination angle limiter; e-eyes for attaching the top shield; g-hole for the cradle axle; and - hole for mounting the sight; K-hole for installing bevel gear; l - cylinder of the balancing mechanism; m - boss for the pressure pin pusher; n-rotation limiter of the upper machine; n-protrusion limiting the spread of the beds; p-tide to limit the swing of the combat axis; c-tide fastening the combat axis

Since the ZIS-Z was developed on a proactive basis, they decided to limit the maximum elevation angle to 37 degrees. This made it possible, while increasing the line of fire by only 50 mm, to maintain the compactness and stockiness characteristic of the anti-tank ZIS-2. The transition to a constant recoil length required a significant rearrangement of the gun, and A.E. Khvorostin did this job brilliantly. The modified gun successfully passed factory tests. The results of the work pleased the creators of the ZIS-Z. It, not inferior to the F-22USV in tactical characteristics, was 400 kg lighter, more compact and more technologically advanced in production and, most importantly, three times cheaper than its predecessor. The maximum rate of fire of the gun reached 25-30 rounds per minute. But ZIS-Z, created on its own initiative, also had a big disadvantage - no one knew about it either in the State Autonomous University or in the People's Commissariat. It was necessary to choose a suitable occasion to present the gun to the leadership of the GAU and bring the work to its logical conclusion - range and military tests, and if their results are positive - acceptance into service and launch into full production.

Such an occasion soon presented itself. In March 1941, the head of the GAU, Marshal G.I. Kulik, came to Gorky, who supported V.G. Grabin a year ago in the creation of the ZIS-2. This time, the marshal was little concerned about the production and development of divisional guns, and he stopped the chief designer’s attempts to discuss this issue. And the gun remained covered in the experimental workshop to wait in the wings.

And this hour has come: on June 22, 1941, German troops crossed the Soviet border. The Great Patriotic War began:

The rapid advance of German troops, the encirclement and pockets in which the troops who entered the battle in the border districts found themselves, led to large losses in personnel and weapons. The evacuation of many enterprises from the European part to the east began. Under these conditions, those factories that were located outside the combat zone were required to sharply increase the production of weapons and military equipment. In accordance with mobilization plans, production of the F-22USV was to be launched at plant No. 92 named after. Stalin and factory No. 221 "Barricades". Moreover, due to the difficult situation at the front, production had to be increased by an order of magnitude compared to the volumes in which these artillery systems were produced in peacetime.

A month after the start of the war, the plant tripled its production of guns. But this was not enough. A construction team of several thousand people arrived at the enterprise. In less than a month, they erected a new building for the production of normals and recoil devices with an area of ​​10,000 m2. To help the plant equip production with horizontal milling, boring and surface grinding machines, the representative of the State Defense Committee G.I. Ivanovsky, former director of the country's largest Krivoy Rog Metallurgical Plant, and during the war, Deputy People's Commissar of State Control, arrived. Such equipment was available at the milling machine plant, but its director did not give it away, saying that production would suffer. The lesser of two evils was chosen - the machines were handed over to the artillerymen. In the evening, G.I. Ivanovsky told the director of this plant by telephone that the equipment must be handed over immediately. An hour later, cars with workers from plant No. 92 arrived at the enterprise, who not only dismantled and transported the machines, but also managed to install and launch them in a new place by morning.

On the first day of the war, Marshal of the Soviet Union G.I. Kulik was replaced as head of the GAU by General N.D. Yakovlev. As V.G. Grabin recalled, in July 1941, having received the consent of People's Commissar D.F. Ustinov, he turned to Deputy People's Commissar of Defense for Armaments G.I. Kulik with a request to familiarize himself with the new developments of the design bureau of plant No. 92 and decide on the feasibility their adoption. The show was scheduled for July 22 in the courtyard of the People's Commissariat of Defense. 57-mm self-propelled anti-tank guns were delivered from Gorky: ZIS-ZO on the chassis of the Komsomolets tracked armored tractor and ZIS-41 on the chassis of the GAZ-AAA vehicle, as well as the ZIS-Z cannon. Despite the good impression made by the work of the gun crews, the marshal’s conclusion about the ZIS-Z was negative.

A-unitary cartridge UOF-354M with a full charge with a high-explosive long-range steel grenade OF-350; B-unitary cartridge UBR-354A with a full charge with an armor-piercing tracer projectile BR-350A; B - unitary cartridge USh354Sh with an incomplete charge with bullet shrapnel Sh-354T; G-unitary cartridge UBR-354P with a full charge with a sub-caliber armor-piercing tracer projectile BR-354P; D - unitary cartridge UD-354 with an incomplete charge with a smoke steel projectile D-350: E unitary cartridge UBP-353M with a flameless full powder charge with a cumulative (armor-burning) steel projectile BP-350M; F - unitary cartridge UD-354 with a full charge with an incendiary long-range steel projectile 3-350; I - training cartridge with a grenade; K - training cartridge with cooled spacer tube T-6; L blank shot with a charge of WMO 17/32 or WMO 17/16 gunpowder; M - blank shot with a charge of VTOD brand gunpowder; I – sleeve; 2.24 - powder charges; 3 - cardboard cover; 4 shutter; 5 leading belt made of red copper; 6 - body of a high-explosive fragmentation grenade; 7,13,31-explosive charges; 8 - fuse KMT1 (KMTZ-1); 9-cardboard cylinder; 10 - KV4 capsule sleeve: 11 - body of the BR-350A armor-piercing tracer projectile: 12 - ballistic tip; 14-bottom fuse MD-8:15 - tracer; 16 – bullet shrapnel body; 17-lead bullet; 18.42 - locking screws; 19.28 - screw heads; 20-distance T-6 double-action tube; 21 - central tube; 22 - expelling charge: 23 - powder charge in the cap; 25 - sub-caliber armor-piercing projectile; 26 - hard alloy core: 27 - smoke projectile body; 29 - fuse KMT-2: 30 - ignition cup; 32-smoke-forming substance; 33 - body of a cumulative steel projectile; 34-BM fuse; 35-gasket; 36-copper charge lining; 37-shaped charge; 38 - detonator capsule; 39-cap made of calico with black powder (additional flame arrester); 40-paper tube with powder column (main flash suppressor); 41 - body of a steel long-range incendiary projectile; 43 - head bushing; 44-gaskets; 45 - incendiary segment; 46-diaphragm; 47 - expelling charge; 48-wood boss; 49-wooden projectile; 50-head; 51 - cooled fuse KMT-1; 52 - screw; 53 - nut; 54-cork; 55-washer; 56-cooled capsule sleeve; 57-cooled spacer tube T-6; 58-bracket; 59 - igniter; 60-shortened case: 61-shot of WMO 17/32 or WMO 17/16 powder; 62-shot from VTOD brand gunpowder

Since the plant was daily required to increase the production of F-22USV, F-34 and ZIS-2 guns, in contrast to pre-war times, when plant No. 92 produced one (sometimes two) type of guns, drastic measures were required to comply with the resolutions of the State Defense Committee . V.G. Grabin proposed the following solution to this problem to the plant director. It is necessary to launch the ZIS-Z into production, which will gradually replace the F-22USV in gross production. In order not to “tease the geese” ahead of time, they decided to make the muzzle brake in pilot production. Assembly of the ZIS-Z without a barrel was carried out simultaneously with the ZIS-2. The first batch of several ZIS-Zs was assembled during the night shift and presented to the customer in the morning, he refused and went to report to the senior military representative, engineer-colonel I.F. Teleshov, who reported this to the GAU. The answer did not come immediately, but the guns began to be received.

At the same time, the plant carried out measures to reduce the labor intensity of the guns produced. First of all, the design bureau decided to simplify the design of the gun by reducing the number of parts and their unification, without reducing their tactical characteristics. Before this, each Grabin gun had its own bolt, and there were five of them in production. For the F-22, before its modernization, it consisted of 116 parts, many of them quite complex. The simplest bolt was for the 57-mm ZIS-2 gun. It was taken as a base when creating a unified bolt, common for all guns. The new shutter had 57 parts. We organized a production line for its production. The shutter began to be made four times faster than before. Before modernization, ZIS-Z and ZIS-2 each had 2080 parts, and after modernization - 1306.

In December 1941, the production of guns increased five and a half times compared to pre-war. The plant fulfilled its obligations, but the front demanded more. The enterprise was visited by K.E. Voroshilov, who spent the whole day getting acquainted with the production and was pleased with what he saw.

At the beginning of 1942, V.G. Grabin was summoned to a meeting of the State Defense Committee, scheduled for January 4, - this was a convenient opportunity to show the ZIS-Z to Stalin and get it adopted for service. V.G. Grabin shared his plans with D.F. Ustinov, and he allowed the cannon to be delivered to Moscow. The GKO meeting was convened at the direction of the military, who argued that the modernized guns would fall apart during artillery preparation and should be made according to old drawings.

At a meeting of the State Defense Committee, Stalin sharply criticized the work of V.G. Grabin, accusing him of design itch, because of which the country would be left without guns. In a depressed state, Vasily Gavrilovich went to the hotel. Early the next morning he had a telephone conversation with I.V. Stalin. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief approved the work done by the plant staff and V.G. Grabin. Taking advantage of the opportunity, Grabin told Stalin about the ZIS-Z and invited him to look at it.

ZIS-Z and F-22USV were delivered to the Kremlin. Stalin came to the inspection with members of the State Defense Committee and military leaders. Stalin liked the ZIS-Z, which meant that she would finally be able to get official registration in the army.

After the ZIS-Z divisional gun was shown in the Kremlin, it passed official field tests. The field testing commission of six people was headed by Panikhin, who headed the Artillery Rifle-Tactical Committee of the Chief of Artillery of the Red Army.

In the test results report, the new divisional gun was recommended for adoption, and it was noted that it was not inferior to its predecessor, the F-22USV divisional gun, and had the following advantages over it:

420 kg lighter;

It has a higher ground clearance of 360 mm (for the F-22USV it is 330 mm);

It has a lower height, which allows it to be better and faster to camouflage it in position;

Placing the guidance mechanisms on one side made it more convenient for anti-tank defense;

It has fewer parts and is easier to manufacture;

The production of one copy of the new gun requires 420 fewer machine hours, while saving 1,400 kg of ferrous and 110 kg of non-ferrous metals.

Among the shortcomings identified by the commission during field tests of the gun and which must be eliminated by the design bureau together with the manufacturer before putting it into full production;

Eliminate leaks in the knurl;

Provide a rollback length of 750 + 50 mm;

Strengthen the sight bracket of the upper machine, strengthen the side level and the cross-swing mechanism of the sight.

By decree of the State Defense Committee of February 12, 1942, the 76-mm divisional gun was adopted for service. Plant No. 92 was given a target for the production of 76-mm divisional guns: in March - 400 F-22USV and 200 ZIS-Z, in April - 650 ZIS-Z and in May - 700 ZIS-Z. In May, Plant No. 92 produced divisional and tank guns 13 times more than the pre-war level; in December this figure increased 16 times. In the first half of 1943, the production of guns increased and reached an 18-fold increase compared to the pre-war level. Factory No. 92 produced more guns than the entire German military industry.

In the multiple increase in the production of guns, an equally important role belongs to the plant’s technological service, which was constantly searching for reserves to increase production. 54 modernized machines and 50 multi-place accessories for them replaced 164 universal machines, which made it possible to free up 2,453 m2 of production space, transfer 247 workers to another job and save 23.9 million rubles. The labor intensity of the ZIS-Z was reduced from 1053 to 633 machine hours. The cost of the ZIS-Z after modernization was increased to 15 thousand rubles, while for its predecessors F-22 and F-22USV it was 120 and 60 thousand rubles, respectively.

The cutting of the hole in the breech for the bolt wedge was carried out on slotting machines by workers of the highest qualifications. Technologists suggested making this hole by broaching. Along with the slotting machines, a broaching machine made by the plant itself was installed on the production line. E.V. Uglova, who had only the third category, began to work on it. The first breech, submitted for inspection, turned out to be made better and faster than in the traditional way. Careful measurements have shown that the accuracy of making a hole and the cleanliness of its processing on a broaching machine is much higher, and many times less labor is spent.

To finish machining the barrel bore, which took about 12 hours using traditional technology (boring with floating cutters), they first used a broach on a machine designed by ENIMS, but the hydraulics did not work reliably on it. The machine tool design department under the leadership of K.I. Borodkin created 100-ton screw broaching machines, which were simpler and more reliable. Finish broaching began to take only 15 minutes. This department modernized over 200 machines of 66 types and created 20 types of new special machines.

At the suggestion of the head of the assembly shop, A. Kovalev, wooden chutes were made along which the carriages rolled, placed on wheels and assembled in the carriage shop. The carriages were installed by crane and connected to each other with a special coupling. The cannon moved along the conveyor using a mechanical winch. At the end of the technological chain, the guns were sent to the factory site; one gun was rolled into the back, the second was towed on a trailer.

The number of devices for making parts has tripled compared to pre-war. Deputy Director for Metallurgy, Professor M.M. Struselba, a specialist in shaped and centrifugal casting, made a great contribution to increasing labor productivity at the plant. At his suggestion, the barrel blank began to be produced by centrifugal casting. Factory metallurgists mastered chill casting of the muzzle brake. Previously, it was made from forgings. The forged version of the part required 30 hours of intense labor, but now only half an hour of machining was required. The Germans were unable to master this technology, although they tried.

They forged a muzzle brake for cannons until the end of the war.

In 1943, plant No. 235 in Votkinsk and plant No. 13 in Ust-Katav joined the production of ZIS-Z, which contributed to increasing the production volume of guns developed under the leadership of V.G. Grabin.

During the Great Patriotic War, the need to create self-propelled artillery became obvious. In the fall of 1942, under the leadership of the chief designer of plant N2 38 (Kirov), M.N. Shchukin, the SU-76 self-propelled artillery mount was developed based on the T-70 light tank. The production of this tank was carried out at several enterprises, including the Gorky Automobile Plant. The ZIS-Z cannon was used as the main weapon on this vehicle. The first SU-76s put into service were found to have serious defects in the power unit during operation at the front. It was significantly modified at the GAZ plant under the leadership of A.N. Astrov and launched into mass production under the designation SU-76M.

On the first self-propelled guns, the ZIS-Z gun was used without a frame and with a new armored cradle and recoil device. Subsequently, a modification of the ZIS-Z for the SU-76M was developed, taking into account its specific placement on the chassis: the upper mounting of the gun was attached to a channel installed across the fighting compartment, the maximum elevation angle was limited to 15 degrees, and a foot trigger was introduced. Subsequently, this modification occupied a significant share in the overall production of ZIS-Z, and the SU-76M became the most massive Soviet self-propelled gun manufactured during the war. A total of 13,732 SU-76M self-propelled guns were produced, of which 11,494 were produced during the Great Patriotic War. Production of the unit continued until 1946.

There is documentary evidence of the technical level of the ZIS-Z cannon from the head of the artillery structures department of the Krupp company, Professor Wolf. Comparing this weapon with German ones, he wrote; “For a 76-mm gun of the 1942 model, the ratio of muzzle energy to the weight of the gun in the firing position is 131. This is a surprisingly high figure. The best German 75-mm gun 16 (obviously, we are talking about 7.5 art. Rak. 40. - Author's note) this parameter is 80.3... The given figures show the significant superiority of the Soviet system. It also manifests itself in the maximum firing range. The gun, which weighs 73 percent of the weight of a 75mm German gun, sends a projectile 1,000 meters further. Moreover, the projectile itself is 13 percent heavier than the German one... Therefore, the opinion that it is the best 76-mm gun of the Second World War is absolutely justified.”

Unlike many guns manufactured during the Great Patriotic War, it was not the last for the ZIS-Z: in footage chronicling armed conflicts in Africa or Afghanistan, you can sometimes see this gun today.

Tactical and technical characteristics of the ZIS-3 gun

Initial projectile speed, m/s:

OF-350……………………………………………………………………………….680

BR-350A………………………………………………………………………………662

Maximum table firing range, km…………13.29

Gun rate of fire, rds/min:

maximum………………………………………………………..25

sighting……………………………………………………………15

Time to transfer from traveling to combat position, s….30 - 40

Maximum elevation angle, degrees……………………………37

Maximum declination angle, degrees………………………………-5

Horizontal firing angle, degrees…………………………..54

Height of the firing line (taking into account tire draft), mm…………..875

Length of the gun with the frames folded, mm…………………..6095

Width of the gun with the frames folded, mm……………….1645

Height of the gun along the shield, mm……………………………………………………1375

Weight of the gun in firing position, kg………………………….1200

N. SOIKO (The article was prepared based on materials from the Korolev Historical Museum)

Noticed a mistake? Select it and click Ctrl+Enter to let us know.