Great treaty of friendship. Ukraine has a friendship treaty with Russia. It is not torn apart on purpose. Secret additional protocol

It is believed that the history of Russia’s relations with Turkey begins in 1475 - it was at that time that the Ottoman Empire conquered Crimea, and the Turks began to oppress Russian merchants in the acquired possessions. Then Ivan III sent a letter to the Turkish Sultan asking him not to interfere with the merchants’ trade. Leader Ottoman Empire went to meet the Grand Duke of Moscow - and Russian trade resumed.

Vasily III, the son of Ivan III, attached great importance to relations with the Turks. The prince ensured that the Turkish Sultan Selim expressed his readiness to “always be with Moscow in friendship and brotherhood” and forbade his people to appropriate the property of Russian merchants who died in Turkey.

However, despite the first successes of bilateral contacts between Russia and Turkey, relations between the two countries were tense. The fact is that the Ottoman Empire constantly supported the Crimean Tatars in campaigns against Russia - and in 1568 the first military conflict began between the powers. The countries first fought for control of the Northern Black Sea region and the North Caucasus, then for the rights of Christians within the Ottoman Empire and the right of navigation in the Black Sea straits.

A series of 13 Russian-Turkish wars, which largely predetermined the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, ended only in 1918.

How to rename an island

In the same 1918, having suffered defeat in the First World War, Turkey was forced to conclude the Mudros Truce with the Entente countries. The document was signed on Lemnos, an island in the Aegean Sea. By the way, it was Lemnos that was used by the game developer Bohemia Interactive Studio as the basis for creating the island of Altis, on which the action of the popular computer game"Arma III". Two developers spent several months in prison on this island - local authorities did not like the fact that they were conducting topographic surveys (according to another version, the men were suspected of spying for Turkey).

Czech intervention was required to free the prisoners.

According to the Armistice of Mudros, the Entente countries had the right to military occupation of the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits, and Turkey had to immediately demobilize the army and transfer to the allies all warships sailing in waters under Turkish sovereignty. And at the end of January 1919, the Supreme Council of the Entente decided: Armenia, Syria, Palestine, Arabia and Mesopotamia were to separate from the Ottoman Empire.

And if before the outbreak of the First World War Türkiye owned the territory with total area 1,786,716 sq. km with a population of up to 21 million people, then after the war its area decreased to 732,000 square meters. km, and the population became only 13 million people.

October Revolution for the Turks

In April 1920, a government was proclaimed in Ankara, headed by politician and future reformer Mustafa Kemal. The Grand National Assembly existed in parallel with the Sultan's government in Istanbul. Kemal was terribly indignant that the Sultan signed the peace treaty of Sèvres, according to which part of the Turkish lands went to the Greek kingdom, and part to Armenia. In response to this, the Great National Assembly, in alliance with the Bolshevik government of the RSFSR, declared a fight against Greece and the Entente, and also sent troops into areas that were disputed between Armenia and Azerbaijan (in particular, in Karabakh).

Vladimir Lenin repeatedly stated that the Turkish struggle for independence arose largely under the influence of the October Revolution.

At the request of Ulyanov, by the way, 6 thousand rifles, over 5 million rifle cartridges, 17.6 thousand shells and 200.6 kg of gold bullion were sent to the Kemalists from the RSFSR.

Soon, the unrecognized government of Kemal signed the Treaty of Alexandropol with Armenia. According to the document, Armenia lost part of its territories, recognized the Sèvres Peace Treaty as annulled, pledged to recall its delegations from Europe and the United States, and transferred to Turkey the right to control railways and other means of communication, as well as “take military measures” on its territory.

The “Peace Treaty between Turkey and Armenia” was signed on the night of December 2-3, 1920, and the next day the Red Army entered Yerevan. The Soviet government of Armenia immediately declared the document annulled and invited the Turks to begin new negotiations.

Together - against imperialism

On February 26, 1921, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs opened the Moscow Conference, and in March, as part of the conference, a Russian-Turkish treaty on “friendship and brotherhood” was signed. “Thanks to the activity of Soviet diplomacy and the realistic position taken by the Chairman of the Grand National Assembly and Prime Minister of Turkey Mustafa Kemal, difficulties in Soviet-Turkish relations were successfully overcome,” wrote historian Pavel Gusterin. “The instructions for conducting negotiations received from the Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars, Vladimir Lenin, stated that it was necessary to make “an extremely strong start to rapprochement and friendship.”

Georgy Vasilievich Chicherin

Wikimedia Commons

“All agreements so far concluded between both countries do not correspond to mutual interests,” the text of the document read. “They agree therefore to recognize these treaties as canceled and of no force.”

It’s interesting what the agreement said: the powers were brought together by “the solidarity that exists between them in the fight against imperialism.”

According to the agreement, Turkey received the Kars region and some other regions of Armenia, but at the request of the Soviet side it undertook to leave the Alexandropol region and the Nakhichevan region. The Soviet government canceled all Turkey's debts to the tsarist government, and also promised that it would support "Turkish sovereignty" and "the national rights of the Turkish people."

Stalin makes territorial claims

On October 13, 1921, with the participation of representatives of the RSFSR, an agreement was signed in Kars (a city in the east of modern Turkey) between the Armenian, Azerbaijani and Georgian Soviet Socialist Republics, on the one hand, and Turkey, on the other. Its provisions practically repeated the essence of the Moscow Treaty. In addition, the document stated that the cities of Kars and Ardahan, as well as Mount Ararat, would go to Turkey.

And on January 22, 1922, the Soviet statesman and military leader signed a friendship treaty with Turkey on behalf of Ukraine.

Soviet-Turkish agreements were of great importance for strengthening political power Mustafa Kemal. “The prestige and importance of Anatolian Turkey in Europe rests solely on Russia and our friendship,” said Turkish Commissioner for Foreign Affairs Yusuf Kemal Bey in April 1922.

In 1945, by the way, Joseph Stalin made territorial claims against Turkey and advocated the annexation of the territories in Transcaucasia, which had belonged to the Russian Empire since 1878 and transferred to Kemal in 1921, to the USSR. However, after the death of the leader, the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated: “The Soviet government considers it possible to ensure the security of the USSR from the side of the straits on conditions equally acceptable to both the USSR and Turkey. Thus, the Soviet government declares that the Soviet Union has no territorial claims against Turkey."

The Japanese name for Japan, Nihon (日本), consists of two parts - ni (日) and hon (本), both of which are Sinicisms. The first word (日) in modern Chinese is pronounced rì and, as in Japanese, means “sun” (represented in writing by its ideogram). The second word (本) in modern Chinese is pronounced bӗn. Its original meaning is "root", and the ideogram representing it is the ideogram of the tree mù (木) with a dash added at the bottom to indicate the root. From the meaning of “root” the meaning of “origin” developed, and it was in this sense that it entered the name of Japan Nihon (日本) – “origin of the sun” > “land of the rising sun” (modern Chinese rì bӗn). In ancient Chinese, the word bӗn (本) also had the meaning of “scroll, book.” In modern Chinese it is replaced in this sense by the word shū (書), but remains in it as a counting word for books. The Chinese word bӗn (本) was borrowed into Japanese both in the sense of "root, origin" and "scroll, book", and in the form hon (本) means book in modern Japanese. The same Chinese word bӗn (本) meaning “scroll, book” was also borrowed into the ancient Turkic language, where, after adding the Turkic suffix -ig, it acquired the form *küjnig. The Türks brought this word to Europe, where it from the language of the Danube Turkic-speaking Bulgars in the form knig entered the language of the Slavic-speaking Bulgarians and, through Church Slavonic, spread to other Slavic languages, including Russian.

Thus, Russian word book and the Japanese word hon "book" share a common root of Chinese origin, and the same root appears as the second component in the Japanese name for Japan, Nihon.

I hope everything is clear?)))

On September 28, 1939, the USSR and Germany entered into an agreement on friendship and borders. It was signed by the German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, who arrived in Moscow on September 27, and on the Soviet side by the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov. Joseph Stalin, the Soviet plenipotentiary representative in Germany A. A. Shkvartsev, and, on the part of the Third Reich, the German ambassador to the USSR Friedrich-Werner von der Schulenburg also took part in the negotiations on the conclusion of a German-Soviet agreement. This agreement consolidated the liquidation of the Polish state and confirmed the previously concluded Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 23, 1939. The agreement was valid until June 22, 1941, when, after Germany attacked the USSR, all Soviet-German agreements lost their force.

According to the Treaty of Friendship and Borders, the Soviet and German governments, after the collapse of the former Polish state, considered exclusively as their task the restoration of peace and order in this territory and ensuring the people living there a peaceful existence consistent with their national characteristics.

Several additional protocols were attached to the agreement. The confidential protocol determined the procedure for the exchange of Soviet and German citizens between both parts of the dismembered Poland. Two secret protocols adjusted the zones of “spheres of interest” in Eastern Europe in connection with the division of the Polish state and the upcoming “special measures on Lithuanian territory to protect the interests of the Soviet side” (Lithuania moved into the sphere of influence Soviet Union in exchange for Polish lands east of the Vistula, which went to Germany). The obligations of the parties were also established to suppress any “Polish agitation” affecting the interests of the two powers.

Poland is on the road to destruction

Modern Poles like to call themselves “victims” of two totalitarian regimes – Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin. They put an equal sign between them and some even want to put modern Russia account for the occupation, dismemberment and destruction of the Polish state. What is especially vile is that there are their accomplices in Russia who want “punishment” of our Motherland.

However, if you look closely at the Republic of Poland in 1918-1939. (II Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth) then one can discover that the Polish state was not an “innocent victim” of the machinations of aggressive neighbors. Since 1918, Warsaw has pursued an active foreign policy aimed at restoring Greater Poland “from sea to sea.” The main direction of Polish expansion was eastern, however, other neighbors also experienced Warsaw's territorial claims. Polish politicians did not prevent the start of a big war in Europe. In fact, Poland was a “hotbed of war”, rocked the “pan-European boat” in every possible way, and did everything to ensure that a world war began. In September 1939, Poland had to pay for the mistakes of previous years and the policies of its government.

Until 1918, the Polish people lived in three empires – Austria-Hungary, Germany and Russia. First world war all three empires were defeated and collapsed. The victorious states of Great Britain, the USA and France allocated territories inhabited by Poles from the fallen powers and connected them with the “Kingdom of Poland”, which received independence from the hands of the Bolsheviks. In the east, the border of Poland was determined by the so-called. "Curzon Lines". The Poles took advantage of the fact that their lands were surrounded by defeated empires and their fragments and captured much more land than they were assigned. So in October 1920, Polish armed forces captured part of Lithuania with the city of Vilna (the historical capital of Lithuania). Germany and the new state of Czechoslovakia also suffered from the Poles. The Entente was forced to recognize these self-seizures.

In the spring of 1920, when the territory of Russia was torn apart Civil War, Polish troops easily captured large territories of Ukraine and Belarus, including Kyiv and Minsk. The Polish leadership, led by Józef Piłsudski, planned to restore the Polish state to the historical borders of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth of 1772, with the inclusion of Ukraine (including Donbass), Belarus and Lithuania. Polish elite, after the defeat of Germany and Russia in the First World War. planned to dominate Eastern Europe. The Soviet armies launched a counteroffensive and drove the enemy out of Soviet territories. However, Lenin and Trotsky lost their sense of proportion and, confident in the beginning of the revolution in Poland, turning it into one of the socialist republics, gave the order for the invasion of Polish territories themselves. Tukhachevsky suffered a serious defeat near Warsaw. According to the Treaty of Riga of 1921, vast lands that were located east of the Curzon Line, with a predominant non-Polish population, were ceded to the Polish state. Poland included Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, the Grodno province, the Volyn province and part of the territories of other provinces of the former Russian Empire. This agreement has already laid a “mine” under the relations between the two countries. Moscow sooner or later had to raise the issue of the return of Ukrainian and Belarusian lands. Warsaw was dissatisfied with the results of the war - the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth could not be created within the borders of 1772. Having captured such booty, the Poles in subsequent years pursued a policy of national oppression and colonization of the eastern regions. Lithuanians, Belarusians, Ukrainians, Rusyns and Russians became second-class citizens in Poland. Until the very beginning of World War II, this determined consistently bad relations between the USSR and Poland, with Warsaw regularly taking the lead. In particular, in the early 1930s, the USSR had trade agreements with almost all countries in the world, and Poland agreed to conclude such an agreement only in 1939, a few months before its death.

Betrayal of France and external aggression. On March 12, 1938, Germany sent troops into Austria. However, the day before, on March 10, an incident occurred on the Polish-Lithuanian border, a Polish soldier was killed there. Poland rejected Lithuania's proposal to create a joint commission to investigate the incident. An ultimatum was put forward demanding that Poland recognize the ownership of the Vilna region and establish diplomatic relations between the states. This ultimatum was also supported by Germany. A campaign was launched in the Polish press calling for a march on Kaunas, Warsaw began to prepare for the capture of Lithuania. Berlin was ready to support the Polish occupation of Lithuania, declaring that it was only interested in Klaipeda (Memel). The Soviet Union was forced to intervene. The head of the Soviet foreign policy department on March 16 and 18 summoned the Polish ambassador and explained that although there is no military alliance between Lithuania and the USSR, the Union could intervene in the Polish-Lithuanian conflict.

France was an ally of Poland and found itself in a difficult position. Germany captures Austria, and the Poles, in alliance with the Germans, threaten Lithuania. Allied Poland receives the prospect of war with the USSR. Paris invites Warsaw to calm down and help the French in the Austrian issue. However, the Poles reproach the French for not supporting them on the Lithuanian issue. An interesting picture emerges: the Third Reich captures Austria and is preparing to completely collapse the Versailles system; France is afraid of this and wants to attract the USSR as an ally, which is also looking with alarm at the emergence of a “hotbed of war” in Europe. At this time, Poland, the official ally of France, with the blessing of Germany, is preparing to seize Lithuania. As a result, the issue of allowing Soviet troops through Polish territory in the event of a war over Austria was not resolved positively. Thus, Warsaw allowed Berlin to capture Austria without consequences and weakened France. In fact, the Poles helped commit the first aggression in Europe. Although the simultaneous tough actions of France, the USSR and Poland against the aggressor, which would have been supported by England, could have stopped a future major war.

In the process of destroying Czechoslovakia, Warsaw also played a significant role. Czechoslovakia had a defensive alliance with France directed against Germany (France had the same alliance with Poland). When Berlin laid claim to Prague in 1938, it was in the French interest that the Poles enter into a military alliance with the Czechoslovaks. However, Poland categorically refused to do this. A similar situation would arise in 1939, when Warsaw would withstand strong pressure from Paris and refuse to enter into a military alliance with the Soviet Union.

Further events would show that Warsaw had a predatory interest in Czechoslovakia - the Poles wanted to grab their piece of the spoils from the country that had come under attack. The French entered into a military agreement with the USSR to defend Czechoslovakia from the Germans in 1935. Moreover, Moscow pledged to help Czechoslovakia only if France helped it. In 1938, the Germans demanded that Prague give up part of the territory - an industrially developed, mineral-rich region in the north and north-west of the Czech Republic, the Sudetenland (received its name from the Sudeten Mountains located on its territory). As a result, France, as an ally of Czechoslovakia, in the event of a German attack, had to declare war on the Third Reich and strike at it. At this moment, Paris's ally, Warsaw, tells the French that in this case Poland will remain aloof from the conflict. since it is not Germany that attacks France, but France that attacks Germany. In addition, the Polish government refuses to allow Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia. If the USSR tried to break through Polish territory by force, then in addition to Poland, Romania would also enter the war with the Union (the Poles had a military alliance with the Romanians directed against Russia). By its actions, Warsaw completely deprived France of any motive to defend Czechoslovakia. Paris did not dare to defend Czechoslovakia.

As a result, Warsaw had a hand in the famous Munich Agreement, when Italy, Germany, France and England gave the Sudetenland to Berlin. The Polish military-political elite not only did not support its ally, France, at this difficult moment, but also took a direct part in the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. On September 21 and 27, at the height of the Sudeten crisis, the Polish government presented the Czechs with an ultimatum to “return” to them the Cieszyn region, where 80 thousand Poles and 120 thousand Czechs lived. In Poland, anti-Czech hysteria was intensified, the process of creating volunteer detachments was underway, which headed to the Czechoslovak border and staged armed provocations. Planes of the Polish Air Force invaded Czechoslovakian airspace. At the same time, the Polish and German military agreed on a line of demarcation of troops in the event of an invasion of Czechoslovakia. On September 30, Warsaw sent Prague a new ultimatum and, at the same time as Hitler’s troops, brought its army into the Cieszyn region. The Czechoslovak government, remaining in international isolation, was forced to cede the Cieszyn region to Poland.

Poland attacked Czechoslovakia completely independently, without the consent of France and England, and even in alliance with Germany. As a result, when talking about the instigators of World War II, one cannot focus only on Germany, Italy and Japan; the Polish Republic is one of the aggressors that started the war in Europe.

Friendship between Nazi Germany and Poland. Before the Nazis came to power in Germany, relations between Berlin and Warsaw were tense (due to the seizure of German lands by the Poles after the First World War). However, when the National Socialists came to power in Germany, the situation changed radically. The Polish elite became a close, although not official, partner of Berlin. The alliance was based on a common hatred of the Soviet regime. Both the Polish elite and the Nazis cherished dreams of “living space” in the East; the vast territories of the USSR were supposed to smooth out the contradictions between the two states.

In 1938, when Poland was preparing to participate in the division of Czechoslovakia, Moscow clearly warned Warsaw that the USSR could take appropriate measures. Warsaw asked Berlin about its attitude to this problem. The Polish ambassador to Germany reported to Warsaw that the Reich would maintain a friendly attitude towards the Polish state in the event of a Polish-Czech conflict. And in the event of a Polish-Soviet conflict, Germany will take a more than friendly position (Berlin hinted at military support in the war between the Polish state and the Soviet Union). At the beginning of 1939, Berlin and Warsaw negotiated cooperation against the USSR. Polish Foreign Minister Jozef Beck informed the German side that Warsaw lays claim to Ukraine and access to the Black Sea.

Poland before the fall. In 1939, Berlin put forward an ultimatum to the Poles - to provide a corridor for the creation of a railway transport line to East Prussia and give Danzig. Poland responds by announcing mobilization. It is clear that in view of such a threat, Poland could use a new strong ally. England and the USSR propose to Poland and Romania to expand the scope of their defensive alliance, directing it to repel the German threat. However, the Polish government categorically refuses. The Polish military-political elite believes that they already have all the trump cards in their hands - an alliance with France and guarantees from England. The Poles are confident that the matter will end only with threats; the Germans will not dare to go to war with a powerful coalition of countries. As a result, Hitler will strike the USSR, not Poland. In the event of a German attack on the USSR, through the Baltic states and Romania, the Polish government was going to implement plans to seize Soviet Ukraine.

At this time, the Soviet Union made enormous efforts to create a military bloc with England and France (Poland's allies) in order to prevent a major war in Europe. The Polish government continued its suicidal course and categorically refused military assistance to the USSR. Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations continued for four months, but did not bring positive results. One of the main reasons for the failure of the negotiations, along with the position of the British government, which pushed Berlin to march to the East, was Warsaw’s reluctance to allow Soviet troops into its territory.

France took a more constructive position - unlike the British, the French could not sit on their islands. The death of the Polish state meant that France no longer had allies in Europe, and she was left alone with Germany. The USSR and France no longer even demanded from Poland a full-fledged military alliance with the Russians. The Polish government was asked to provide only a corridor for the passage of Soviet troops so that they could engage in the fight against the Germans. Warsaw again responded with a categorical refusal. Although the French also dropped the question of the future withdrawal of Soviet troops - they promised to send two French divisions and one British one so that the support would be international. The Soviet government, England and France could provide absolute guarantees for the withdrawal of the Red Army from Polish territory after the end of the conflict.

As a result, Moscow, understanding the desire of Poland and England to provoke a conflict between the USSR and Germany, decided to gain time and agreed to conclude a non-aggression pact with the Germans.

February 14, 1950

Both Contracting Parties undertake, by mutual consent, to seek the conclusion, in the shortest possible time, together with the other powers allied during the Second World War, of a Peace Treaty with Japan.

Both Contracting Parties will not enter into any alliance directed against the other Party, and will not participate in any coalitions, as well as in actions or activities directed against the other Party.

Both Contracting Parties will consult with each other on all important international issues affecting the common interests of the Soviet Union and China, guided by the interests of strengthening peace and general security.

Both Contracting Parties undertake, in the spirit of friendship and cooperation and in accordance with the principles of equality, mutual interests, as well as mutual respect for state sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of the other Party, to develop and strengthen economic and cultural ties between the Soviet Union and China, to provide provide each other with all possible economic assistance and carry out the necessary economic cooperation.

This Treaty shall enter into force immediately on the date of its ratification; the exchange of instruments of ratification will take place in Beijing.

This Treaty remains in force for 30 years, and if one of the Contracting Parties does not declare a desire to denounce the Treaty one year before its expiration, it will continue to remain in force for 5 years and will be extended in accordance with this rule.

Compiled in Moscow on February 14, 1950 in two copies, each in Russian and Chinese, and both texts have equal authority.

By authority
Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
A. VYSHINSKY

By authority
Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China
ZHOU EN-LAI

The “Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance” was signed between the USSR and China

Soviet-Chinese “Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and mutual assistance"for a period of thirty years was signed in Moscow February 14, 1950. The historical document was the result of a personal meeting and particularly friendly relationship between Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong. However, the agreement itself was signed by the ministers of foreign affairs: Zhou Enlai from the PRC, and Andrei Vyshinsky from the USSR.

Mao Zedong's visit to Moscow dragged on for two months. Beijing expected the treaty to provide powerful political, military-economic support for the new Chinese statehood. Moscow hoped to strengthen its position in Asia and to strengthen the socialist bloc on a global scale. On the same days, a decision was made to provide China with a Soviet preferential loan in the amount of 300 million US dollars. Moscow expressed its readiness to provide the PRC with economic, military, scientific and technical support.

Close relations between the USSR and the People's Republic of China, led by Mao Zedong, were established earlier - when the USSR provided assistance to the Chinese Communist Party in the struggle for power. So the signing of the agreement itself simply stated the state of affairs and was timed to coincide with Mao Zedong’s visit to Moscow. However, after the death of Stalin and the beginning of de-Stalinization in the USSR in 1956, relations between the countries began to deteriorate.

Nikita Khrushchev's speech at a closed meeting of the 20th Congress of the CPSU was perceived sharply negatively by Mao Zedong. Also, the PRC has a negative attitude towards the new foreign policy course of the USSR - towards breaking out of isolation and establishing business relations with Western countries, known as the policy of “peaceful coexistence of the two systems.” The PRC accuses the Soviet leadership of revisionism and concessions to the West. During Cuban missile crisis The PRC supported the idea of ​​armed confrontation between the USSR and the USA and was dissatisfied with the peaceful resolution of the crisis.

Mao Zedong's hopes of receiving nuclear weapons from the USSR were also not realized. Finally, in 1962, the Soviet Union supported India in the war with China. In 1963, the PRC and the USSR exchanged letters in which they expressed their ideological positions and thus formally acknowledged the existence of disagreements between the states.

In 1964, there was an almost complete break in relations between the CPSU and the CPC, the PRC recalled its students from the USSR, and the Soviet Union recalled its specialists from the PRC. Soon, an armed conflict breaks out between the USSR and the PRC on Damansky Island. However, the friendship agreement was not terminated. In 1979, the PRC fought with Vietnam, and the USSR took the side of Vietnam.

Soviet-Chinese Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance

TREATY of friendship, alliance and mutual assistance between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's Republic of China

Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Central People's Government of China. People's Republic,

Determined, by strengthening friendship and cooperation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's Republic of China, to jointly prevent the revival of Japanese imperialism and the repetition of aggression on the part of Japan or any other state that would join in any form with Japan in acts of aggression,

Filled with the desire to strengthen lasting peace and general security in the Far East and throughout the world in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations,

deeply convinced that the strengthening of relations of good neighborliness and friendship between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's Republic of China meets the fundamental interests of the peoples of the Soviet Union and China, have decided to conclude this Treaty for this purpose and have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - Andrei Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, Minister of Foreign Affairs USSR, Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China - Chou En-lai, Premier of the State Administration Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs of China.

Both authorized representatives, after exchanging their credentials, found in due form and in full order, agreed as follows:

Both Contracting Parties undertake that they will jointly take all necessary measures at their disposal to prevent a repetition of aggression and violation of the peace by Japan or any other state that would directly or indirectly join with Japan in acts of aggression. In the event that one of the Contracting Parties is attacked by Japan or its allied states, and thus finds itself in a state of war, the other Contracting Party will immediately provide military and other assistance with all means at its disposal.

The Contracting Parties also declare their readiness, in a spirit of sincere cooperation, to participate in all international actions aimed at ensuring peace and security throughout the world, and will devote their full energies to the speedy implementation of these goals.

Georgiy Kolarov

Finally, the long-awaited event happened between the two Bulgarian states: an agreement on friendship, cooperation and good neighborliness was signed. It was signed on August 1, 2017. - on the eve of the celebration of the 114th anniversary of the Ilinden-Preobrazhensky-Krestovdensky Uprising - the most massive uprising against the Turkish enslaver, in defense of the sacred right to live in a single and free state, from Lake Ohrid to the Black Sea and from the Danube to Aegean Sea. 08/02/1903 The Internal Macedonian-Odrin Revolutionary Organization (IMORO) rebelled all Bulgarians living in the territory of the country remaining under Ottoman rule as a result of the unjust Treaty of Berlin, which abolished San Stefano.

The fight against regular (asker) and irregular Turkish units (bashibozuk) lasted until late autumn, until snow fell and the approaching winter stopped the movement of Bulgarians and Turks along the Rilo-Rhodope massif and the Strandzha and Sakar mountains. In the end, the Turks extinguished the uprising with their characteristic cruelty and genocide against civilians. The surviving rebels and civilians moved to the Russian-liberated Principality of Bulgaria in anticipation of the First Balkan War. It started only 9 years later. The allied Orthodox armies won a number of victories over the Turks.

In 1912 The territories of the geographical region of Macedonia, inhabited mainly by Bulgarians, were cleared of Ottoman troops. The personnel of the irregular formations "Bashibozuk" were either destroyed or transferred to the residual Turkey. However, most of the area was occupied not by Bulgarians (who were thrown towards Istanbul), but by Serbian, Montenegrin and Greek units. After the end of the war, they refused to leave there, contrary to preliminary agreements. Attempts of the last king Russian Empire Nicholas II's role as an arbiter ended in disaster - his authority among the Balkan monarchs was too insignificant. The Bulgarian Tsar Ferdinand hoped to take Istanbul with his own forces and accept the crown of the Byzantine emperors. His Serbian, Greek, and Montenegrin colleagues negotiated behind his back, feeling Russian support. When Tsar Ferdinand made the disastrous decision for Bulgaria to demonstrate military force by attacking the Serbian and Greek armies, Nicholas II provoked Romania to attack her from behind. Bucharest, in search of compensation for the Romanian-speaking population trapped within the Bulgarian borders, demanded the entire territory of Southern Dobruja (on the Bulgarian-Romanian border). The Turks, sensing the weakness of Bulgaria, also carried out a counterattack and regained part of the lands liberated by the Bulgarians. As a result, Bulgaria (whose army bore the brunt of the war) received minor territories. The bulk of the lands inhabited by the Bulgarians remained under the rule of Serbia and Greece. Romania also expanded into Southern Dobruja, with an entirely Bulgarian population. She held it until 1940.

As a result, when the Bulgarian Orthodox neighbors sided with the Entente in World War I, Sofia found herself in the camp of the Central Forces in order to be able to regain what was lost. Defeats in the Second Balkan and First World Wars in Bulgaria are designated as the First and Second National Catastrophes. As is known, the unjust seizure of territories from the vanquished and their distribution among the victors led to the Second World War. In it, Bulgaria again sought revenge from Serbia, Montenegro and Greece.

Inspired by victories in the two Balkan wars and in the First World War, the Serbian political elite began to implement the Serbian doctrine of Macedonism, invented by Minister Stojan Novakovic, Professor Jovan Cvijic, etc. They used this doctrine for anti-Bulgarian propaganda in the geographical region of Macedonia. They understood that they could not immediately impose Serbian national identity on local Bulgarians. Therefore, the imposition of Macedonian identity was seen as a step towards subsequent Serbization.

Meanwhile, the Comintern was created in Moscow. And although the Bulgarians played a key role in it (two of them: Vasil Kolarov and Georgi Dimitrov were elected in turn general secretaries, and Boris Stomoniakov was appointed Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs), the leader of the Yugoslav communists, Josip Broz Tito, began to enjoy special authority. Under his influence, in 1934, based on regional specifics and the southwestern dialect of the Bulgarian language, the Comintern decided to create the Macedonian nation and the Macedonian language. During and after World War II, leaders of the Yugoslav Communist Party put it into practice. Specifically on the territory of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia (as part of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia - SFRY), the Macedonian doctrine was implanted by ethnic Bulgarians who lost their parents during the Balkan and First World Wars and were raised in a children's home in the Serbian (Yugoslav) city of Kragujevac in the Macedonian-Yugoslav spirit .

As a result of repressions by the security forces of socialist Yugoslavia, 22,000 Macedonian Bulgarians lost their lives, and 144,000 spent a long time in Tito’s prisons and camps.

These were predominantly representatives of the intelligentsia and conscious patriotic strata. After their elimination, it became easier to spread the Macedonian identity among those living in the created 08/02/1944. Socialist Republic Macedonia. Among the local Bulgarians, they began to consistently eradicate national identity and impose a new language - the local Bulgarian dialect, which was continuously enriched with Serbo-Croatian words. It is still developing without interruption - after each break of several years in meetings with relatives, the author of these lines notices the presence of new words and the disappearance of old words. Moreover, it still remains a dialect of the old Bulgarian language.

In Sofia, many radical historians, philologists, and politicians criticize Prime Minister Boyko Borisov and Foreign Minister Ekaterina Zaharieva for the compromise they made - the agreement was signed “in the Bulgarian language in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria and in the Macedonian language in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia.” This text gave Macedonian Prime Minister Zoran Zaev a reason to boast to Parliament and at a rally before it that Bulgaria had already recognized the Macedonian language. In essence, Bulgaria only recognized the obvious fact that in the Macedonian Constitution this language is called not Bulgarian, but Macedonian. In addition, both texts differ from each other - in addition to differences in dialect, Macedonians use the Serbian version of the Cyrillic alphabet (imposed after 08/02/1944), which multiplies the differences in dialects.

Nowhere in the agreement is the phrase “Macedonian people” mentioned - it was this fact that provoked acute discontent in Skopje, which was expressed by the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, one of the leaders of the VMRO-DPMNE party, Antonio Milososki. He is also worried that the treaty does not clearly distinguish between common and separate history (as has been said, separate Macedonian history has existed for exactly 73 years) and that Macedonia is given more responsibilities and Bulgaria is given more rights.1 He was supported by a young VMRO-DPMNE activist: MP Parliamentarian Ane Laškovska expressed alarm that “the people of the Republic of Macedonia are in panic because SDSM (Zoran Zaev’s party) has begun to change the history of the Macedonian state, our past, and has agreed to rewrite the history books. Bulgaria celebrates, Macedonia is defeated.”2

They were answered by the deputy chairman of the Sofia VMRO, Euro-deputy Angel Dzhambazkiy: “Miloshosky’s behavior is extremely malicious and very indicative. This has already happened many times in Bulgarian history, in the history of the struggle for the unification of the Bulgarians in Macedonia. When he was an intern or doctoral student in Sofia, he was a very clearly stated Bulgarian, a very passionate follower of the line of conduct of Todor Alexandrov, Ivan Mikhailov, old figures and leaders of VMRO. There are photographs (some of them in in social networks), which shows Antonio Milososki, in our company, with other members of the organization, holding the VMRO banner. So, the surprise is unpleasant, but it is probably a consequence of Milososki’s long stay in power.”3 The author of these lines has known this character of the Skopje Tito elite since October 27, 2000, when the Community of Citizens “Radko” was founded in Skopje (Radko is the battle cry of the long-time Head of VMRO Ivan Mikhailov). And he can confirm the words of Dzhambazki that he openly and passionately expressed his Bulgarian identity and commitment to the unification of the Bulgarians in one state. Therefore, this evolution of his is more than amazing. However, it concerns not only him, but also the entire current leadership of VMRO-DPMNE, led by chairman and former Prime Minister Nikolai Gruevski. As Dzhambazki said about him, “Gruevski himself underwent a very serious ideological turn in his behavior, in his self-determination. It is known that his political career was connected with a Bulgarian bank in Skopje, before becoming an adviser to the Serbian Minister of Finance. Then Gruevski himself declared his pro-Bulgarian sympathies.”3 The author can add that Gruevski was raised as a politician by the former chairman of VMRO-DPMNE Lyubcho Georgievski (now the leader of the VMRO - People’s Party - he already has a Bulgarian passport, as a result of the statement of Bulgarian identity and origin), which is still 02/22/1999. made the first attempt to normalize relations between the two states.

Then, with the Prime Minister of Bulgaria Ivan Kostov, “we signed a joint declaration in Sofia, which opened up a real opportunity to solve common problems. Then Skopje declared that it would no longer make claims about the presence of a Macedonian minority in Bulgaria and insist on granting it the corresponding rights and freedoms. In the case, it is very important that this comes into direct conflict with Article 49 of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, which obliges it to take care of the Macedonian minorities in Greece and Bulgaria.”4 It is the fact that in the contradiction between the treaty and the Constitution, the treaty prevails, that leads to themselves as Osprey politicians with an Oedipus complex. This also means that the Macedonian Constitution is hopelessly outdated and it is time to change it in accordance with new realities. This issue will be resolved in the near future, after the ratification and entry into force of the treaty.

Then Gruevski carried out an internal party coup against Georgievski, removed him from the posts of party chairman and prime minister and became one himself, starting a revision of all common documents signed with Bulgaria, as well as imposing ancient history on Macedonia.

The evolution of Skopje VMRO-DPMNE is amazing, especially since many of its functionaries, members of their families, parents, children have Bulgarian passports and real estate in Bulgaria.

The Chairman of the Sofia VMRO, First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense in the coalition government of Boyko Borisov, Krasimir Karakachanov, gives a clear and precise description of the unexpected evolution of the Skopje VMRO-DPMNE: “VMRO-DPMNE has long been a party with a pro-Yugoslav orientation, which protects only the personal interests of its leaders . Former Foreign Minister Christian Vigenin tried to initiate a policy of neglecting the national interests of Bulgaria and unconditionally supporting the membership of the Republic of Macedonia in the EU and NATO. However. in the end, he heard what we told him... The policy of extreme Macedonism, especially in its ancient form, carried out by Gruevski and his team, including people who were parasites of the Bulgarian state, took oaths before the grave of Todor Alexandrov, the Bulgarian flag and the VMRO flag , now they are talking nonsense.”5 Obviously, he means the same Antonio Milososki.

Karakachanov emphasizes that Gruevski, in his status as prime minister, was twice on the verge of signing this agreement, “however, most likely, foreign policy factors did not allow him to do this. At the last moment, Gruevski refused. One can guess who influenced him, knowing his economic ties with Belgrade.”5 It can be added that as former minister finance (before taking the prime minister's post), Gruevski belongs to the global financial elite. She is indifferent to such concepts as: patriotism, sense of duty.

It seems to the author that the main reason for today’s strange behavior of Gruevski, Milososki and the company is the fact of losing power (apparently for a long time) and they do not want their political opponents to add to their asset the signing of this agreement: “Me or no one!”

At the same time, Karakachanov considers Zoran Zaev a “pragmatic person”: “As the mayor of the city of Strumica, where more than half of the population acquired Bulgarian passports, he most likely understood what was going on. The main thing is that he has the courage to sign the agreement.”5

Karakachanov estimates that until now some Macedonian politicians “invented history, creating tension, putting forward certain claims about minorities and languages ​​on the territory of Bulgaria.”6 As a result, “Macedonia entered into a political crisis, it did not have a single friend in the Balkans, reached the point of economic and political isolation... These politicians in Skopje believed that they could build a new national identity through confrontation, hatred and stupid chauvinism.”6 As can already be seen, they did not succeed.

Regarding the signing of the agreement, Karakachanov shares: “I told Borisov that this was going down in history. In Skopje, just in front of the Church of the Holy Savior, shortly before laying wreaths at the grave of Gotse Delchev (the Bulgarian revolutionary, military leader of the VMRO, who fell on the eve of the Ilinden-Preobrazhensko-Krestovden Uprising), young guys - followers of the Sofia VMRO - approached us. And they told him, without any prior agreement with us: “Mr. Borisov, you will remain in history, just as Tsar Boris the Unifier remained!”5 The basis of the agreement for Karakachanov is obvious: “We have a common history. Every fourth citizen of Bulgaria (every third ethnic Bulgarian - G.K.) has roots in Macedonia, every Macedonian has relatives in Bulgaria. Over 10,000 Macedonian students have already graduated from Bulgarian universities in the last 20 years. More than 120,000 Macedonian citizens have acquired Bulgarian passports (130,000 are waiting for citizenship - G.K.).”6

According to Karakachanov, the most important thing in the agreement is the member according to which, “Macedonia will no longer rely on this member 49 of its Constitution, according to which it must protect Macedonian minorities in neighboring countries.”5 Almost everyone agrees with him Bulgarian politicians, political scientists, historians, journalists and simply patriots.

The well-known Bulgarian diplomat, former deputy minister of foreign affairs and ambassador in London, director of the Institute of Economics and International Relations Lyubomir Kyuchukov also expresses his positive opinion about the treaty: “The treaty does not belong to any party or government, it is the result of the efforts of Bulgarian foreign policy throughout decades. The treaty was in the interest of Bulgaria; Macedonia needed it. The Bulgarian position is key here. It is defined by two leading criteria - to unite, not to divide, and to think of Macedonia as people and citizens, and not as a territory. Because it is Macedonianism that seeks to build a new identity. The distance between people is strengthened by every public scandal between the two countries. If people on both sides of the border begin to hate each other, then Macedonism has won. It is in Bulgaria’s interest to remove all barriers that hinder communication and cooperation between people, so that citizens of both countries feel at home everywhere, on their own territory.”7

Both he and other analysts make it clear that there can be no talk of a territorial unification of the two Bulgarian states, but only of a historical, cultural and everyday one.

As former Sofia VMRO activist, famous journalist and political strategist Vladimir Yonchev writes on his website, “The Macedonians and I are like two brothers who lived in the same house as children, then grew up and separated in separate apartments. Imagine what a nightmare it will be if they, with their families and new problems, decide to live again in home!? It's unlikely that anyone wants this. It’s just about talking brotherly, visiting each other and celebrating our parents’ birthdays together.”8

A certain form of political unification between Sofia and Skopje is possible only within the framework of NATO and the EU. However, before entering there (with the help of Bulgaria, of course), the Republic of Macedonia must also change its name in order to remove Greek claims.

One way or another, the agreement is an important step for Macedonia towards Euro-Atlantic integration. Probably, it was precisely this prospect that became the reason for the Russian media to suppress news around a key event for the two Bulgarian states and for the Balkan Peninsula.

Or, when they do cover the topic, they give the opportunity to speak out to such Bulgarian analysts who, to put it mildly, exaggerate the military potential of the two Bulgarian states, presenting it as a threat to Russia!?9 This is a big compliment to the two armies: the Bulgarian and the Macedonian! Against the background of their general weakness, job vacancies, lack of motivation for military service in Bulgaria and Macedonia. It is known that in the spring of 2001. The Macedonian army suffered a shameful defeat from the Albanian separatists. Scientist Rosen Yanev remembers how he was then in Macedonia, in the north of which “a war was raging. Refugee camps were set up throughout the country. The people were frightened and those with whom I spoke clearly expressed their fears of an Albanian invasion. They had hope that the Bulgarians would watch their back. Only you defeated the Albanians in the war, they said.”10 In the spring of 2001. however, the Bulgarian instructors were unable to help either.

The limited military potential of the Bulgarian army is concentrated in peacekeeping missions in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina and, of course, on the Turkish border. The more limited capabilities of the Macedonian army are aimed at suppressing a possible separatist rebellion by the Albanian minority, as well as expected aggression from Kosovo and Albania. In addition, the US military bases in the villages of Krivolak (Macedonia) and Sarafovo (Bulgaria) have not gone away - they will remain as they were. There are unlikely to be new ones: the Americans cannot afford to concentrate so much effort and resources in the Balkans when there are regions that are more important to them.

Over the course of a year, Russia has lost 4 key Slavic-Orthodox allies in the Balkans, which are home to two peoples: Bulgarians and Serbs. Bulgaria and Montenegro are already in NATO, Serbia and Macedonia are heading there after presidential and parliamentary elections, as a result of which pro-Western politicians came to power. In Bulgaria, the government of Boyko Borisov tried to maintain friendly relations with Russia until May 24, the holiday of Slavic writing. Then the referents, the “Balkanists,” led President Putin to say that “the alphabet came to Russia from the Macedonian land”11 and provoked a huge scandal between Moscow and Sofia. It was further expanded by State Duma deputy and world chess champion Anatoly Karpov during his visit to Sofia: in the morning he said on television that the alphabet came to Russia from Byzantium!?!? As a result, Prime Minister Boyko Borisov canceled the audience scheduled for the afternoon. No one in Bulgaria understood what it was: the blatant incompetence of the great chess player, or a malicious provocation against the Bulgarian public? One way or another, anti-Russian sentiments appeared in Bulgaria.

As a result, 08/04/2017 - 25th anniversary of the Treaty of Friendship between Russian Federation and the Republic of Bulgaria passed unnoticed. If diplomatic or public events had previously been scheduled, they were canceled (the author warned about this immediately after the meeting of the presidents of Russia - Vladimir Putin and Macedonia - Georgiy Ivanov). Only on the presidential websites in Moscow and Sofia did mutual congratulations appear. Moreover, Putin called Bulgaria “brotherly”, and his colleague Rumen Radev defined Russia as “friendly”...

Lyubomir Kyuchukov believes that “Russia has no political and economic resource(outside energy), nor ideological alternatives to deviate the countries of the region from the goal clearly declared by all: European and Euro-Atlantic integration. However, Russia is acquiring a secondary, artificial alternative, taking advantage of Brussels’ disinterest. External interference in the region exists not only from the East, but also from NATO members.”7 Kyuchukov, in his capacity as former deputy chairman of the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP - formerly communist) and former deputy foreign minister and ambassador, has always tried to maintain a balanced foreign policy.

On the Russian side, very often incompetent or unscrupulous people appointed as “specialists” on the Balkans take an unambiguous pro-Serbian position in the old conflicts between Belgrade and Sofia, mainly on the Macedonian issue. Since first Montenegro and then Serbia turned their backs to Russia and their faces to the West, they generally lagged behind Bulgaria with old claims and took up their former “favorites”.

The surprising fact is that none of them noticed the development of pro-Western tendencies in Belgrade and Podgorica, which could not but lead to a geopolitical reorientation of the two countries.

Of course, there are pleasant exceptions among Russian experts. For example, Lev Vershinin, who makes accurate and correct diagnoses to self-proclaimed “specialists” in Bulgaria. By the way, he repeatedly points out one of the reasons for the sad outcome of the Balkan Wars - the permissiveness and impunity of the ruling Montenegrin dynasty, due to the presence of two daughters of the king in the Russian royal court. Princess Stana and Princess Militsa had a serious influence on the foreign policy decisions of the Russian Empire in relation to the Balkans. Accordingly, Montenegro was the first to attack Turkey in the First Balkan War, without coordination with the allies, when the rearmament of the Bulgarian army was not yet completed.

Among those who work in Moscow, the head of the Association of Orthodox Experts and the head of the department of interaction with the Russian Orthodox Church at the Institute of CIS Countries, Kirill Frolov, stands out. He openly and honestly declares that “Macedonians are Bulgarians, Macedonia and Bulgaria are one.”11 It is a pity that although he occupies a key position, the responsible factors do not listen to him.

The confusion in Russian Balkan studies and policy towards the Balkan Peninsula provides an opportunity for anti-Russian elements in Sofia and Skopje to manifest themselves, including in relation to the just signed treaty. The most ardent example: the claims of the extreme Russophobe, former Bulgarian President Rosen Plevneliev, almost to the authorship of the treaty. Attributing non-existent merits to himself, he does not fail to hint at secretive opposition to Russia and the hybrid war that the Kremlin is allegedly waging against the Bulgarians.

Bulgarian analyst Ivan Petkov answered him. He made it clear that “the words of former President Rosen Plevneliev could undo the efforts of the entire nation. The long-term efforts that began with the late Zhelyu Zhelev, survived Ivan Kostov and Georgiy Parvanov, and found their triumph with Boyko Borisov. The Prime Minister signed a historic treaty with Macedonia, which united all political forces in Bulgaria. And so, until former head state Rosen Plevneliev did not appear as a catalyst for warming Bulgarian-Macedonian relations. In other words, the engine and inspirer of the historical document. Thus, he took a dangerous step - he could break the unstable unity of politicians, in the name of Bulgaria. He gives an example of showing off one's merits more and more. Before showing himself, he must answer at least two questions: how many times has he visited Macedonia as president?; where was he when Bulgaria recognized the independence of its neighbor and when the declaration of good neighborliness was signed? Whether he was a student then or was looking for a way to get ahead in business, it doesn’t matter. In any case, he was very far from foreign policy processes. Unlike him, another former president, Georgi Parvanov, has much more reason to be a factor in reconciliation with Skopje... Even Rumen Radev does not allow himself to reveal his merits, like a real head of state. On the contrary, in his greeting, he noted the efforts of all his predecessors. The question arises: why does Rosen Plevneliev allow himself to do this?”12 Petkov gives different versions of the answer to the question.

The author, however, believes that these words and hints were suggested to Plevneliev from overseas: thus, he makes it clear that reconciliation between Sofia and Skopje happened not thanks to, but in spite of Moscow. Because if this is his merit, then he, as an extreme Russophobe, reconciling both Bulgarian states, opposed Moscow. Unfortunately, certain statements and writings in the Russian-language media on the topic are a breeding ground for this type of statement. Therefore, the Kremlin should listen less to armchair scientists and more to Russian diplomats who have worked for many years in embassies and consulates general in the two Bulgarian republics. At least they know perfectly well what's going on.