1.1. Formation of ideological views and political views of M.N. Ryutina. Political and revolutionary activities of M.N. Ryutina 1910-1920s.
1.2. The struggle for power in 1928-1932.
CHAPTER 2. Political activity of M.N. Ryutin and participation in groups that fought for power in the party in the 1920s-1930s.
2.1. M.N. Ryutin and the “defeat” of the Moscow Party organization in 1928
2.2. Activities of M.N. Ryutina is against the establishment of a regime of personal power in the party by I.V. Stalin.
CHAPTER 3. The activities of the “Union of Marxists-Leninists” and an attempt to continue the struggle in new conditions.
3.1. “Union of Marxists-Leninists”: creation, goals and objectives of the group M.N. Ryutina.
3.2. The main provisions of the platform “Stalin and the crisis of the proletarian dictatorship” and the appeal “To all members of the CPSU (b)”.
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Introduction of the dissertation (part of the abstract) on the topic “Activities of the Union of Marxists-Leninists”: M.N. Ryutin and the struggle for power in 1928-1932."
A special page in Russian history of the early 1930s. is the activity of the “Union of Marxists-Leninists” to remove I.V. Stalin from power. In this episode of the struggle for power, the conflict between opposing ideologies and the desire to radically change the model of state governance introduced from above was clearly visible. Stalin's leadership sought to rapidly transform Russia into a politically and militarily powerful state. The ultimate task required not only the efforts of the entire people, but also considerable sacrifices, as well as a rejection of revolutionary rhetoric, a radical change from “party romantics” to unprincipled and unquestioningly obedient “pragmatists.” In the party environment, instead of the previous groups opposing Stalin’s course, a fundamentally new one arose - the “Union of Marxists-Leninists”, which was distinguished by the radicalism of its goals, objectives and methods of struggle.
I.V. Stalin made the most of the liquidation of the “Union of Marxists-Leninists” to strengthen the regime of individual power in the party and in the state. Having realized in 1932 the emergence of a clandestine opposition against the backdrop of a deepening general economic crisis, he and his entourage accelerated the process of discrediting senior party and Soviet leaders,1 using the fact of the emergence of the “Union of Marxists-Leninists” for subsequent reprisals against more serious political opponents.2
1 RGASPI. F. 589. Op. 3. D. 9355 (T. 3). L. 320.
2 Ibid. D. 9355 (T. 2). L. 58, 61, 65, 68, 379.
The relevance of this topic follows from the tasks of updating domestic historiography concerning many aspects of the socio-economic and political development of Russia in the 20th century. The socio-political changes in Russia that began in the late 1980s aroused increased interest in the problems of Stalinism, totalitarianism and mass violence in the Russian history of the last century. The history of the struggle against the Stalinist regime in recent decades has attracted special attention from domestic and foreign researchers.3 The need to identify the various reasons for the emergence of a totalitarian model of governing society and the state in Soviet Russia has become one of the most important tasks of domestic historiography. Meanwhile, many aspects of this struggle have not yet received appropriate, if possible objective, coverage based on archival sources; a gap still remains between mass stereotypes and professional historiography.4 Many problems of confrontation and destruction of various political forces in Bolshevik Party in the 1920s - 1930s, when intra-party struggle turned out to be the only way to identify those participating in power and influencing decision-making in the state level.5
3 Kislitsyn SL. Those who said no. Episodes from the history of political struggle in Soviet society in the late 20s - the first half of the 30s. Rostov n/d, 1992; It's him. Syrtsov's case. State and personality in Bolshevik Russia. Rostov n/a 1997; Conquest Robert. Great terror. Riga, 1991; Cohen Stephen. Bukharin. Political biography 1888-1938. M., 1988; Kro-iachev S. Chronicle of communist terror. 1917-1940 Krasnodar, 1995; Larina A.M. Unforgettable. M., 1989; Litvin A.JJ. Without the right to think. Historians in the era of great terror. Kazan, 1994; Martyushev F.I. Victims and executioners. About the repressions of the 30s - 40s. Ekaterinburg, 1997; Rogovin V. Party of those executed. M, 1997; Romanovskaya V.B. Repressive bodies and public legal consciousness in Russia of the 20th century: Experience in philosophical and legal research: Diss. . doc. legal Sci. St. Petersburg, 1997.
4 Khlevnyuk O.V. Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in the 1930s. Mechanisms political power in USSR. Author's abstract. diss. doc. ist. Sci. M., 1996. P. 1.
5 Nazarov O.G. Intra-party struggle in the Bolshevik Party (1923-1927). Author's abstract. diss. Ph.D. ist. Sciences M., 1995. P. 1.
IN THE HISTORIOGRAPHY of the problem, the following main periods can be distinguished, with some degree of convention.
1. During the life of I.V. Stalin, the problem of the opposition CPSU(b) movements, including the Union of Marxists-Leninists, was not scientifically developed in the domestic historical literature, moreover, it was considered closed. At the same time, in a negative sense, the surname M.N. Ryutin, as well as the “Ryutin platform” were mentioned in official publications. Briefly, in one phrase, it was reported that in 1928 the secretary of one of the capital’s district committees M.N. Ryutin together with the head of the Moscow party organization N.A. Uglanov supported the leaders of the “right deviation” N.I. Bukharin, A.I. Rykova and M.P. Tomsky, for which he was removed from his post. The “Ryutinskaya platform” appeared during the trial of the anti-Soviet Trotskyist center.6 Such a negative attitude towards this political figure is explained by the fact that existed during the life of I.V. Stalin's concept of enemies of the people who had to be mercilessly destroyed. In the party and society, differences of opinion, at least at the official level, were not allowed; any expressed doubt about the correctness of the party’s ideological guidelines was considered a hostile attack, and publicly stated deviation or disagreement with the party line was qualified as the machinations of enemies of the people. But in addition to the ban on researching this problem, due to the closed nature of the archives, there were no relevant sources.
Unlike Soviet scientists, noticeable attention to the activities of M.N. Ryutin has been shown by foreign historians for many years. IN
6 Bolshevik. 1932. No. 19. P. 86; CPSU(b) in resolutions and decisions of congresses, conferences and plenums of the Central Committee. Ed. 6th. Part 2. M.? P. 822; TSB. T. 27. M„ 1933. P. 48, 51; Right there. T. 46. M., 1940. P. 667-673; Right there. T. 55. M., 1947. S. 44, 46; History of the CPSU(b). Short course. M„ 1938. P. 281; Judicial report on the case of the anti-Soviet Trotskyist center. M., 1937. S. 71, 190; Yaroslavsky Em. History of the CPSU(b). Part 2. M„ 1935. P. 275. In particular, responses to the defeat of the “Union of Marxists-Leninists” were published in the foreign press already in 1932. Interest in the “Ryutin case” reappeared in 1936 after publication in the “Socialist Bulletin” » version B.I. Nikolaevsky.8 The author, hinting at his alleged conversation with N.I. Bukharin, who was on a business trip abroad, described in detail the conflict in the Politburo between Stalin and Kirov. The first, according to him, insisted on the execution of the old honored party member Ryutin, the second did not agree to physical reprisal against a political opponent and insisted on his own.9 This fictional story with some additional details was repeated by S. Cohen and R. Conquest.10 In other works foreign historians, if Ryutin was mentioned, it was mainly in connection with the names of major political figures I.V. Stalin, S.M. Kirova, K.E. Voroshilova, N.I. Bukharin, J.I.M. Kaganovich, V.M. Molotova, E.M. Yaroslavsky.11
2. Since the second half of the 1950s, after the 20th Congress of the CPSU and the beginning of the so-called “Khrushchev Thaw”, attempts at serious scientific research and understanding of the processes of the late 1920s - early 1930s, if undertaken, were not successful had. Science, including history, could not develop freely; it was still assigned an auxiliary role, the publication of each work on the topic of resistance to the cult of personality of I.V. Stalin, before seeing the light of day, was subjected to strict ideological prices
7 Across Russia and the Socialist Bulletin 1932. September 26. RGASPI. F. 589. Op. 3. D. 9355 (T. 1). JI. 79-85; Moscow rebellion // Neuss Zuricher Zeitung. 1932. October 14. RGASPI. F. 589. Op. 3. D. 9355 (T. 1). L. 65-69.
8 Socialist Bulletin. 1936. No. 23/24. pp. 20-21.
9 A separate and convincing investigation involving domestic archival sources was conducted by O.V. Khlevnyuk, who proved the complete inconsistency of this version. See Khlev-tok O.V. Politburo. Mechanisms of political power in the 1930s. M., 1996. pp. 74-77.
10 Cohen Stephen. Decree. op. pp. 410-411; Conquest Robert. Decree. op. Part 1. Riga, 1991. P. 48-
11 Valentinov (Volsky) N. The doctrine of right-wing communism. Munich, 1960; Tucker R. Stalin. The path to power. 1879-1929. M., 1990; KunM. Bukharin: his friends and enemies. M., 1992. zure. Any deviation from the stereotypes and ideological schemes that had developed in previous decades, albeit in milder forms, was condemned. Due to the closed nature of the archives, there were still no opportunities for serious research in this direction. M.N. Ryutin and his associates were not rehabilitated, and the ban on studying the problem even to a minimal extent was maintained until the rehabilitation of M.N. Ryutin in 1988
3. Since the late 1980s. A new stage has begun in the development of domestic historical science, which is characterized by a surge of interest in society in the problem of opposition movements to the Stalinist regime, understanding of possible alternative ways of development of the state in the late 1920s - early 1930s. In connection with the rehabilitation of M.N. Ryutin published a series of publications about him, first in periodicals, and then scientific research. Stalin's repressions were condemned in these works, but most of them lacked a serious analysis of the features of the struggle for power in the period under review. The problem was initially significantly simplified, considered mostly superficially or in a given direction, and was reduced mainly to highlighting the negative personal qualities of I.V. Stalin, and M.N. Ryutin and his associates were given the role of a handful of daredevils who, in conditions of terror and violence, found the courage to boldly declare disagreement with the line pursued by the leader and call on the party to fight the dictatorship
10 and die heroically. Most publications on this topic
12 Acceleration Lev. Finally! // Moscow news. 1988. No. 26. June 26; VaksbergA. How alive with the living // Literary newspaper. 1988. June 29; Anfertyev I. Fearless Ryutin // Red Star. 1988. July 23; Martemyan Ryutin. After reading, pass it on to someone else! To all members of the CPSU (b). Publication by A. Vaksberg // Youth. 1988. No. Ts. S. 22-26; Prutskov G. M. Ryutin: “I will not kneel!” // East Siberian Truth. 1988. November 7; Gusev SL. From the position of historical truth and high morality // Party life. 1988. No. 18. P. 9-15; Semenov A. The pain of our memory // East Siberian Truth. 1988. September 18, September 28; Anfertyev I. Ryutin against Stalin // Smerch. M., 1988. P. 340-387; Vaksberg A. How alive they were quite bright, but mostly one-sided in nature and did not explore, due to lack of access to archives, the problem of the struggle for power in the party and state in the 1920s - 1930s, as well as the reasons for their emergence group M.N. Ryutin, the personnel of the “Union of Marxists-Leninists”. Beyond the framework of most of the published materials, which in previous traditions were mainly of a propaganda nature, the program goals and objectives of the group and the fates of the individuals involved in its activities remained unexamined. The authors of these works focused on the political views and individual, most striking statements of M.N. Ryutin, as well as the degree of influence on some party leaders of the ideas contained in the documents of the “Union of Marxists-Leninists”. In the overwhelming majority of publications about Ryutin and his group, only a passing mention was made in the general context of repressions against party and Soviet cadres. The authors, with rare exceptions, did not touch upon the crisis situation of the country's economy at that time, or the social tragedy of the Russian people as a whole. However, for subsequent research work, these publications were invaluable.
It should be noted that studies published during this period about M.N. Ryutin, were written after the judicial rehabilitation of him and his associates, and therefore most of them are characterized by common shortcomings. They all came out of the hasty fire alive // Rehabilitated posthumously. Vol. 2. M., 1988. P. 6-22, Anfertyev I. Ryutin against Stalin // Smerch. 2nd ed. M., 1989. P. 340-387; Protocol No. 5 of the meeting of the Politburo Commission of the CPSU Central Committee. July 27, 1988 // News of the CPSU Central Committee. 1989. No. 6. P. 101-103; About the case of the so-called “Union of Marxists-Leninists.” Information from the CPC under the CPSU Central Committee and the IML under the CPSU Central Committee // News of the CPSU Central Committee. 1989. No. 6. P. 103-115; Anfertyev I. Ryutin against Stalin // Returned names. Book 2. M., 1989. P. 177-202; It's him. Ryutin against Stalin // Russian Ezhsgod-nik-89. Vol. 1. M., 1989. P. 160-172; VaksbergA. As alive with the living // Rehabilitated posthumously. M., 1989. S. 336-346; Kolyaskin A. Those who challenged Stalin. // Lenin's Banner. 1989. July 26; Shishkin I.B. The Ryutin case // Questions of history. 1989. No. 7. P. 39-52; Epucoea S. “I won’t kneel!” //Moskovskaya Pravda. 1990. February 11,14. the significance of these publications, which were published without any serious research work in the archives. As a result, their source base was significantly narrowed, and negative phenomena and obvious contradictions in the actions of the participants in those events were mentioned, with rare exceptions, in passing. Many of these obvious ambiguities and contradictions continued to be hushed up by inertia and were interpreted exclusively in the spirit of internal self-censorship.13
At the same time, very detailed works written by professional historians also saw the light.14 The problem is covered in the most detail in the works of B.A. Starkov and in a number of collective works united by the theme of resistance to the cult of personality of I.V. Stalin.15 In particular, the most interesting and informative are the studies of B.A. Starkov, in which the author examines the reasons that prompted M.N. Ryutin to create the “Union of Marxists-Leninists”. Noting that the creation of an underground anti-Stalinist group by Ryutin and his comrades was the largest protest against the regime of personal power of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), the author
13 Borshchagovsky A. Let’s listen to Ryutin’s voice // Moscow News. 1990. No. 21. May 27; It's him. Voice from a loner. Letters from M. Ryutin about literature // Literary newspaper. 1990. No. 24. June 13; Chizhova JI.M. Who is to blame for the political discredit of N. A. Uglanov // Questions of the history of the CPSU. 1990. No. 8. P. 77-87; Mikhailov N. Ryutin against Stalin // Glasnost. 1990. No. 10, 11; Mikhailov N. Seditious “platform”. About the attempt to create an anti-Stalin underground and its consequences // Trud. 1990. October 4. m Volnoye V.A. Political terror in the 30s in Soviet Russia. M., 1995. P. 4-7; Ivnitsky N.A. Collectivization and dispossession (early 30s). M., 1996. P. 102; Kislitsyn SL. Decree. op. pp. 25, 26; Conquest Robert. Decree. op. Vol. 1. Riga, 1991. P. 48-50; Cohen Stephen. Decree. op. pp. 360, 410, 434; Khlevtok O.V. 1937: Stalin, the NKVD and Soviet society. M., 1992. S. 16-27.
15 See: Starkov B. Honor of the Party // Knowledge is power. 1988. No. 11. P. 81-83; It's him. M.N. Ryutin (Towards a political portrait) // News of the CPSU Central Committee. 1990. No. 3. P. 150-163; It's him. “My tragedy. tragedy of an entire era" (from M.N. Ryutin’s letters to his relatives. 1932-1936) // Ibid. pp. 163-178; It's him. The Ryutin case // They were not silent. M., 1991. S. 145-178; It's him. Approval of the personal power regime of I.V. Stalin and resistance in the party and state. The results of the political struggle in the 30s. Diss. . doc. ist. Sci. St. Petersburg, 1992; It's him. Hostage of the socialist idea // Affairs and people of Stalin’s time. St. Petersburg, 1995. pp. 181-209; About the case of the so-called “Union of Marxists-Leninists” // News of the CPSU Central Committee. 1989. No. 6. P. 104; Maslov N. A stunning document from the era of Stalinism // Ibid. 1990. No. 12. P. 200-202. pays special attention to this particular event, analyzes the program documents of the “Union of Marxists-Leninists”, which contained criticism of the political regime. An analysis of the documents of the “Union of Marxists-Leninists,” the author notes, allows us to conclude that, first of all, they were directed against the regime of Stalin’s personal power and did not call for the overthrow, disruption, weakening of Soviet power, or for counter-revolutionary actions. Therefore, its qualification as an anti-Soviet, anti-party, counter-revolutionary organization can hardly be accepted.16 Such an assessment is undoubtedly fair, since by the beginning of the 1930s not only the role and position of Stalin in the party had changed, but also radical changes had occurred in the political and ideological the nature of the CPSU(b). These changes were so profound that they allow us to talk about the degeneration of the entire communist regime in the Soviet Union, with the actual abandonment of the previous philosophical, social and political guidelines of the pre-revolutionary time. Thus, the attempt by Ryutin and his group to fight Stalin’s regime turned into a struggle against the new degenerated party and its leaders, which undoubtedly doomed them to inevitable death.
Of interest is the study by I.B. Shishkin "The Case of Ryu"
1 7 tina”, containing many facts unknown at that time from the life of one of the participants in the “Union of Marxists-Leninists” - V.N. Kayurov and his relatives. The author of the article talks about how the group’s documents were distributed and under what conditions they were reproduced. However, in this work there is extremely little information about other members of the Union of Marxists-Leninists; the author did not touch upon the circumstances of the emergence and activities of the group. Follows in a positive way
16 They were not silent. P. 166.
17 Questions of history. 1989. No. 7. P. 39-52. plan to note the articles of A. Vaksberg, which provide a number of information from Ryutin’s pre-Moscow life, as well as his fate after his arrest in 1932.18 Of these, information about the dignity with which Ryutin behaved during the investigation, how he maintained presence of mind in conclusion. He did not break even in 1936, when the NKVD authorities again resumed the proceedings in the case of Ryutin and his group, trying to incriminate them with terrorist activities. The fact that the Stalinist repressive machine operated flawlessly, exterminating generation after generation of party and Soviet leaders it disliked, is also evidenced by other published works in which M.N. Scientifically based and balanced assessments are given to Ryutin and the activities of the “Union of Marxists-Leninists”, despite the fact that this problem is covered mainly in fragments.19
It should be noted that in last years The interest of researchers in this issue has noticeably decreased. Ryutin is usually mentioned in the context of the general opposition to the Stalinist dictatorship.20 At the same time, collections of documents have also been published,21 which
18 Vaksberg A. How alive with the living // Literary newspaper. 1988. June 29; Martemyan Ryutin. After reading, pass it on to someone else! To all members of the CPSU(b). Publication by A. Vaksberg // Youth. 1988. No. 11. P. 22-26.; It's him. As alive with the living // Rehabilitated posthumously. Vol. 2. M., 1988. P. 6-22.
19 Trotsky Archive. Communist opposition in the USSR. 1923-1927. Ed.com. Felshtinsky Yu. T. 1-4. M., 1990; VolkogonovD. Triumph and tragedy. Political portrait of I.V. Stalin. Book 1. Part 1-2. M., 1989; It's him. Trotsky. Political portrait. Book 1-2. M., 1992; Documents testify. From the history of the village on the eve and during collectivization of 1927-1932. Ed. Danilova V.P., Ivnitsky N.A. M., 1989; Kozlov A.I. Stalin: the struggle for power. Rostov n/d., 1991; Medvedev R.A. About Stalin and Stalinism. M., 1990; Larina A.M. Unforgettable. M., 1989; Rehabilitation. Political processes of the 30-50s / Comp. Kurilov I.V., Mikhailov N.N., Naumov V.P. M., 1991.
20 Power and opposition. Russian political process of the 20th century. M., 1995; Rogovin V. Decree. op.; Khlevnyuk O.V. Politburo. Mechanisms of political power in the 1930s. M., 1996.
21 Unknown Russia. XX century / Comp. Kozlov V.V., Zavyalov S.M. Vol. 1-4. M„ 1992-1993; Documents testify. From the history of the village on the eve and during collectivization of 1927-1932. M., 1989; Letters from IV. Stalin V.M. Molotov. 1925-1936. Collection of documents / Comp. Kosheleva L., Lelchuk V., Naumov V., Naumov O., Rogovaya L., Khlevnyuk O. M., 1995; Stalin's Politburo in the 30s. Collection of documents / Comp. Khlevnyuk O.V., Kvashonkin A.V., Kosheleva L.P., Rogovaya L.A. M., 1995; The tragedy of the Soviet village. Collectivization and dispossession. Documents and materials. 1927-1939. T. 1. May 1927 - November 1929. M., 1999; can form a more objective and complete picture of the struggle for power in 1928-1932. Despite this, the history of the emergence and activities of the “Union of Marxists-Leninists” according to archival sources still remains outside the scope of serious research work. Documents related to the activities of M.N. Ryutin on the creation of organized underground resistance by I.V. Stalin, as well as materials concerning his attempts to attract into the ranks of his supporters the most prominent representatives of the opposition movements that had been defeated by that time, await further objective research.
Thus, the historiographic analysis showed that to date the political and organizational activities of M.N. Ryutin in 1932 received quite serious scientific reflection in Russian historical science, the main milestones of his biography were highlighted, answers were received to many questions related to the emergence of the underground group, the circumstances of the prosecution of members of the “Union of Marxists-Leninists”. However, to date there has been no comprehensive study devoted to the activities of the “Union of Marxists-Leninists” and the analysis of program documents of M.N.’s group. Ryutina. At the same time, serious historians Stalin era have no doubt that “the manuscripts and the fate of Ryutin will undoubtedly still be studied.”22 In addition, debatable issues still remain on this issue. In particular, to what extent Ryutin participated, and
Soviet leadership. Correspondence. 1928-1941 M., 1999; How the NEP was broken. Transcripts of the plenums of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of 1928-1929. In 5 volumes. T. 1. United Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party (Bolsheviks) April 6-11, 1928 M., 2000; T. 2. Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, July 4-12, 1928. M., 2000; T. 3. Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) November 16-24, 1928 M., 2000; T. 4. United Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) 16-
April 23, 1929 M., 2000; T. 5. Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) November 10-17, 1929 M., 2000; Stalin and Kaganovich. Correspondence. 1931-1936 / Comp. Khlevnyuk O.V., Davis R.W., Kosheleva L.P., Rees E.A., Rogovaya L.A. M„ 2001.
22Khlevnyuk O.V. Politburo. Mechanisms of political power in the 1930s. P. 62. Did N.I. participate at all in the opposition activities of the leaders of the so-called “right deviation”? Bukharin, A.I. Rykova and M.P. Tomsky, and also in connection with what circumstances and why it was L.B. who was brought to party and criminal liability in the case of the “Union of Marxists-Leninists” in the first place. Kamenev and G.E. Zinoviev, and not other prominent oppositionists. Why did Ryutin direct the edge of his criticism against Stalin alone and ignore the activities of his closest associates V.M. in program documents? Molotov, JT.M. Kaganovich, K.E. Voroshilov and others. To what extent was Ryutin connected with the Trotskyist opposition and why was he given a death sentence in 1937? In addition, some studies present Ryutin's decision to create an underground group and challenge Stalin as spontaneous or based on personal animosity between them. Beyond the scope of published scientific works on the problem, such important aspects as the intensification of the struggle for party and state power against the backdrop of those crisis phenomena that accompanied the acceleration of the pace of industrialization and collectivization in 1928-1932, and the participation of M.N. in this struggle remained. Ryutin, his attempts to counteract Stalin’s course long before the creation of the “Union of Marxists-Leninists” in 1932.
Based on this, the OBJECT OF THE RESEARCH is the opposition of I.V. Stalin in the 1920s - 1930s, the creation and activities within the framework of the opposition struggle of the group “Union of Marxists-Leninists”.
THE SUBJECT OF THE STUDY is the activities of M.N. Ryutin and the attempt made by him and his comrades in the “Union of Marxists-Leninists” to counteract I.V. Stalin in his desire to establish a totalitarian regime in the state.
THE PURPOSE of this study is to study the process of formation of opposition activity of M.N. Ryutin and analysis of program documents of the Union of Marxists-Leninists. Based on the purpose of the work and taking into account its multifaceted nature, the following tasks were set:
1. Analyze the formation of ideological views and political views of M.N. Ryutin, as well as his political and revolutionary activities in the 1910-1920s.
2. Consider the features of the struggle for power in 1928-1932, and also determine the role, place and degree of participation of M.N. Ryutin in the groups that fought for power in the party and state in the 1920-1930s.
3. Find out the role of M.N. Ryutin in the process of “defeating” the Moscow party organization in 1928, the main reasons for his removal from party activities.
4. Study the efforts undertaken by M.N. Ryutin’s attempts to fight against the establishment of a regime of personal power in the party by I.V. Stalin in 1929-1930
5. Research and determine the reasons for the emergence and features of the activities of the “Union of Marxists-Leninists”, formulate the goals and objectives of the group M.N. Ryutina.
6. Analyze the main provisions of the platform “Stalin and the crisis of the proletarian dictatorship” and the appeal “To all members of the CPSU (b)”.
7. Summarize, synthesize and subject critical analysis literature that is devoted to this problem. This is all the more important because the period of silence about the “Ryutin case” was replaced by an abundance of scientific and pseudo-scientific works and publications, which are not always based on reliable sources.
8. To identify the persons brought to party and criminal liability in the case of the “Union of Marxists-Leninists”, to clarify their biographies and future fate.
CHRONOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK OF WORK. Chronologically, the work covers more than forty years of life and political activity of M.N. Ryutin, that is, from the moment of his birth until the 1930s, when, due to political circumstances, he was forced to organize the group “Union of Marxists-Leninists” and tried to fight I.V. with illegal methods. Stalin. In some cases, the author went beyond the designated time frame to trace the fate of both Ryutin himself and one or another member of the underground group.
TERRITORIAL FRAMEWORK OF WORK. The study covers the entire territory of the USSR, until 1917 - Russian Empire, since events that developed not only in Moscow, but also in other cities and regions of the country were studied.
METHODOLOGICAL BASIS AND METHODS. The degree of knowledge of this topic also predetermined the methods of this study. The methodological basis of the work is the principles of historicism and objectivity, a systematic and specific consideration of the political struggle in the late 1920s - early 1930s. and the fate of M.N. associated with these events. Ryutin and members of the group “Union of Marxists-Leninists”. Since this topic touches on the beginning of one of the bloodiest eras in the history of the Russian people, the author tried to be guided as much as possible by the criteria of objectivity and compliance with historical truth. In the course of the work, a dialectical understanding of the processes of historical development was used, taking into account the cause-and-effect conditionality and patterns of events and phenomena. At the same time, the author also took into account the role of the subjective factor in historical processes. Speaking about historicism, the author means the principles of scientific knowledge that require studying the widest possible range of phenomena in the political life of Russia in the first third of the 20th century. Such methods make it possible to reproduce (reconstruct) not only the historical process itself, but also its specific stages, as well as their specific forms of development. To achieve the goals and objectives set for himself, the author used traditional research methods: chronological, comparative-historical, problem-chronological, retrospective, synchronous.
THE SCIENTIFIC NOVELTY OF THE RESEARCH is due, first of all, to the fact that to date no special monographic work has been prepared on the history of resistance to the Stalinist regime that formed by 1930. The scientific novelty of this study also lies in the fact that for the first time an attempt is made to give a reasoned answer to numerous questions related to the history of its origins and activities in the late 1920s - early 1930s. opposition groups to “Stalin and his clique” using the example of the “Union of Marxists-Leninists”. Considering the degree of development of the topic, much attention was paid to the formation of the ideological views of the initiator of the underground group, M.N. Ryutin, the peculiarities of the struggle for power in 1928-1932, the personal composition of the group, individual biographical stories of members of the “Union of Marxists-Leninists”. The work provides an analysis of the group's program documents, the true history of their writing and subsequent editing, as well as the circumstances of the group's failure.
In addition, it was possible to identify, clarify and document several conflict situations between I.V. Stalin and
M.N. Ryutin: the second half of 1928, when the so-called “defeat” of the Moscow Party organization took place; second half of 1930 - beginning of 1931 - political discredit of M.N. Ryutin, expulsion from the party, first arrest, inclusion of the old and honored Bolshevik on a par with the leaders of the White Guard emigration, saboteurs from the so-called “Industrial Party”, followers of L.D. Trotsky and the leaders of the former opposition, as well as a conspiratorial promoter of the policy of “right deviation”; 1932 - attempt by M.N. Ryutina uses illegal methods to fight I.V. Stalin and his course of promoting the repressive mechanism through the creation of the group “Union of Marxists-Leninists”; the second half of 1936 - the beginning of 1937, when attempts were made to get M.N. Ryutin in order to discredit N.I. Bukharin's testimony about the terrorist intentions of the underground group he created in 1932. The study of these conflict situations, which, as a rule, were also of a personal nature, reveals a well-established mechanism of political discrediting and elimination of undesirable figures, merciless reprisals against everyone who could be or oppose Stalin’s achievement of undivided power in the party and state. At the same time, the Secretary General consistently and unswervingly followed the well-known formula that it is not difficult to seize power, it is important to retain it.
SOURCE BASE. A variety of sources were used in writing this work. All of them can be divided into the following groups.
1. Official documents, including press appearances, reports, speeches and verbatim reports, resolutions of party congresses, conferences and plenums, scientific works, business correspondence, and other documents of party and government officials.
Published documents in the 1910s - 1930s. constituted the largest and at the same time the least informative group of sources for the study. At the same time, after the rehabilitation of M.N. Ryutin published documents that made it possible to significantly deepen the study of this problem.24
2. Archival documents. The complex of archival materials used to solve research problems constitutes the most significant part of the sources. Unlike published ones, they are extremely informative and essentially indispensable in covering the present topic. They are mainly drawn from the funds of the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI), the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GA RF), the Russian State Military
23 About work in the village. Resolution of the 10th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). CPSU in resolutions. Ed. 9. T. 4. M., 1984; On the results and further tasks of collective farm construction. Resolution of the plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. November 10-17, 1929 Ibid. T. 5. M., 1984; XV Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Verbatim report. M.-L., 1927; Ryutin M. Party and the working class. M., 1924; Ryutin M.N. Smenovekhites and the proletarian revolution. Rostov-on-Don, 1924; Ryutin M.N. Party unity and discipline. M.-L., 1926; XIV Congress of the CPSU(b). Verbatim report. M., 1926. Stalin I.V. About the right-wing danger in the CPSU(b). Speech at the plenum of the Moscow Committee and the International Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on October 19, 1928 // Op. T. 11. M., 1949; Stalin I.V. On the issue of the policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class // Ibid. T. 12. M., 1949; Stalin I.V. Results of the first five-year plan. Report on January 7, 1933 at the joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party (Bolsheviks). //Ibid. T. 13. M„ 1951.
24 Bukharin N.I. Selected works. M., 1988; Documents testify. From the history of the village on the eve and during collectivization of 1927-1932. / Ed. Danilova V.P., Ivnitskogo N.A. M., 1989; Kozlov A.I. Stalin: the struggle for power. Rostov n/d., 1991; Larina A.M. Unforgettable. M., 1989; Unknown Russia. XX century / Comp. Kozlov V.V., Zavyalov S.M. Vol. 1-4. M., 1992-1993; Documents testify. From the history of the village on the eve and during collectivization of 1927-1932. M., 1989; Letters from I.V. Stalin V.M. Molotov. 1925-1936. Collection of documents / Comp. Kosheleva L., Lelchuk V., Naumov V., Naumov O., Rogovaya L., Khlevnyuk O. M., 1995; Stalin's Politburo in the 30s. Collection of documents / Comp. Khlevnyuk O.V., Kvashon-kin A.V., Kosheleva L.P., Rogovaya L.A. M., 1995; The tragedy of the Soviet village. Collectivization and dispossession. Documents and materials. 1927-1939. T. 1. May 1927 - November 1929. M., 1999; Soviet leadership. Correspondence. 1928-1941 M., 1999; How the NEP was broken. Transcripts of the plenums of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) 1928-1929. In 5 volumes. T. 1. United Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) April 6-11, 1928 M„ 2000; T. 2. Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, July 4-12, 1928. M., 2000; T. 3. Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) November 16-24, 1928. M, 2000; T. 4. United Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) April 16-23, 1929. M, 2000; T. 5. Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, November 10-17, 1929. M, 2000; Stalin and Kaganovich. Correspondence. 1931-1936 / Comp. Khlevnyuk O.V., Davis R.W., Kosheleva L.P., Rees E.A., Rogovaya L.A. M„ 2001. historical archive (RGVIA) and the personal archive of daughter M.N. Ryutina - JI.M. Ryutina.25
The bulk of the sources used in the process of working on the dissertation are mostly unpublished documents from state archives introduced into scientific circulation for the first time. More than 200 cases were studied.
Documentary materials of RGASPI are distributed among the following funds:
F. 17 - Central Committee of the CPSU (CPSU Central Committee) (1898, 1903-1991). It examines the minutes of meetings, decisions and resolutions of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, transcripts of meetings of the Organizing Bureau and the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, reports of leading party and government officials, verbatim reports of the plenums of the Central Committee and joint plenums of the Central Committee and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, closed letters and appeals of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Moscow Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, minutes and transcripts of meetings of the Bureau of the Moscow Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, closed decisions of the secretariats of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Moscow Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, minutes of joint meetings of the Bureau of the Moscow Committee and the Presidium of the MCC CPSU(b).
F. 372 - Far Eastern Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) (Dalburo) (1920-1925), which contains reports, circulars, correspondence, including on personnel issues.
F. 558 - Stalin (present Dzhugashvili) Joseph Vissarionovich (1878-1953). It examines author's documents (letters, notes, resolutions on documents), coded telegrams, draft articles, proofreadings, clippings from foreign press and translations to them, documents from a “special folder.”
25 Of particular value are the JI.M. transferred to the applicant. Ryutina in 1989, letters to M.N. Ryutina from prison to relatives (1932-1936). Fragments of letters were published by B. Starkov, V. Vinogradov, I. Kurilov and Yu. Sigachev. News of the CPSU Central Committee. 1990. No. 3. pp. 163-178.
F. 589 - Committee of Party Control under the Central Committee of the CPSU (CPC) (1952-1991), which contains personal files of communists, appeals to party congresses, letters from those expelled from the party to party authorities, questionnaires and biographical information of those expelled, certificates prepared in the process rehabilitation.
The study is based on a selection of documents from M.N.’s personal file. Ryutin, bound in 5 volumes and transferred from the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation. It was formed, judging by the selection of documents, from the early 1960s to the end of the 1980s, and consists mainly of originals (handwritten autographs of notes, letters, statements, typewritten transcripts of meetings and various documents) or typewritten copies made in various years . It can be assumed that the compilers of the “case of M.N. Ryutina” tried to compile it mainly to follow the chronological principle. Thus, the first volume presents in sufficient detail documents from the late 1920s, when M.N. Ryutin for the first time openly opposed I.V. Stalin and the so-called general party line he pursued after the XV Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). The most fully presented are various kinds of documents (statements, minutes of conversations, meetings of the party board of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party (Bolsheviks), fragments of interrogations of the OGPU) dating back to 1932-1933, during the period when the most active investigation was carried out into the activities of the organizers and
97 members of the Union of Marxists-Leninists. These documents indicate that through intimidation and deception, people were deprived of the right to think, any, even the most sensible, thoughts were suppressed, and in the instilled atmosphere of hostility and suspicion, attempts to propose alternative options for the socio-political and economic development of the country were excluded.
The basis of the second volume is an unpublished transcript in two copies of an extraordinary meeting of the presidium of the TsSKVKP(b) dated October 9, 1932, dedicated to a detailed analysis
26 RGASPI. F. 589. Op. 3. D. 9355. (G. 1-5).
27 Ibid. D. 9355 (T. 1). case M.N. Ryutin and the communists involved in the creation of the “Union of Marxists-Leninists”.28
The third volume mainly contains documents from 1929-1931, among which documentary evidence (statements, complaints, explanatory notes and correspondence between the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Irkutsk District Party Committee) about the trip of M.N. is of particular interest. Ryutina on home leave in June 1929; materials (transcripts of interviews with M.N. Ryutin, incorrect and corrected transcripts of the meeting of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated September 23, 1930) about the real reasons and circumstances of the exclusion of M.N. Ryutina from the party; materials of the criminal prosecution of M.N.’s relatives Ryutina (January-June 1931). There is also a particularly valuable document here - the resolution of the Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party (Bolsheviks) dated October 2, 1932 “On the counter-revolutionary group of Ryutin-Slepkov”, drawn up with an extract from the protocol dated November 25, 1937 and certified by the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party (Bolsheviks) I. .IN. Stalin (autograph), in which the Ryutin-Slepkov group is characterized as “White Guard counter-revolutionary,” whereas earlier, in the fall of 1932, it was called the “counter-revolutionary Ryutin-Ivanov-Galkin group.”29
In the fourth volume, the following documents can be separated into independent thematic collections: correspondence and auxiliary materials of the secret department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks with local control bodies of the party in connection with the allegations put forward in 1926 against M.N. Ryutin with accusations that during the years of the revolution and the Civil War he was a Menshevik, “an active White Guard in 1918, who shot workers”; autobiography
28 Ibid. D. 9355 (T. 2).
29 Ibid. D. 9355 (T. 3).
M.N. Ryutin, dated September 1, 1923, which allowed, in the process of working on his dissertation, to form the most complete picture of the circumstances of his life, as well as revolutionary and party activities; correspondence of the State Security Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the Main Military Prosecutor's Office with the Party Control Committee under the CPSU Central Committee (1962) and the accompanying archival materials for the indictment in the case of the “counter-revolutionary organization “Union of Marxists-Leninists”. thirty
The fifth volume presents mainly documents dated 1988 (protest by way of supervision Prosecutor General USSR, resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the USSR, auxiliary materials) on the posthumous rehabilitation of M.N. Ryutin and his comrades in the “Union of Marxists-Leninists.”31
Of particular interest in the case of M.N. Ryutin presents reference materials, including biographical ones, about all those who were in one way or another in various years involved or included in the “Union of Marxists-Leninists”, as well as their personal assessments of the events that took place at that time. The documents largely shed light on the peculiarities of the internal party struggle in the early 1930s, and also characterize the methods of combating dissent in the party, which ultimately led to the formation of the personality cult of I.V. Stalin. A characteristic feature of the “case of M.N. Ryutin" is that the sheets of the five-volume book are numbered in reverse order.
F. 613 - Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (Central Control Commission) (1920-1934), in which the protocols of the plenums, presidiums, secretariat, party collegium and “party troikas” of the Central Control Commission were studied.
30 Ibid. D. 9355 (T. 4).
31 Ibid. D. 9355 (T. 5).
The study of the specified complex of archival materials of RGAS-PI made it possible to clarify many facts of the biography of M.N. Ryutin (election as a delegate to party congresses and conferences, confirmation in one position or another, his attitude towards opposition figures). In particular, it was established that in 1928 Ryutin was removed from the post of secretary of the Krasnopresnensky district committee of Moscow in violation of the Charter of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). The fact that he continued his political activities as deputy executive editor of the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper, and in fact was the head of the editorial team of the army newspaper for about a year, is a considerable merit of K.E. Voroshilov, with whom M.N. Ryutin maintained friendly relations since the early 1920s, when he was secretary of the Dagestan regional committee of the CPSU (b), and K.E. Voroshilov - commander of the North Caucasus Military District. In 1930, after printed reproaches from I.V. Stalin, M.N. Ryutin, as evidenced by the above-mentioned RGASPI documents, not only was not subjected to repression, as his biographers wrote about at the end of 1980, but was even promoted - he was appointed chairman of the Office of the Film and Photo Industry and a member of the board of the People's Commissariat for Education, replacing a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee in this post CPSU(b) Ya.E. Ruzutaka. Thus, the analysis of archival documents allows us to assume that within the party-bureaucratic mechanism laid down by I.V. Stalin, there were also healthy elements who, contrary to the evidence, nominated the most trained and sensible party workers to leadership positions.
Documentary materials on the revolutionary and state activities of M.N. Ryutin, as well as those relating to his persecution in the party and the courts, his stay in places of detention were identified mainly in the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GA RF) (Moscow) and distributed among the following funds:
Fund R - 374 - Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) - People's Commissariat of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate (Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) - NK RKI USSR). It examines transcripts of meetings of the plenums of the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, minutes of joint meetings of the presidium of the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the collegium of the NK RKI of the USSR and copies of materials for them. Some documents from archival files were seized, about which there are corresponding notes.
Fund R - 7816 - Committee for Cinematography and Photography (Film Committee) under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.
1929-1930. It contains documents about the process of reorganization of the department in 1929-1930: registers of enterprises, their addresses and details, changes in the composition of governing bodies, draft governing documents (charter and regulations), work plans of enterprises, applications for manufactured products.
Fund R - 8131 - USSR Prosecutor's Office. 1924-1991, in which documents of general and judicial supervision, supervision of correctional labor institutions and supervision of places of deprivation of liberty and places of detention were studied.
Fund R - 8409 - (Society) “E.P. Peshkova. Assistance to political prisoners." 1922-1938. It examines lists of relatives of political prisoners, alphabetical directories of political exiles and prisoners according to the resolutions of the Special Meeting, letters and statements of political prisoners and political exiles, their relatives on the review of cases and the application of amnesty, correspondence and statements of political prisoners and their relatives on the provision of material assistance and permission for visits.
Fund R - 9414 - Main Directorate of Places of Detention of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. 1930-1960. It examined alphabetical cards in which information about the Gulag camps was collected in a systematic form (location, date of formation and liquidation with references to the numbers and dates of orders), which made it possible to get a more complete picture of the conditions of detention of persons prosecuted in the case of M N. Ryutina.
These documents of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation contain mainly indirect information on this problem, which, however, does not reduce their value as the most reliable source that makes it possible to identify the main drive “belts” of the repressive mechanism
1930s, to understand that even in legal chaos there was a place for philanthropy and the opportunity to provide help to those who were in dire need of it.
Documentary materials relating to the military service and revolutionary activities of M.N. Ryutin in the Far East were identified in the Russian State Military Historical Archive (RGVIA) (Moscow) and are distributed among the following funds:
Fund 1466 - Military Commissar of the Provisional Government under the Irkutsk Military District. 1917. It examines appeals, official correspondence and reports of the commissioner, as well as printed materials (leaflets, appeals, newspapers).
Fund 1468 - Headquarters of the Irkutsk Military District. 1875-1919. It examines the main official documents (orders, directives, telephone messages), which reflected the process of change of power in the Irkutsk Military District in 1917-1918, as well as the procedure for the demobilization of parts of the district.
Fund 1489 - Head of infantry warrant officer training schools in the Irkutsk Military District. 1917-1918. It examined lists of variable composition of schools, as well as the track records of graduates.
The RGVIA documents contain extremely scanty information about military service non-commissioned officer and then warrant officer of the army infantry M.N. Ryutina. This is largely explained by the period of revolutionary transformations, during which the activities of warrant officer M.N. were not fully reflected. Ryutin neither as chairman of the Harbin Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, nor as commander of the troops of the Irkutsk Military District.
As for others, including local archives, they, unfortunately, have preserved a small number of documents relating to Ryutin’s political activities. This fully applies to the Siberian archives, where only a small part of the documentary sources about the life and work of M.N. is stored. Ryutina.
3. Memoir literature. Unfortunately, there are no memories directly about the activities and personality of M.N. Ryutin is not available, largely for the reasons stated above. However, this work uses the memoirs of party and government officials of the period under study, as well as participants in the opposition struggle of the 1920s - 1930s, which help to form a more comprehensive picture of that period, to better understand the motives of the actions of representatives of both that and and the other side
4. Materials from periodicals, especially newspaper publications, turned out to be extremely informative for the study. From them you can glean a lot of valuable information not only about the early revolutionary activities of M.N. Ryutin, but also to trace how his ideological views were formed. Particularly important for our research were newspaper publications in the period between the February Revolution and the beginning of the Civil War. Documentary information about this period of the life of the hero of our study is extremely meager and sometimes only in the periodical press of this time one can find some data about the activities of warrant officer M.N. Ryutina.33
The main sources are given in the text of the dissertation. During the research, many other scientific works, memoirs, and archival documents were used, information about which is also
32 Larina A.M. Unforgettable. M., 1989; Kaganovich L. Memoirs. M., 1996; Chuev F. That's what Kaganovich said. M., 1992; Khrushchev N.S. Time. People. Power. Memories. In 4 books. M., 1999\ Mikoyan A.I. It was. M„ 1999.
33 Harbin news. 1917. September 20; In the Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies // Harbin Vsstnik. 1917. October 11; Events in Harbin // Siberia. 1917. November 15; Events in Harbin // Siberia. 1917. November 29; Transbaikal new. 1917. December 12; How the Chinese maintain order. Letter from Harbin // Irkutsk life. 1917. December 29; Ryutin. By the time // Bulletin. Organ of the Novonikolaevsk Organizing Bureau of the RCP(b) and the Revolutionary Committee. 1919. No. 1. December 18; It's him. Storm // Ibid.; It's him. Conference of Communists // News of the Irkutsk Provincial Revolutionary Committee. 1920. April 4; It's him. Party life // Wall newspaper of ROST. 1920. April 21; It's him. Meeting of the Council of Workers and Red Army Deputies // Ibid. April 30; It's him. XIV Congress and regulation of the growth of the party // Working Moscow. 1926. February 9 and 10; It's him. Party and internal party democracy // Pravda. 1926. August 19; It's him. What has been done and what needs to be done // Working Moscow. 1926. December 18; It's him. The fourteen-year path of Trotskyism // Bolshevik. 1927. No. 2. P. 81; Working Moscow. 1927. January 8 (about M.N. Ryutin); It's him. On the disbelief of the opposition and the guild sentiments of the proletariat // Pravda. 1927. April 3; It's him. Grassroots work and tasks of the party leadership // Bolshevik. 1927. No. 5. P. 49-58; It's him. The Chinese revolution and the slogan of the Soviets // Bolshevik. 1927. No. 11-12. P. 29; Elimination of the kulaks as a class // Red Star. 1930. January 16; Let us completely expose the kulak agents, allies of counter-revolutionary Trotskyism - right-wing opportunists // Pravda. 1930. October 6. is given at the end of the work. Thus, we have a complex of materials that allow us to illuminate quite fully this problem. But this does not mean that further research will be stopped, because There are other documents in the archives, the discovery of which will most likely make it possible to supplement the problem of resistance to the cult of personality of I.V. Stalin.
SCIENTIFIC NOVELTY and PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE of the work lie in the fact that the author for the first time, from a scientific objective position, comprehensively examines the problem of organized resistance to the regime of personal power established by Stalin in the party and state, and also shows the mechanisms of repressions emerging in that period aimed at discrediting and subsequent destruction of party and statesmen. The process of resistance to the repressive course is considered in the organic unity of goals and objectives to destroy “differences of opinion” in the party and society, the ways and methods of the government’s fight against opposition movements, and is presented in its logical completeness - from the formation of the views and ideological views of Stalin’s opponents, the circumstances that forced their involvement in opposition activities, their intentions, role and contribution to the fight against the regime before the tragic fate that befell them. The work is based on previously classified archival documents, which are being introduced into scientific circulation for the first time. The research materials can serve as the basis and component for further fundamental research on the problem of organized resistance to the course of I.V. Stalin in the 1920s - 1930s. They can also be used by social scientists, teachers of higher and secondary special education. educational institutions, by secondary school teachers when studying national history, and are also of interest to a wider range of readers, including relatives of the repressed, interested in the problem of the cult of personality of I.V. Stalin.
The main scientific results obtained during the study are presented in a number of publications in domestic publications.
Conclusion of the dissertation on the topic “National History”, Anfertyev, Ivan Anatolyevich
CONCLUSION
Having examined the dramatic, full of contradictions era of the birth and formation of the Stalinist regime from a modern scientific perspective, when not only those historical characters, but also the system itself no longer exist, one involuntarily suggests a comparison of the participants of the “Ryutin group” with numerous revolutionary democratic organizations of the 19th century. Comparing, you find the only thing that united them - isolation from the masses and their lack of understanding of the historical moment in which they unfolded their struggle. Although history does not know the subjunctive mood, it can still be assumed that the ideas of the “Marxists-Leninists” in that particular situation were unlikely to meet the interests of the majority of party members. These ideas, in many ways, no longer met the hopes and aspirations of the broad masses, since they did not imply fundamental changes to improve their lives, but only outlined, and even then with reservations, some liberalization of the already established regime. It would also be useful to remember that even Lenin’s NEP was viewed with hostility by many party members with a revolutionary past. And among the “Marxists-Leninists” there was no leader whose authority, even to a small extent, could be compared with the authority of a major leader, so power after the removal of Stalin could end up in completely different hands than they had imagined.
In any case, it cannot be said about the “Marxists-Leninists” that they were a small group of people connected by personal friendship and acquaintance, although the social party movement began with such relations at all times. Having originated in a narrow circle of like-minded people, this underground movement, even in conditions of conspiratorial activity, began to grow rapidly, as evidenced by the investigation materials. Thus, more than seven dozen people who were in one way or another connected with the “Ryutin case” went through the hearing procedure at the Central Control Commission, although some of them did not know Ryutin himself. Not all of them suffered equally severe punishment, but it should be taken into account that the Central Control Commission dealt only with the leadership of the Union of Marxists-Leninists, or with old party members whose experience gave them the right to be ranked among the party elite, although formally these people were not occupied any positions by that time. Many, many dozens, if not hundreds, of those suspected of having connections with the “Marxists-Leninists” went through interrogations at the OGPU, and we can only guess about the further fate of these people. We must also remember that some of the people remained not “covered” by either the Central Control Commission or the OGGGU. And many of them fought not for power, but against the upper layer of representatives of the anti-people government, led by Stalin.
The work provides a detailed and thorough description of both the personality and activities of I.V. Stalin as General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, concerning primarily the adventuristic pace of industrialization and excesses in collectivization, analyzed the methods by which he managed to form a regime of sole and unlimited power in the party and state, the consequence of which and the most complete reflection was the established for many decades his cult of personality. It is shown that he fully demonstrated himself as a cruel, ruthless leader, as authoritarian as the system of power he created itself. It is also interesting how, according to his instructions, total control over the political activities of party members and government officials was formed. It is unlikely that he felt any remorse, sending hundreds of thousands of people to death in the name of the only goal - strengthening his own sole power. He did not feel pity for his enemies and friends, knowing full well that if he gave in or weakened the pressure in the most acute political struggle for sole illegitimate power, then there would be no mercy for him. In fact, he had no other choice in a situation that he largely created himself. However, attempts to revive such a system of power continue today by individual unscrupulous politicians and publicists who, for the purpose of their own short-term political gain, are looking for easier ways to implement the difficult and large-scale tasks facing modern society and the Russian state.
The study identified the main trends in opposition to the cult of personality of I.V. Stalin using the example of the creation of the illegal party organization “Union of Marxists-Leninists”, and also determined the degree of influence of this struggle on the internal political situation in the USSR and subsequent mass repressions. M.N. Ryutin took the risk of creating the Union of Marxists-Leninists, believing that this organization would be required by circumstances in the very near future. This did not happen, but everything could have happened completely differently. It was all the more important to study the practical activities of M.N. Ryutin, his legal and illegal attempts to counteract the regime of personal power of I.V. Stalin, the formation of the cult of personality, analyze their character, content and results, as well as show his theoretical views and ideological guidelines that guided him, reveal the style and methods of work of a party leader who had the courage to resist the repressive machine. The liquidation of the “Union of Marxists-Leninists” in the fall of 1932 became a milestone for Stalin in his desire to strengthen his individual power in the party, and therefore in the state. The strategic initiative in making the most important decisions at the state level finally and until the end of his life passed to the Secretary General, and in the future he only needed formal support from the Politburo.
The political repressions of this time were one of the most difficult periods for Soviet Russia. The program of the “Union of Marxists-Leninists” called on the groups of Trotsky, Bukharin, Kamenev and Zinoviev, opposed to Stalin, to give the General Secretary a “general battle” using illegal methods. As a result, for the first time, repressions on such a scale fell on an entire group of honored party members. Stalin’s desire to erase any difference between oppositionists and counter-revolutionaries is evidenced by his speech at the XVII Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), which. took place a little over two years after the difficult year for the General Secretary in 1932. Stalin twisted into a tight knot all any serious opposition movements in the party, so that he could later classify them as one “criminal camp.” In it, he convinced the congress delegates that there was no difference between the Trotskyist program and the plans of the right. The Trotskyists at one time demanded the dissolution of state farms as unprofitable, the dissolution of a large part of the collective farms as inflated, abandonment of the policy of eliminating the kulaks, a return to the concession policy and the concession of a number of industrial enterprises as unprofitable. Harsh criticism of the economic policy of the party elite was also heard from the right. In this regard, Stalin posed the question to the delegates of the congress: how do these movements differ from each other? “It’s clear that nothing. It turns out that the “left” openly joined the counter-revolutionary program of the right in order to form a bloc with them and wage a joint struggle against the party.”410 Such an arbitrary interpretation of the political positions of various party factions laid the basis against the total extermination of everyone who did not agree with Stalin’s line manuals. It is obvious that the activities of M.N. Ryutina largely influenced the very scale of the repressions that soon followed in 1936-1939. The group’s activities occur during a period of change in I.V.’s methods of struggle. Stalin with opposition elements. The “Leader of all nations” could no longer and did not want to use palliative methods to combat his opponents. He needed effective measures, of which the physical destruction of enemies was undoubtedly one of the most effective ways their neutralization. Under these conditions, Stalin proved himself to be a politician who knew how to find allies, skillfully maneuver in the struggle for power, carry out multi-step operations, wait for the moment to attack, and retreat when circumstances required it. The Ryutin case largely strengthened Stalin’s intentions to launch mass repressions in the country. He just had to wait for the right moment to realize his intentions.
The work defines the methods of activity of the organizers of the “Union of Marxists-Leninists”, who tried to illegally resist the regime of personal power of I.V. Stalin. They were not original and were borrowed from previous pre-revolutionary practices, as well as techniques and methods of waging the opposition struggle of 1920-1930. Basically, they traditionally relied on Marxist-Leninist dogmas, recipes for exiting the systemic
410 of the CPSU(b) in resolutions and decisions of congresses, conferences and plenums of the Central Committee. Ch. I. M., 1941. P. 560-561. crisis of 1932. The displacement of I.V. was declared. Stalin from the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, and it was also supposed to fight for the restoration of the broadly interpreted Leninist principles of life and activity of the party, the creation of preconditions for the country to emerge from the severe economic crisis, and improve the lives of the broad masses. Moreover, it was assumed that the new collective leadership of the party would strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat, relying on the secret services.
Members of the group were arrested before they were registered in the organization, at the stage of preparing program documents. The group had no charter, no program, no membership cards. In fact, their activities were stopped at the stage of stating their intentions about the desirability of changing the party and state leadership, and, accordingly, the political course being implemented by them. Members of the group were not part of any anti-Soviet or anti-state organizations, or, especially, terrorist centers. Implement the plans of M.N. Ryutin and the organizers of the “Union of Marxists-Leninists” put plans into practice during the period of autocracy of I.V. Stalin was, of course, impossible, but the attempt to confront the anti-people regime, to find ways to radically improve the lives of broad sections of the people deserves respect.
The study examines the reasons and motives that prompted M.N. Ryutin to take the path of fighting the policy pursued by I.V. Stalin, their ideological and political differences were revealed. The emergence of the “Union of Marxists-Leninists” was due to a systemic economic crisis provoked by an accelerated course towards industrialization and collectivization, as well as the desire of I.V. Stalin to strengthen individual power in the party and state. M.N. Ryutin repeatedly in 1928-1932. opposed the establishment of a regime of personal power in the country by I.V. Stalin, the formation of his cult of personality. He turned out to be not one of those who, at the behest of Stalin, became bargaining chips in political games, gave up, gave up, refusing to continue the struggle. Realizing the viciousness of Stalin’s policy of cutting off from the leadership prominent figures who had the courage to take their own political position, he did not limit himself to indignation at Stalin’s immorality and outright unprincipledness, but came to the conclusion that it was necessary to fight against what was actively forming at the turn of the 30s. XX century regime of his sole power.
The political views and theoretical views of the group members, which they set out in the draft program documents, were clearly debatable in nature and did not contain direct calls for a change in the political system. All the blame for the decline in the standard of living of the people is placed on Stalin and his entourage. The question of popular free elections was not raised; in fact, it was only about changing one ruling group in the party and state to another, however, just as uncontrollable by society and the people as the first, led by Stalin. They planned to acquaint the communists with the platform, attract them to their side during discussions, and then remove I.V. from the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Stalin, perhaps in a formally legal manner. Their plans included convening an extraordinary emergency congress of the party and electing a new composition of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. The task was to eliminate the dictatorship of Stalin, which could only be accomplished by the party and the working class, no matter what difficulties they had to overcome and no matter what sacrifices it required.
Based on archival documents and sources inaccessible to researchers, the life path of M.N. is illuminated. Ryutin, his experience of political activity both in the pre-revolutionary years and after the establishment of Soviet power in Russia. His ideological views and political views were formed in difficult and largely contradictory conditions in the pre-revolutionary years, and in the conditions of the Civil War, the features of a revolutionary pragmatist, an adherent of radical actions, who subordinated his actions to the tasks of a radical reorganization of life on new socialist principles, were clearly visible. Not agreeing with the input of I.V. Stalin's administrative-command system of party-state management of industry and agriculture, gross violations of socialist democracy, the statutory principles of democratic centralism within the party, M.N. Ryutin realized his views and ideas for the further construction of socialism in the country in a theoretical work - the platform “Stalin and the Crisis of the Proletarian Dictatorship”, and with the leadership to realize his intention to replace I.V. Stalin, as head of the party and state, should have issued an appeal “To all members of the CPSU(b).” They also contain an analysis of the new political reality - the final formation of Stalin’s dictatorship in the party and the state, as well as the reasons for the defeat of various groups opposing Stalin, the characteristics of the main political figures who opposed Stalin are given, for tactical reasons there is no assessment of the activities of his closest associates.
The literature that is devoted to this problem is generalized, synthesized and subjected to critical analysis in the work. Scientific conclusions, lessons and practical recommendations, arising from the scientific understanding of the political situation of 1928-1932, which made it possible to expand the scientific argumentation and eliminate inaccuracies and existing conscious or involuntary distortions in the coverage of the topic.
As a result of the political situation associated with the liquidation of the “Union of Marxists-Leninists” in 1932, not only Lenin’s associates, old Bolsheviks, prominent party and government figures, but also hundreds of thousands of ordinary party members became victims of merciless preventive reprisals against real and imaginary opponents of the General Secretary , workers, employees, peasants, guilty of only one thing - the ability to think, evaluate and speak out loud about the events taking place in the country. On the path chosen by Stalin, he had many victories, but for decades only one problem remained on the agenda - when exactly the model of a totalitarian state created by him, designed to strengthen and maintain his sole power, would be destroyed. In this regard, the activities of M.N. are extremely interesting. Ryutin and his group, which opposed the tyranny of “Stalin and his clique” after the defeat of the authoritative organized opposition to the course of the General Secretary. From the previous opposition movements of the 1920s. created on the initiative of M.N. Ryutin’s group was distinguished by the radicalism of the methods of the planned struggle, an attempt to create an organizationally formalized illegal structure within the party, observance of secrecy, and selective personal recruitment of its supporters.
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CENTRAL CONTROL COMMISSION OF THE AUCP(B) / CENTRAL CONTROL COMMITTEE OF THE ALL-UNION COMMUNIST PARTY (BOLSHEVIKS)/ M. N. RYUTIN / M. N. RYUTIN / I. V. STALIN / J. V. STALIN / PARTY OPPOSITION / PARTY OPPOSITION "THE UNION OF MARXIST-LENINISTS" / "UNION OF MARXIST-LENINITS"annotation scientific article on history and archeology, author of the scientific work - Anfertyev Ivan Anatolyevich
The article examines the mechanism for strengthening the formation that had formed by the early 1930s. the system of individual power of I.V. Stalin with the help of discrediting by the control bodies of the ruling party his most consistent and therefore dangerous political opponent M.N. Ryutin. In modern historical literature, the latter is better known mainly for the fact that in 1932 he prepared a theoretical work “Stalin and the Crisis of the Proletarian Dictatorship”, called the “Ryutin Platform”, and his political views and attitude towards Stalin were set out in the address “To all members All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)", better known as the "Ryutin Manifesto". In the first half of 1932, Ryutin organized an illegal group in the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the “Union of Marxists-Leninists.” However, less well known is the episode of 1930, when the head of the capital’s trust, A. S. Nemov, sent a statement to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks about Ryutin’s attempt to recruit him into a group opposed to Stalin. As a result, Ryutin was expelled by the presidium Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks from the party, was arrested in November 1930, but released in January 1931 on Stalin’s orders. The analysis made it possible to establish that in addition to the persecution of Ryutin for both personal and political reasons, Stalin used his exclusion from the party to prepare for the prospect of mass extermination of party cadres who did not want to be obedient executors of his largely adventuristic plans.
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M. N. Ryutin: On the Verge of Being Expelled from the Party by the Central Control Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)
The article and the published document research the machinery of strengthening J. V. Stalin "s individual rule via headhunting the most consistent and therefore the most dangerous rival of his, M. N. Ryutin. In recent historiography, the latter is best known for writing a fundamental paper “Stalin and the Crisis of the Proletarian Dictatorship" (1932), which was named "Ryutin's Platform". His political stance and very negative assessment of Stalin were expounded in “Appeal to All Members of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)”, which is more commonly known as Ryutin Manifesto. In the first half of the year 1932 Ryutin formed an illegal group inside the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), “The Union of Marxist-Leninists”. Two years before there was another, less known, episode concerning Ryutin's anti-Stalin efforts: a head of a Moscow trust A. S. Nemov directed a notification to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) claiming that Ryutin had attempted to recruit him in an anti-Stalin group. As a result, Ryutin was expelled from the party by the Presidium of the Central Control Committee and then, in November 1930, arrested. Nevertheless in January 1931 he was released on Stalin's instruction. The study established that Stalin, while pursuing his own personal and political objectives in Ryutin's persecution, used this expulsion from the party to pave the way for the future massive purge of the party cadres reluctant to carry out his largely opportunistic plan of building of the so-called 'socialism" in the USSR.
Text of scientific work on the topic "M. N. Ryutin. On the eve of expulsion from the party by the Presidium of the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks"
UDC 94(47).084.6
I. A. Anfertiev
M. N. Ryutin. On the eve of expulsion from the party by the Presidium of the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks
Political activities of M. N. Ryutin1 and other opposition figures at the turn of the 1920s - 1930s. against the establishment of the personal power regime of J.V. Stalin in the party has been described in sufficient detail and, it would seem, there is no particular need to return to this problem again2. However, a number of studies, especially those
See: Anfertyev I. A. Activities of the “Union of Marxists-Leninists”: M. N. Ryutin and the struggle for power in 1928-1932. dis. ...cand. ist. Sci. St. Petersburg, 2004; Starkov B. 1) Honor of the party // Knowledge is power. 1988. No. 11. P. 81-83; 2) M. N. Ryutin (Towards a political portrait) // News of the CPSU Central Committee. 1990. No. 3. P. 150-163; 3) “My tragedy. tragedy of an entire era" (from M. N. Ryutin’s letters to his relatives. 1932-1936) // News of the CPSU Central Committee. 1990. No. 3. P. 163-178; 4) The Ryutin case // They were not silent. M., 1991. S. 145-178; 5) Approval of the regime of personal power of I.V. Stalin and resistance in the party and state. Results
I political struggle in the 30s. dis. ... Dr. Ist. Sci. St. Petersburg, 1992; 6) Hostage of social
Kustic idea // Affairs and people of Stalin’s time. St. Petersburg, 1995. pp. 181-209; About the case of the so-called “Union of Marxists-Leninists” // News of the CPSU Central Committee. 1989. No. 6. P. 104; 8 Maslov N. A stunning document of the era of Stalinism // News of the CPSU Central Committee. 1989. 1990. £ No. 12. pp. 200-202.
2 Power and opposition. Russian political process of the twentieth century. M., 1995; Istoriography of Stalinism: Sat. Art. M., 2007; Khlevnyuk O.V. 1) Politburo. Mechanisms of political power in the 30s. M., 1996; 2) Owner. Stalin and the establishment of the Stalinist dictatorship. M.: ROSSPEN, 2010; History of Stalinism: a repressed province. § M.: ROSSPEN, 2011; Bitsiokha V.G. Formation of the Soviet political system: regional aspect. October 1917 - mid-20s (based on materials from the Saratov ^ province). dis. ...cand. ist. Sci. Saratov, 2010; Borisova Yu. A. Regional party committees as bodies of local political power in 1918-1937: on the example of the Western region of the RSFSR. dis. ...cand. ist. Sci. M., 2008; Bogatyrev M. A. N. I. Bukharin
published in the late 1980s - early 1990s, due to the inaccessibility of the source base, contains inaccuracies, distortions and obvious, but still exaggerated, speculations3. In particular, there is no complete clarity about the circumstances of the exclusion of M. N. Ryutin from the party in the fall of 1930. Meanwhile, this event can be classified as extraordinary, if we take into account the position that on the eve of the expulsion was occupied by Martemyan Nikitich - Chairman of the Office of the Photo and Film Industry, member of the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR4. In this regard, the archival document published for the first time is of particular value for researchers of the history of Stalinism, since it allows, to a certain extent, to reconstruct not only the mechanism for identifying and punishing active opponents of the Stalin regime among the party and state nomenklatura, both open and disguised, but also to identify a carefully disguised plan for the upcoming “great purge” of the party in the second half of the 1930s. Main
and NEP: Problems and contradictions. dis. ...cand. ist. Sci. Rostov-on-Don, 1994; Vyaz-mitinova I.P. Organizational problems of the Bolshevik Party under the conditions of a monopoly on power in the 20s. dis. ...cand. ist. Sci. M., 1994; Ivantsov I.G. The role of internal party control in the strengthening and development of the CPSU (b) 1920-1929: Based on materials from Kuban. dis. ...cand. ist. Sci. Krasnodar, 2005; Izmozik V. S. Political control in Soviet Russia. dis. ... Dr. Ist. Sci. St. Petersburg, 1995; Isaev A. E. Political struggle in the CPSU(b) in 1923-1929. in the coverage of Anglo-American historiography. dis. ...cand. ist. Sci. M., 1994; Kislitsyn S.A. The struggle of the CPSU(b) against the right deviation. Problems of historiography of the 1920s - the first half of the 1930s. dis. ...cand. ist. Sci. Rostov-on-Don, 1984; Lozbenev I.N. Interaction of economic and socio-political processes in the Moscow region during the NEP years. 1921-1929 dis. ...cand. ist. Sci. M., 2001; Makarov V. B. Formation of the Soviet government controlled, October 1917 - mid-1920s: Evolution of Doctrine and System. dis. ... Dr. Ist. Sci. Nizhny Novgorod, 2002; Musaeva Z. A. The struggle for political leadership in the CPSU (b). 1924-1929 dis. ...cand. ist. Sci. M., 1994; Nazarov O.G. The struggle for leadership in the RCP(b) and its influence on the creation of the nomenklatura system in the 20s. dis. ... Dr. Ist. Sci. M., 2001; Pashin V.P. Party-economic nomenklatura in the USSR (Formation, development, consolidation, in the 1920s - 1930s). dis. ... Dr. Ist. Sci. M., 1993; Potapova I. R. Formation of the command-administrative system of industrial management (1926-1932). dis. ...cand. ist. Sci. M., 1993; Potashev A.F. The phenomenon of Trotskyism in Russian socio-political literature. dis. ... Dr. Ist. Sci. Rostov-on-Don, 1993; Reya Brova N.M. The fate of agriculture in Russia in the interpretation of socio-political forces of the 20s. dis. ...cand. ist. Sci. Rostov-on-Don, 1993; Rogovin V. Party ^ executed. M., 1997; Tereshchuk S.V. Formation and development of state control bodies in the RSFSR-USSR: 1917-1934. dis. ...cand. ist. Sci. M., 2005; Timofeeva L.A. Raykom in the system of local city government in the 1920s: Using the example of a source study of the fund of the Krasnopresnensky Republic of Kazakhstan RCP (b) / VKP (b) of Moscow. dis. ...cand. ist. Sci. M., 2003, etc.
3 In particular, see: Telman I. Ryutin against Stalin. Throwing down the gauntlet to the all-powerful highlander. £
[Electronic resource.] Access mode: http://mkisrael.co.il/article/2012/01/15/660697- -ts ryutin-protiv-stalina-.html (date of access - 01/04/2015). ^
4 RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 163. D. 823. L. 51, 90. |
There are two sources about the activities of M. N. Ryutin: the so-called “rehabilitation” case of Ryutin in 5 volumes (RGASPI) and the archive of his daughter, Lyubov Martemyanovna Ryutina, which she collected all her life, including Ryutin’s unpublished “prison” letters (1932- 1936). Both published sources5 and archival documents stored in RGASPI were used: F. 17 - Central Committee of the CPSU (CPSU Central Committee) (1898, 1903-1991). It examines the minutes of meetings, decisions and resolutions of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, transcripts of meetings of the Organizing Bureau and the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks; F. 56 - Fifteenth Congress of the CPSU (b) (1927); F. 57 - Sixteenth Conference of the CPSU (b) (1929); F. 58 - Sixteenth Congress of the CPSU (b) (1930); F. 74 - Voroshilov Kliment Efremovich (1881-1969); F. 85 - Ordzhonikidze Grigory Konstantinovich (1886-1937); F. 89 - Yaroslavsky Emelyan Mikhailovich (real name: Gubelman Miney Izrailevich) (1878-1943), F. 558 - Stalin (real name: Dzhugashvili) Joseph Vissarionovich (1878-1953); F. 589 - Party Control Committee under the Central Committee of the CPSU (CPC) (1952-1991); F. 613 - Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (Central Control Commission) (1920-1934). The materials of the fund are concentrated in four inventories: Op. 1 - minutes of plenums, presidium, secretariat, party board and “party troikas” of the Central Control Commission; Op. 2 - protocols of the Central Control Commission for the revision, inspection and cleaning of the batch (1921); Central Verification Commission of the Central Control Commission (1924-1926); Central Control Commission Commissions
5 About work in the village. Resolution of the XV Congress of the CPSU(b). CPSU in resolutions. Ed. 9. T. 4. M., 1984; On the results and further tasks of collective farm construction. Resolution
Allied Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Verbatim report. M.-L., ^ 1927; Ryutin M.N. 1) The party and the working class. M., 1924; 2) Smenovekhites and the proletarian revolution. Rostov-on-Don, 1924; 3) Party unity and discipline. M.-L., 1926;<3 XIV съезд ВКП(б). Стенографический отчет. М., 1926. Сталин И.В. 1) О правой опасен ности в ВКП(б). Речь на пленуме МК и МКК ВКП(б) 19 октября 1928 г. // Соч. Т. 11. ¿к М., 1949; 2) К вопросу о политике ликвидации кулачества, как класса // Там же. Т. 12. £ М., 1949; 3) Итоги первой пятилетки. Доклад 7 января 1933 г. на объединенном пленуме ^ ЦК и ЦКК ВКП(б) // Там же. Т. 13. М., 1951; Документы свидетельствуют. Из истории ^ деревни накануне и в ходе коллективизации 1927-1932 гг. М., 1989; Письма И. В. Ста-« лина В. М. Молотову. 1925-1936. Сборник документов / Сост.: Л. Кошелева, В. Лель-§ чук, В. Наумов, О. Наумов, Л. Роговая, О. Хлевнюк. М., 1995; Сталинское Политбюро си в 30-е годы. Сборник документов / Сост.: О. В. Хлевнюк, А. В. Квашонкин, Л. П. Коше-
8 leva, L. A. Rogovaya. M., 1995; The tragedy of the Soviet village. Collectivization and dispossession. Documents and materials. 1927-1939. T. 1: May 1927 - November 1929 M., 1999; ^ Soviet leadership. Correspondence. 1928-1941 M., 1999; How the NEP was broken. Transcripts of the plenums of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in 1928-1929. In 5 volumes. T. 1: United Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission § All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) April 6-11, 1928 M., 2000; T. 2: Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) July 4-12, 1928 M., ^ 2000; T. 3: Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) November 16-24, 1928 M., 2000; T. 4: United Plenum ^ of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) April 16-23, 1929 M., 2000; T. 5: Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) November 10-17 ^ 1929 M., 2000; Stalin and Kaganovich. Correspondence. 1931-1936 / Comp.: O. V. Khlevnyuk, J. R. W. Davis, L. P. Kosheleva, E. A. Rees, L. A. Rogovaya. M., 2001.
for inspection and cleaning of the party (1929-1930); Central Commission of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks for cleaning the party (1933-1935); Op. 3, 4 - Regulations, circulars, directives, reports and reports on the work of the Central Control Commission; correspondence with citizens, organizations and institutions (1921-1938).
Initially, on the transcript entitled “Survey of Comrade. Ryutin on September 20, 1930,” more reminiscent of an interrogation with partiality, was marked “top secret,” which once again proves the desire of the leaders of the Central Control Commission of the CPSU (b) to hide the true circumstances of the “Ryutin Case,” a candidate for membership just a few months ago Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)6. Questions were asked to Martemyan Nikitich by two members of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission - E. M. Yaroslavsky and M. F. Shkiryatov. Based on the text of the transcript, it can be judged that they were aware not only of Ryutin’s single attempt to involve A. S. Nemov in opposition activities, which he outlined in a statement to the Central Committee.
The personality of the first of them, Emelyan Mikhailovich Yaroslavsky, is described quite well in the literature, but mainly as the permanent leader of the Union of Atheists. Before his election to the Central Control Commission in April 1923 at the XII Congress, he was a member of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), and for a year he was secretary of the party’s Central Committee7. Re-election at the XIII Congress from the Central Committee to the Central Control Commission may have been considered by him, a party member since 1898, as a nomenklatura demotion, but the position of the actual head of the Central Control Commission allowed him to show integrity and make independent decisions on some issues, sometimes with shades of some kind of party liberalism8. In one of Yaroslavsky’s surviving letters to G.K. Ordzhonikidze9, in connection with this liberalism he sometimes allowed, he was forced to justify himself, offering to find a “tougher” person to replace him10. With Ryutin, they were from the Baikal region, one might say, fellow countrymen, they had mutual acquaintances from pre-revolutionary activities in Siberia. A little less than a year before the survey, in August 1929, Yaroslavsky was examining a complaint against Ryutin’s secretary! £
6 See: Central Committee of the CPSU, CPSU (b), RCP (b), RSDLP (b): Historical and biographical ^
Russian reference book / Comp. Yu. V. Goryachev. M.: Parade Publishing House, 2005. pp. 356-357. |
7 Yaroslavsky Emelyan Mikhailovich (1878-1943) - candidate member of the Central Committee in 1919-1921; "I
member of the Central Committee in 1921-1923. Member of the Central Control Commission, the Presidium of the Central Control Commission and the Secretariat of the Central Control Commission in 1923-^
8 As a result of the unification in June 1924 at the XIII Congress of the RCP (b) of the People's Commissariat of the RKI and the Central Control Commission.
in a single party-state body the chairman of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission was ^
People's Commissar of the USSR RCT. ¡3
9 Ordzhonikidze Grigory Konstantinovich (1886-1937) - in 1926-1930. chairman
Central Control Commission - People's Commissar of the USSR RKI. $
Op. 27. D. 250. L. 1. -3
Ust-Udinsky District Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Kibanov11. Then Yaroslavsky managed to close the “case,” but this time, judging by the severity of the cross-examination, there was no mercy for the accused.
Yaroslavsky’s partner in Ryutin’s survey, Matvey Fedorovich Shkiryatov, was younger than Emelyan Mikhailovich both in age and in party pre-revolutionary experience, but not without reason was considered more experienced in identifying obvious and hidden enemies of the party, since it was he who was the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP ( b) entrusted to lead it back in 1921-1923. Central Commission for inspection and cleaning of its ranks12.
Little is known about Alexander Semenovich Nemov, who submitted the application. He was born in 1898, in the party since 1917, in the 1920s - 1930s. was in Moscow for Soviet leadership, and may have participated in the opposition. In May 1937, he held the position of head of the 10th Main Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Defense Industry of the USSR13. In his statement, he reported on meetings with Ryutin on vacation in Essentuki, during which he conducted anti-party conversations14. A typewritten copy of Nemov’s letter to the Central Committee was preserved by Ryutin’s daughter, Lyubov Martemyanovna, and passed it on in the late 1980s. to the publisher of the transcript.
Nemov’s statement listed Ryutin’s “seditious” statements that the policy of the ruling core in the Party Central Committee headed by Stalin was disastrous for the country, by the spring of 1931 it would be completely bankrupt, a situation would arise where there would be no formal opposition, but no one would Stalin will not support, and the policies of “this sharper and magician” Stalin will be exposed. Nemov claimed that Ryutin assessed Stalin’s report at the 16th Congress as “a complete cheating and deception of the proletariat.” Without mentioning strikes at the congress due to the difficult financial situation of the working class, Stalin mocked the workers when he said that their real wages had increased, while the whole world knows that the material situation of workers in the USSR has never been so difficult , as recently15. Stalin's collectivization policy failed, the peasants did not go to collective farms and did not give up their grain, they did not trust the party, the country was in a financial crisis.
^ 11 See: Anfertyev I.A. “Such a response could be understood as a reluctance to respond to the Central
^noy control commission." About persecution by Irkutsk party officials
and the “disgraced” candidate member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, M. N. Ryutin. 1929 // Historical art
3 hiv. 2010. No. 2. P. 177-185.
8 12 Shkiryatov Matvey Fedorovich (1883-1954) - member of the Central Control Commission in 1923-1934, secretary of the Central Control Commission
^ in 1923-1927, 1930-1934. n
13 In May 1937, A.S. Nemov was arrested and sentenced to death by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR. By the ruling of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR from November 3->Br 5, 1956, the case against A.S. Nemov was dismissed for lack of corpus delicti. On March 6, 1957, the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU, having considered the application of A.S. Nemov’s wife, rehabilitated him posthumously and reinstated him in the party. RGASPI. F. 589. Op. 3. D. 9355 (T. 3). L. 50. £ 14 RGASPI. F. 589. Op. 3. D. 9355 (T. 3). L. 50. S 15 Ibid. L. 27.
collapse. The explanation of the authorities that there is no small change in the country due to the spread of speculation is nothing more than a fraud. In fact, all this happened because of the same disastrous Stalinist policies16. According to Ryutin, the speeches of A.I. Rykov and M.P. Tomsky at the XVI Congress with repentance were in vain, Stalin’s position in relation to N.I. Bukharin was vile, as if the General Secretary and his group wanted Bukharin “to write articles a repentant sinner,” but the leader of the right told Ryutin’s supporters that under no circumstances would he write a single line. In such conditions, the work of the right comes down to spreading the idea among workers everywhere that the misfortune and misfortune for the country is “that magician and sharpie” Stalin17. This idea should have been firmly implemented in enterprises and in the countryside.
After Stalin can be removed from power, or, as Ryutin said in a conversation with him, Nemov, “swept away,” the rest of his supporters will be easy to deal with. The presence of Thermidorianism in the country is an indisputable fact, Ryutin said, it is necessary to unite with the Trotskyists in the fight against the General Secretary. The reprisal against the best members of the party forced the entire party to remain silent and “unanimously” raise their hands. To Nemov’s question about who can now be elected general secretary instead of Stalin, Ryutin replied that there are no general secretaries after the removal of Stalin there will be no more. In any case, his, Ryutin’s, supporters will insist that the party be governed collectively, because if there is a general secretary, then there is no guarantee that the same combinations and tricks carried out by Stalin will not be repeated. The composition of the Politburo, Ryutin argued, will have to be changed more often so as not to overstay its welcome, since its current composition is basically out of touch with the masses. Before leaving, Nemov concluded, Ryutin left him his home address and asked him to be sure to keep in touch with him in Moscow. Moreover, he advised work to discredit Stalin to be carried out only among people well known to him and, taking into account the mistakes of the past opposition, to carry out this work face to face. In the event that someone failed and betrayed him, then Nemov should have resolutely renounced all accusations. ^ In the absence of any witnesses to their conversations, the authorities will not be able to bring motivated charges against them. I
Today it is difficult to say what prompted Nemov to write a letter to the Central Committee, condemning Ryutin to repression, just as it is impossible to determine the “percentage” of the reliability of its contents. Perhaps Nemov considered it his party duty to inform the party leadership about the maturing opposition sentiments. ... It was also possible that he, who was previously suspected of having connections with the Trotskyists, was made to understand that he himself could be brought to trial for failure to inform if he ^ will not set out in all the details, perhaps with additions, the character ^
16 Ibid. L. 28.
17 Ibid. L. 25. oo
of his conversations with Ryutin. It is likely that Nemov conscientiously carried out the instructions given to him to discredit Ryutin. Finding himself among those involved in the Ryutin case, he, like many others like him, in the second half of the 1930s. was accused of counter-revolutionary activities, arrested and, according to the verdict of the Military Collegium, executed in May 1937.
In the archives of L. M. Ryutina there is preserved an explanatory note from her father addressed to Yaroslavsky, written by him on September 21, 1930, after reading Nemov’s letter to the Central Committee. In it, he declares that everything stated is 99 percent lies, everything is upside down and distorted, he never belonged to the right and was not involved in disseminating the views of the right deviation18. Ryutin claimed that he spoke with Nemov at the resort about economic and political issues three or four times, we met at the source and on the street or in the park. The essence of all conversations with Nemov boiled down to the fact that he, Ryutin, was never associated with Bukharin’s group. But he never shared the theoretical views of Bukharin and his followers in the field of historical materialism. He could say the same about the theory of organized capitalism, about the theory of the peaceful growth of kulak cooperative nests “into socialism,” as well as about the theory of gravity. Even when in 1928 the general secretary removed him from the post of secretary of the bureau of the Krasnopresnensky district committee, he considered Stalin to be the largest leader of the party, capable of implementing Leninist principles. He then allowed deviations from the party line on the issue of the pace of industrialization and in assessing the situation in the countryside. But at the same time he believed that Stalin had wrongfully defamed him and “shook him out of party work with a deft maneuver”19. He considered this to be a dishonest act on his part. This is the essence of this supposed part of his conversation. As for the general economic situation in the country, in a conversation with Nemov, he only said that this year, 1930, would be very tense and nothing more. The situation would be especially difficult by the spring of 193120, while Nemov turned these words into a prediction
collapse of party politics. He did not refuse the words that 1930 could be very tense for the country, but in this, Ryutin argued, there was nothing anti-party or right-wing. At the same time, he denied that he spoke about Thermidor and strikes. All this is fictitious from beginning to end, since he is not a Trotskyist or an Ustryalovite to say such nonsense. Everything that A. S. Nemov said about collective farms is also a lie.
y And yet the exclusion of Ryutin from the party could be considered ordinary,
and the only remarkable thing is that it was dealt with by the Presidium of the Central Control Commission21, and the resolution
At 18 RGASPI. F. 589. Op. 3. D. 9355 (T. 3). L. 207.
19 Ibid. L. 2.
^20 Ibid. L. 205.
^ 21 See: Anfertyev I.A. Transcript of the meeting of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on September 23, 1930. The activities of M. N. Ryutin against the regime of I. V. Stalin // Clio. 2004. No. 4 (27). J S. 33-45. WITH
The decision of the Presidium was approved by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks22. However, this is not so if we consider the situation in the context of the persecution of Martemyan Nikitich before and after his expulsion from the party. Until September 1930, he was persecuted twice: in 1928, he was removed from the post of secretary of the Krasnopresnensky district committee of the CPSU (b) and removed from the bureau of the Moscow regional committee of the CPSU (b); in 1930 he was removed from the post of deputy executive editor of the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper. Both times his case was dealt with personally by Stalin, with whom Ryutin had the courage to enter into discussions. However, after being removed from work at Krasnaya Zvezda, Ryutin was promoted and appointed Chairman of the Photo and Film Industry Directorate of the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR23.
On October 5, 1930, at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Ryutin’s personal file was considered, and the very next day a resolution of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was published in the newspaper Pravda, which stated: “For treacherous and double-dealing behavior in relation to the party and for an attempt to underground propagandize right-wing opportunist views, recognized by the XVI Congress as incompatible with the existence of the party, to exclude M. Ryutin from the ranks of the CPSU (b)”24. Under the heading “Right-wing opportunists, party traitors - get out of our ranks!” The newspaper published an editorial beginning with the words: “By the resolution of the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Ryutin was expelled from the party. Ryutin, expelled from the party, is a typical example of a double-dealer. As secretary of the Krasnopresnensky district committee, Ryutin, together with Comrade Uglanov, led a factional struggle against the Central Committee. He, together with the entire right-wing opposition, tried to oppose the Moscow organization to the party and the Central Committee. Ryutin together with t.t. Uglanov and Bukharin accused the party of sliding towards Trotskyism. Ryutin, together with all the rightists, fought against the policy of industrialization, against the construction of collective and state farms. They declared the socialist attack on the kulaks organized by the party to be Trotskyism.” It was further said that the Leninist Moscow organization had removed its former right-wing opportunist leadership, accused by the party of right-wing views. Some comrades who defended these views, under the influence of party criticism, allegedly sincerely abandoned them! and began to actively participate in socialist construction. Ryutin, as it turned out later, was not one of them. His several years in the Bolshevik Party did not turn this former Menshevik into a Bolshevik. |
22 Protocol of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks No. 11 of October 5, 1930, paragraph 29: About Ryutin (resolution of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission of September 23, 1930, protocol No. 8, paragraph 2; Yaroslavsky). It was decided: “For his treacherous and double-dealing behavior towards the party and for the attempt to underground propagandize right-wing opportunist views, recognized by the XVI Congress as incompatible with remaining in the party, to expel Ryutin from the ranks of the CPSU(b). This resolution will be published in the press.” (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 799. L. 7). .¡U
23 RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 163. D. 823. L. 51, 90. ^
But with the open preaching of right-wing opportunist views, it became difficult to appear in party organizations. Therefore, Ryutin, like some other rightists, began to maneuver back in October 1928. Having admitted his mistakes at the October plenum of the Moscow Committee in 1928, he remained as before a right-wing opportunist.
The epigraph of this article in Pravda was the words of Stalin: “It is impossible to launch a real struggle against class enemies with their reflection in the rear”25. It was made clear to party members that the time for discussions and conversations was in the past, and the time had come for the decisive eradication of dissent, no matter in what form it may be expressed. The fact that the first blow would be struck against party members who had previously proposed making adjustments to the party line could be judged by the call that was preceded by Stalin’s epigraph: “Let us completely expose the kulak agents, the allies of counter-revolutionary Trotskyism - right-wing opportunists”26.
Ryutin, removed from party work for his conciliatory attitude towards the right deviation, never once showed himself in practice as a right opportunist. In this regard, the article specified, after the defeat of the right, Ryutin “voted, spoke and wrote in defense of the general line. But this was one side of Ryutin’s activities. There was also other work hidden from the party. Here the true Ryutin, a right-wing opportunist and traitor to the party, was and acted.” Yes, the author of the article argued, Ryutin betrayed the party. “Behind the back of the party, taking advantage of its trust, he tried to use the difficulties of socialist construction to corrupt the party members. He rolled lower and lower from step to step. Ryutin not only, like the Smenovekhites in his time, as many right-wingers do now, waited for the party to abandon the policy of a full-blown socialist offensive, but he tried to conduct underground work against the Central Committee, like a genuine kulak agent.” ^ However, not everyone in the party accepted these accusations “at face value.” In particular, on the day the article was published in Pravda, at a meeting of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Co-yuzkino cell, the assessment of Ryutin’s behavior was not unequivocally negative. Information about this was also preserved in the minutes of the meeting of the party board of the Central Control Commission on November 18, 1930, as a result of which it was decided to “ask the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to discuss the issue of the situation in Soyuzkino”27.
a In November 1930, a closed letter from the Moscow Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) signed by L. M. Kaganovich was sent to the district committees, city committees and party cells of the Moscow party organization, which ordered that it be read out at closed meetings and that an action plan be developed and within a month do-
8 live practical suggestions28. The document analyzed in detail “-
^ 27 RGASPI. F. 613. Op. 1. D. 186. L. 52. S 28 Ibid. F. 17. Op. 86. D. 97. L. 2, 3.
the situation in Moscow party organizations, assessments were given both of the internal situation of the country and of foreign policy events. The reasons for the exclusion of M. N. Ryutin from the party were discussed in detail in the section “Issues of Internal Party Life.” However, in the previous section - “Exacerbation of the class struggle and the discovery of counter-revolutionary organizations” - apparently, it was not at all accidental that socialist construction “took place and is happening in an atmosphere of the most fierce class struggle”29. In this regard, in the months following the 16th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, in accordance with the directive of the Moscow Regional Party Committee, a massive operation was carried out to “remove counter-revolutionary kulak, anti-Soviet activists from the village”30. About a thousand people were subjected to repression - former landowners, police officers and gendarmes, merchants, priests, including about 150 Socialist Revolutionaries. In a number of areas, the document notes, “kulak, rebel, Socialist Revolutionary and terrorist groups engaged in terrorist attacks, arson, poisoning of livestock, and spreading rumors of war” were eliminated31. The aggravation of the class struggle, it was further stated, was also evidenced by the intervention plans hatched by the leaders of the so-called Industrial Party. This, from their point of view, was favored by the struggle of the Trotskyists and right-wing deviationists against the party leadership, since there was an ideological kinship between the platforms of the Industrial Party, the Labor Peasant Party and the platform of the right-wing deviation. Thus, the closed letter stated, the counter-revolutionaries ideologically united with the right-wing deviationists and tried to use their leaders for their own purposes, helped them win within the CPSU (b), “they did not disdain terror, they created a terrorist group that was preparing terrorist attacks during the days of the 16th Congress against Stalin, Voroshilov, Kuibyshev, Molotov, as well as against comrade. Menzhinsky, Yagoda and others.”32.
In the next section, “Issues of Internal Party Life,” it was noted that “the party crushed the right deviation as kulak agents in the party, and the 16th Congress recognized the views of the right opposition as incompatible with belonging to the CPSU(b)”33. But right-wing deviationists, it was noted in the document, S! continued the attack on the Central Committee and are conducting it “underground, treacherously, deceiving ^ the party, double-dealing, hiding behind formal agreement with the general ^ line, this is most clearly confirmed by the factional treacherous ra- | the work of a prominent right-wing deviationist, the closest associate of Bukharin and Uglanov, the former secretary of the Krasnopresnensky district committee - Ryutin... Ryutin - s
Russian assessments of the party's policy and the situation in the country were no different
29 Ibid. L. 9. -3
30 Ibid. £
33 Ibid. oo
from assessments of the Menshevik-White Guard emigration"34. Further, Ryutin was accused of intending to “overthrow the leadership of the party, headed by Comrade Stalin”35.
Defamed publicly in the press and no less publicly before his now former party comrades in a closed letter from the Moscow Regional Committee, Ryutin was arrested in November 1930. The basis for the arrest was intelligence and operational information. At the same time, the intelligence services of the White emigrant organizations reported to their centers that Ryutin was arrested for his connections with the group of the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR S.I. Syrtsov36. His supporters opposed the methods of industrialization of the country that were carried out by Stalin. However, during interrogations by the OGPU, Ryutin denied the charges against him. Menzhinsky was forced to turn to Stalin with a request to clarify his future fate, citing the fact that Ryutin “portrays himself as innocently offended”37. Stalin wrote on Menzhinsky’s note: “In my opinion, we need to let him go.”38 On January 17, 1931, Ryutin was released from prison with the firm intention of continuing the fight against the man who, in his firm conviction, was leading the country and the party to inevitable death.
Thus, summing up the presented documentary material, an objective researcher is obliged to recognize Stalin as a politician who knows how to skillfully maneuver in the struggle for power, find allies, play out multi-step operations, wait for the moment to attack, retreat when circumstances require it, play the undeservedly offended, and sometimes offended by the leader's mistrust. Some historians believe, and not without reason, that Stalin's cult of personality began to take shape in the early 1930s, but in reality the desire for personal aggrandizement and, subsequently, deification can be detected a decade earlier. But in those years, not everyone noticed this; many party leaders attributed these rather alarming symptoms to the inevitable costs of the struggle for power that intensified after Lenin’s death. However, after the defeat of the left-wing, Trotskyist-Zinovievist opposition and the so-called right-wingers led by Bukharin, Stalin’s cult of personality acquired its most visible outlines.
This could not but cause protests in the party environment, especially among those party workers who were close enough to the Secretary General to soberly judge his intentions. As a result, Stalin can be called a political pragmatist who, in the interests of his political benefits, promoted
and the spread of myths about one’s own foresight and genius in the struggle
* 34 RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 86. D. 97. L. 11, 12. § 35 Ibid. L. 11.
^ 36 Starkov B.A. The Ryutin case // They were not silent / Comp. A. V. Afanasyev. M.: Politizdat, ^ 1991. P. 158.
^ 37 RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 1. D. 5282. L. 1.
C 38 Ibid.
be with opponents of Soviet power, whom he also appointed himself. Most of those who, at his will, turned out to be bargaining chips in political games, gave up, gave up, refusing to continue the fight. M. N. Ryutin turned out to be one of the few who were not satisfied with the role of victim assigned to him, who did not give in to the all-powerful dictator, but decided to continue the fight, but not alone, but by trying to create an underground organization within the CPSU (b).
Present t.t. Yaroslavsky, Shkiryatov; Ryutin.
YAROSLAVSKY. Reads out a letter from Comrade. Nemova.
What do you say about this?
RUTIN. I, Comrade Yaroslavsky, I think this is a disgrace from beginning to end.
SHKIRATOV. What is he lying about?
RUTIN. Lies! 99% lying!
SHKIRATOV. How did he come up with everything?
RUTIN. Yes, I will tell you about our conversations.
YAROSLAVSKY. This happened 8-10 times.
RUTIN. This is nonsense, of course. We met once or twice. He came to see me once, then we met at a watering hole39. And 8-10 times is an exaggeration. Naturally, he asked me what my views were. I stated that I never completely agreed with the right, even when I was removed40. Firstly, on general theoretical issues, on Bukharin’s general theoretical philosophical concept, I have always been a decisive opponent; I have never been a mechanist. With regard to the theory of organized capitalism, I did not for one minute subscribe to such theories. ^
Finally, regarding the peaceful growth of the fist, I have never shared this. | Even when I was removed [from party work], I stated that I had differences with the party on two issues, regarding the pace of industrialization and the party’s policy in the countryside. Regarding the pace, of course, I was a supporter of the fact that we should adhere to a fast pace, but when I spoke out against Stalin at the bureau of the district committee, the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission knew about it. ^
SHKIRATOV. Comrade, tell us what you and Nemov talked about? N«
39 Probably at the sanatorium spring. to her
40 M. N. Ryutin means 1928, when, on the initiative of I. V. Stalin, he was removed from duty.5
ties of the Secretary of the Krasnopresnensky District Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. oo
RUTIN. I'll tell you everything in detail. I said that I never agreed with Bukharin, Tomsky and Rykov regarding the international situation. In this regard, I have never had any differences with the party. Opportunistic elements - I believe that the process of purification must go further, that the specific conditions of the development of capitalism led to this, although the cause of Bolshevisation has recently advanced. I said that there are discrepancies on certain issues; I do not hide them, for example, regarding zoning. When we once met at the Politburo, and Comrade. Stalin and a group of comrades talked about zoning, I said, I personally stand on the point of view that it would be more expedient to liquidate regional centers rather than district centers. In this regard, I still have [doubts]. As for me personally - even when they filmed me - I was mixed with the rightists, defamed, and the speech of Comrade. I consider Stalin against me at the Organizing Bureau to be wrong, unscrupulous, and they assigned me to this company.
SHKIRATOV. Did you and Nemov talk?
RUTIN. Yes. Then I talked about such things as regarding contracting. Comrade arrived there. Muralov, who toured collective farms and individual farms. He came and said that with the beginning of contracting they began to slaughter cattle again. I say - this is a disgrace, measures must be taken to stop it.
When he says that I associated myself with Rykov, that we are right-wing, this is an outrage that cannot be gone further.
YAROSLAVSKY. I admit that when a person writes, he may forget something or may not report accurately, but here he talks about a whole series of issues, he says that you gave such an assessment that the policy of the party led by Stalin is disastrous, etc. (is reading).
RUTIN. I declare that this is all a lie from beginning to end. And now ^ I have an idea of what explains this document. I can say [that] when we were fighting the Trotskyist opposition, he sympathized with Trotskyism. This can be confirmed by the current secretary Galkin and the employees of the Control and Commission. We had him under suspicion. I called him out and beat him.
YAROSLAVSKY. What does this have to do with it? sch RYUTIN. For example, I spoke out regarding zoning, but regarding this company [against the right, we] said that they had killed me. But what I said, he did not write, but he wrote what I did not say.
and YAROSLAVSKY. But, for example, regarding Stalin’s report to the congress
£de (reads). Such specific things.
® RUTIN. Wrong. I'll tell you how it happened. I declare
§ I believe that Stalin’s report is basically completely correct, but some
^ questions, I believe, he did not touch upon. But to say that this is cheating [on the part of
Nemov], so distort...
n YAROSLAVSKY. You said that in his report he did not touch upon the issue of
With strikes.
RUTIN. I can’t say because I didn’t know anything about the strikes myself.
YAROSLAVSKY. There was no such conversation?
RUTIN. Did not have.
YAROSLAVSKY. And they didn’t say anything about salaries?
RUTIN. And he didn’t say anything about salary.
YAROSLAVSKY. And what about the fact that the party’s policy with collective farms failed?
RUTIN. Regarding collective farms, I say again, I had doubts, and now I don’t hide it. The same applies to zoning.
YAROSLAVSKY. The question here is not about collective farms, but here it is directly stated: “The policy regarding collective farms has clearly failed.”
RUTIN. He asked me how you look at collective farms. I said, I think the policy is certainly correct, but the excesses that were in this regard caused us a lot of trouble. I did not speak about the Central Committee. How could I speak when we have 30-40% [of peasants] on collective farms?
YAROSLAVSKY. Regarding the financial collapse, the absence of small change [must] be explained by speculation - this is a fraud.
RUTIN. He pulled out everything he said. He himself said that this cannot be explained by speculation alone. I said - I can’t explain it, because I don’t know the matter. We argued with Goncharov, who was there. Goncharov said: “In my opinion, it is in vain that the Central Committee adheres to such measures, some kind of bonds need to be issued.” And I said, on the contrary, the policy of the Central Committee is correct, because if you issue bonds, this can complicate the situation in the future, and the Central Committee, when it does not follow the line of least resistance, is right. So I spoke with Goncharov and Nemov, but I said that they had gone too far with regard to the issue of paper money. But, in the end, you can’t, when you’re talking to a party member, in completely loyal terms, think that he’ll make something up, distort something, miss a word here, insert a word there, and something like this will happen.
YAROSLAVSKY. It is nonsense to think that party members, when meeting, will not talk about party politics even during their holidays.
RUTIN. Moreover, I spoke most of all about theoretical issues. I read the theory of surplus value of Marx and Hegel.
YAROSLAVSKY. The question here is not about Hegel. Here we have a document that says that a comrade who was on the Central Committee of the party is carrying out work that can only be characterized as double-dealing.
RUTIN. Of course, if that were the case. ^
YAROSLAVSKY. To say that I vote for the party line and try to show myself as a supporter of the party line, but conducts such preparations that say that we are pursuing a disastrous policy, that a crisis is inevitable, and that the majority will inevitably understand this destruction.
SHKIRATOV. Nemov has come, you can call him and say that Comrade Ryutin denies everything.
RUTIN. 99%
SHKIRATOV. Did they talk about Stalin? I
RUTIN. I said, I think that when he came out and said that I was a conciliator, he defamed me. Everything here is 99% false. YAROSLAVSKY. Then let's call Nemov.
In the presence of Comrade NEMOVA.
RUTIN. That's it, brother. Well, you rigged it. YAROSLAVSKY. Comrade Ryutin says that this is 99% untrue. NEMOV. I had no doubt that Ryutin would deny, because Ryutin gave such instructions to conduct these conversations face to face, without witnesses. RUTIN. Ugliness.
NEMOV. What is it, Ryutin, you better speak Bolshevik, straight. RUTIN. Don't rub your glasses in. I know when you were with the Trotskyists. NEMOV. I believe that there will be a number of comrades who will confirm this. It will come out eventually. Ryutin approached this carefully, gradually, introducing me to the issues I was writing about. RUTIN. Where was it? NEMOV. In Essentuki, 8 or 10 times. YAROSLAVSKY. Comrade Ryutin says 2-3 times. NEMOV. When I was with Goncharov. RUTIN. You came to me yourself.
NEMOV. I brought [photo]cards to Goncharov, I photographed him, and brought the cards. Ryutin came in, then he said, let's go down, he took me by the arm, let's go down. This was our second conversation. Here you have already spoken in more detail. The third time we drank water, the fourth time we went to see a guy who lived in the Kalinin sanatorium. _ SHKIRATOV. Gerasimovich.
^ NEMOV. The fifth time we met in the park, you were walking with a mug of O
there, and I there. We talked about the same things. Of course, I didn't write it down. ^ SHKIRYATOV. It turns out that we met more than 2-3 times. and RYUTIN. We met more, but didn’t talk every time.
NEMOV. They also talked near the sanatorium. ^ RYUTIN. And every time you tried to probe me. and YAROSLAVSKY. The point is not who probed whom, but that such work took place.
^ SHKIRYATOV. What did he say about Stalin?
£ NEMOV. A magician, a sharper, a schemer who will bring the country to ruin, ® at the latest this will be in the spring. At first he said that it would be in the fall, and then, when he arrived from Kislovodsk, he said that it would be in the spring, and that our goal was that we needed to brush it off, and when we brushed it off, then we could handle it.
Tell me, Ryutin, you said, how many business executives I know, and who is reliable.
RUTIN. You're lying!
NEMOV. And that it is necessary to prepare people in enterprises in order to strike at the right moment, and in order to conclude a bloc with the Trotskyists.
RUTIN. You yourself were a Trotskyist.
NEMOV. That our attitude towards the economy is undoubtedly correct, and their41 attitude was disastrous, because Stalin carried it out and failed. But with regard to internal party democracy, they were certainly right, and on this basis it is possible to come to an agreement with them.
YAROSLAVSKY. About Thermidorianism.
NEMOV. Why do you need to be careful? Because the best comrades are exiled, expelled, one word and it’s over. The facts of Thermidorianism are obvious to us. How else can we evaluate such reprisals?
SHKIRATOV. About Maksimov.
NEMOV. He says, I’ll go there, Maksimov is very popular among Moscow workers, I need to talk to him. But then, when he arrived, he said that you need to be very careful, because the guys are fighting.
RUTIN. But I didn’t say anything to Maksimov. I asked him only in relation to Velostroy.
SHKIRATOV. Did they talk about our difficulties?
RUTIN. Didn't say anything. Since I am still under suspicion, I knew that people would manipulate the facts.
SHKIRATOV. You spoke with Maksimov that we have a hellishly difficult situation in the country, etc., and Maksimov said why do you always ask me such questions regarding the difficulty of the situation.
RUTIN. You see, comrades, if this is how things stand, then I will simply be forced to refuse to testify.
YAROSLAVSKY. No party member has the right to refuse testimony. If you consider yourself a party member...
RUTIN. I think.
YAROSLAVSKY. .if you think you are being blackmailed, you must speak up.
RUTIN. For example, regarding Thermidor. When I deeply believe in the power of the proletarian revolution, talking about the degeneration of our party is the devil knows what. Did I say that I am for the slow pace of industrialization?
NEMOV. What you didn’t say, I don’t write. I write what you say-^
ril. Don’t examine me, but tell me straight - you said that if you fall asleep, then you have to proceed [in this case with the case] straight to refusal. RUTIN. You lie, you lie, you bastard, you liar!!!
41 We are talking about L. D. Trotsky and his followers.
YAROSLAVSKY. You can’t allow this, then he also has the right to call you a scoundrel. If I allow such a thing in relation to him, I will have to admit that he will also call you a scoundrel, and then you will hit each other in the face. This is not a conversation in a party office.
RUTIN. Did I say that I never got along with Rykov and Bukharin, even when I was filmed.
NEMOV. No. This is where you really lie. He said that it was in vain that Tomsky and Rykov spoke at the congress42, because they would have been elected anyway. You said this at your dacha. You said: “Bukharin told us that he will not write a word about this anymore.”
RUTIN. Does “to us” mean factions?
YAROSLAVSKY. Well, it’s no secret to us that the right faction existed.
RUTIN. I declare that I have not seen Bukharin for two years.
YAROSLAVSKY. I also haven’t seen him for a long time, but yesterday I received one document that proves that he cannot take the right path.
SHKIRATOV. When I asked Maksimov whether he asked about the internal party situation, he said no, he kept asking me questions. I said that Ryutin spoke to you. He said: “He came for the first time, one woman saw him and said: Ryutin has arrived. We met with Ryutin, then we went, Ryutin began to talk about philosophical issues, and in addition began to ask where he worked. Maksimov said that he works in Industrial, then you began to say that our situation is very difficult, and Maksimov said: of course, there are some difficulties, but we are building, growing, etc. Then, he says, the conversation moved on to other topics " After this, when Maksimov came to see you, Ryutin again moves on to this issue. Nemov was there then.
^ NEMOV. And the woman who worked in Sovkino, a department manager or something.
SHKIRATOV. He says: “Ryutin again began to turn the conversation back to the fact that the internal situation is difficult, and I said, why the hell are you asking me questions about this all the time.”
RUTIN. When I came to Essentuki, we talked about economic issues, but didn’t talk at all about general issues. We talked about economic issues when we met somewhere on a path in Kislovodsk in a park. We met and started talking, and he said: “How are you?” I say it’s difficult to work, the general economic situation is difficult, but what about you? He says: “It’s hard to work, very hard.” Then I said what the situation is in cinema, that they don’t pay attention, they think that there are only artists there, etc. I don’t know, but it’s possible that I started talking, or maybe he asked how work was, what is your position in the Photo Association? I told you what the difficulties were. But I definitely need to start.
C 42 This refers to the XVI Congress of the CPSU(b), held in July 1930.
SHKIRATOV. It's not about you saying all the time that you're fine. It is important in what perspective this discussion takes place. For example, Nemov, a party member since 1917, he wrote this conversation about your attitude towards comrade. To Stalin, about the bargaining chip, about the difficulties, about Stalin’s speech at the congress, that he did not talk about strikes in the country. That Kaganovich suggested that you speak at the congress. Is this what you were talking about?
RUTIN. Said. I said that they still suspect me of being related to Bukharin’s group. By the way, Kaganovich came up and said that we are putting forward your candidacy for the Central Committee. I was surprised, I did not expect this due to the gross mistakes that I made43. Comrade Kaganovich invites me to speak. There was such a situation: I had already signed up on economic issues, I wanted to speak on cinema issues, but since I didn’t get [the floor in the debate], I agreed with Kaganovich that I would write an article. I wrote the article.
SHKIRATOV. Did you talk to Nemov?
RUTIN. Yes. I showed this article to Sutyrin, but he said that now it should be written a little differently than it was written, the congress was over, I had to go on vacation, I spoke with Kaganovich, he said: “You will come after your vacation and write.”
SHKIRATOV. And you didn’t say anything about Stalin and elaboration? RUTIN. I connected this with his speech [at the 16th Congress], but I didn’t say anything regarding the general leadership; when Kozlov arrived, I said that people were being removed, but I believe that Stalin is taller and larger than all [opposition figures in the party] and never will make the mistakes they make.
SHKIRATOV. The point is not that you spoke with Kozlov, but that you spoke with Nemov.
NEMOV. Regarding the conversation with Kaganovich, he actually talked about the article, almost in the dining room they met him - “when Kaganovich said that he was nominating me as a candidate [for a member of the Central Committee], I understood what he wanted, but since I am fundamentally not I agree [with the party line], then I said that maybe it would be better to write an article, but then I went on vacation and avoided this matter.” WITH! YAROSLAVSKY. Did you argue with Ryutin or did you not object? ^
NEMOV. A whole series of questions were not clear to me when he said that Stalin needed to be removed, another collegial leadership should be installed, I said - | Imagine, we don’t have a more authoritative person, tomorrow Stalin will leave, who ^ should be chosen as General Secretary? He says: “There shouldn’t be a General Secretary at all, there should be collective leadership, otherwise there is no guarantee that again there won’t be such tricks and combinations that have now been eliminated.”
Stalin says and that the situation we have now will not begin again.” ^-
43 This refers to the publication by M. N. Ryutin of the editorial article he wrote “Liquidation of the kulaks as a class” in the newspaper “Red Star” dated January 16, 1930 and the article refuting I. V. Stalin “On the issue of liquidation of the kulaks as a class” class" in "Red.5 Star" dated January 21, 1930 oo
RUTIN. On the contrary, you tried to approach me back in the Supreme Economic Council. He tried to find out my position, asked what my point of view was now. I said, I never completely agreed with Bukharin, Tomsky, Rykov, even when they filmed me. I had two fundamental mistakes: I was against the tempos that were taken, that is, I stood for fast tempos, but said that they should be tested in practice. The second mistake is regarding the political situation of the village. Later, in December and January, I already voted together [with other party members equally].
SHKIRATOV. How do you explain that Nemov says everything so incorrectly?
RUTIN. I already told Yaroslavsky [that] Nemov and I fought during the Trotskyist opposition.
YAROSLAVSKY. He fought with me too, then he must have mistrust of all of us.
SHKIRATOV. What was this fight about?
RUTIN. He assisted the Trotskyists in a hidden form. He was then the director of Labor Supply and [we] called him [at the district party committee] and pressed him.
YAROSLAVSKY. Did you remove him from his job, expel him from the party?
NEMOV. Was I given any punishment at all?
RUTIN. You secretly assisted the Trotskyists and fought against us.
YAROSLAVSKY. What did you do, expelled from the party, fired from your job?
RUTIN. The opposition was defeated, and Comrade. Nemov walked away unnoticed.
YAROSLAVSKY. If he moved away from the opposition, then why should he now be against you?
RUTIN. I called him and said that you should not double-deal, etc. He was doing such tricks then. The secretary of the cell came and told me that I needed to call him, that Nemov was conducting [opposition] work and was connected with the Trotskyists.
NEMOV. Being the secretary of the district committee, you, knowing that the chairman of the trust was carrying out Trotskyist work, at least in a hidden form, he should have called me and brought it to my attention, but I declare that Ryutin never called me, I never fought with Ryutin and in general I didn’t fight with anyone from the district party committee, and we didn’t oppose each other. No one called me or spoke to me. This is an absolute lie.
at RYUTIN. Galkin can confirm.
^ NEMOV. Neither Ryutin nor Galkin called me or spoke to me. £ I don’t know why he wants to attribute Trotskyism to me, [probably] to justify
give your work. No one ever spoke to me, never called me.
RUTIN. Galkin can confirm that he carried out hidden Trotskyist work, and secondly, that I spoke with him on this issue.
^ SHKIRYATOV. Was Galkin there?
RUTIN. In any case, I told Galkin.
NEMOV. Or maybe you’ll remember when you called me. When it was?
RUTIN. I had so many people.
NEMOV. Well, in winter, in summer.
RUTIN. In October, in December44.
NEMOV. October, November, December I was abroad and arrived in February. I left during the October celebrations. I returned in February 1928. How could he call me during the struggle.
RUTIN. Witnesses can confirm this.
YAROSLAVSKY. This takes us on a tangent, because even if we assume that Nemov was a Trotskyist and you called him out, I don’t understand how this has anything to do with the matter. I, too, fought against the Trotskyists no less than Ryutin, why did Nemov choose Ryutin and write about him what did not happen?
RUTIN. I directly had to deal with Nemov. Your situation is completely different.
NEMOV. If we assume that Nemov has something against Ryutin, then [here] is another fact. When our Rukhimovich factory was inspected by the main inspectorate of the Supreme Economic Council, and the question arose about removing me, Ryutin spoke out and declared [that] Nemov must be left at all costs. This was in February at the height of the struggle against the Trotskyists. There were no clashes. Why is this so?
SHKIRATOV. It is completely unclear why Nemov chose Ryutin. You say that he was a hidden Trotskyist, and that there was a struggle, but it turns out that there is no resolution against Nemov, on the contrary, you spoke in his defense. But there were other people in the district committee who fought against the Trotskyists, why did he necessarily attack you? And then you say: everything that Nemov wrote is all a lie. I can’t believe that you didn’t talk to him, that you didn’t talk about the bargaining chip, about Stalin’s speech.
RUTIN. I spoke, but it's all perverted. I can say point by point what I said and what I didn’t say. Regarding the small change coin, I said the following: there are difficulties in Moscow and in the provinces with the small change coin - obviously, in addition to sabotage elements, an excessive amount of money has been issued. But do!£
From this the conclusion that we have a financial catastrophe is, of course, nonsense. A
Next, you say why Nemov does this. I myself am surprised, but I was not an ordinary worker, I was the head of the district committee, the struggle was waged in aggravated forms. As far as I remember, I protected many others. When | I see that the man is moving away as a political leader, I had to distract the man from the path he had taken. -A
NEMOV. When they talked about money, does Comrade remember? Ryutin, what he said about Bryukhanov’s article, that every literate party member will understand that this is a fraud regarding small change. To be honest, I haven’t read this article. He says: “it’s funny, only people who have lost their minds, or this idiot, as he put it, Bryukhanov, can put it all together
44 Apparently, we are talking about the fight against the opposition in the fall of 1927. oo
to speculation." “This is due to the general economic situation. If one or two are shot, how can this get rid of the difficulties? This is nonsense."
RUTIN. I thought that Bryukhanov’s article was not exhaustive, and that it might be wrong to put forward only this [argument]. But in no way did I connect this with party politics. There are many articles in Pravda that I criticized, but I doubt whether this article reflects the editorial line of Pravda.
YAROSLAVSKY. Comrade Ryutin, you understand that we are talking about serious things, we are talking about whether the party can allow such things, the question is about staying in the party. When a party member talks about changing the leadership, discrediting it45, etc.
RUTIN. Undoubtedly.
YAROSLAVSKY. I ask you to remember how it all happened and explain it.
RUTIN. Then you give me this document and I will try to explain it.
YAROSLAVSKY. We did not reprint it and did not give it to anyone; this one was printed by Nemov personally.
RUTIN. I will answer each point.
NEMOV. Regarding the assessment of Stalin, as you said, regarding the leadership.
RUTIN. I'll tell you, I'll tell you.
YAROSLAVSKY. At first, 99% of it was not true, we only talked 2 times and didn’t talk about all this. And now it turns out that we talked about all the issues, and from the conversations it turns out that not 99% is untrue, but a lot is confirmed.
RUTIN. What he wrote about, I didn’t talk about it and couldn’t talk to party members. Everything can be so distorted that you end up with a picture like this: they distort one thing and throw out another.
NEMOV. Well, Ryutin, could I really have made this up from beginning to end? _ RUTIN. You're 99% perverted.
^ NEMOV. I must state with full responsibility that I have come to the conviction
I think that based on everything that Ryutin said, he is the most inveterate reactionary, I even
^ I must say this: I read this book of testimony, - you can be put
and next to Kondratiev, and on some issues even worse.
RUTIN. Don't do such things! Slanderer! Kondratiev stands on the point of view of Thermidor, and [I] deeply believe in the power of the proletarian revolution
But tions, I do not allow the thought of the degeneration of the party, I could not tell you this
ry, and anyone who has known me for a long time will never believe this.
I am not only from Kondratiev’s point of view, but also from Teodorovich’s point of view
£ could not stand if it was verified by the K[control] K[commission]. ® YAROSLAVSKY. The control commission did not check any of this. § RUTIN. I could never say that we made a socialist revolution early and that we are perishing. And regarding Rykov, I never completely agreed, despite the fact that I was admitted
n errors. This is a direct attempt at factional connection.
45 This refers to the discrediting of I.V. Stalin.
NEMOV. You said that we believe that the speeches of Trotsky46 and Rykov were erroneous, they should not have spoken, they would have been elected [to the Central Committee] anyway. Speaking [at the congress] with repentance is a mistake.
RUTIN. How could I say this when I had nothing to do with them? NEMOV. How could you tell?
RUTIN. I regarded their performance as insincere. The official assessment is this. I had approximately the same mood as Andreev. At first I thought that Tomsky's speech was sincere, but the future will show how he will behave. NEMOV. You're clever!!!
YAROSLAVSKY. I suggest Comrade Explain Ryutin more precisely. He asks to give him the statement of Comrade. Nemova. SHKIRATOV. Why spread it? RUTIN. Then I can write this [more accurately].
YAROSLAVSKY. I said that at first it turned out that it was 99% a lie, but then a lot of things turned out to be true. RUTIN. Everything can be distorted beyond recognition.
YAROSLAVSKY. We won't distort it. Why are we, Shkiryatov and I, going to lie, or what?
SHKIRATOV. There are all the questions that every party member can talk about, about the bargaining chips, etc. But what is important, as they say, is how the preparation for this work is carried out.
RUTIN. Believe it or not, [but] I did not completely share their theoretical views on issues of international politics, on issues of the Comintern, I did not have the slightest bit of disagreement with the party. Regarding Comrade I had deviations from Stalin, but I always assessed him as the largest figure, although I spoke about [his] shortcomings, [because] it is necessary to preserve these cadres47. This [was] around the month of December. In a conversation with Voroshilov, I stated that I would not go with Bukharin, Tomsky, Rykov. I made mistakes on the issue of industrialization, but now there are no differences. Relatively!£
He did not speak at all about the situation in the village. I said that somehow S! I met with Stalin at the Politburo, when the question of zoning was discussed, I then expressed that it would be more expedient to liquidate not district, but regional centers. I had my doubts about this. | NEMOV. You didn’t say this, you don’t make it up, you didn’t say a word about this - ^
ril, honestly, you're making this up. You said that the attitude towards collectivization of agriculture is disastrous.
SHKIRATOV. And even if he did, what’s so special about it? ^
NEMOV. With regard to the assessment of Bryukhanov’s article, I admitted that I did not read it, and I did not write this in the statement, now I remember. §
RUTIN. You are trying to connect this with the general line of the party.
46 There is a typo in the text, meaning M. P. Tomsky. "C
47 They probably mean representatives of the so-called right deviation.
NEMOV. Don't you want to say that the main question boiled down to this?
RUTIN. And other comrades in the sanatorium assessed this article as a weak article.
NEMOV. The point is not what Bryukhanov wrote, but that this is party policy. Mainly you pressed on Stalin's [policies]. All the trouble, all the misfortune comes from the fact that Stalin rules. You said that at meetings all resolutions are passed unanimously, this is typical, but when our propagandists come, they say that we are already so delusional that no one believes us.
RUTIN. It turns out that I spoke out entirely, and he only listened to me as I sang like a nightingale. Something's wrong here. You also spoke about difficulties and spoke in the same order. He didn’t object when I spoke out about Bukharin’s article, when I spoke out about my attitude towards the right, nothing.
NEMOV. I didn't ask any of this.
RUTIN. No, you said, what is your attitude to the position of the right. You agreed with me that their position is correct.
NEMOV. Listen, comrades, it turns out that not only he spoke, but Nemov also said that he gave the same assessment.
SHKIRATOV. To characterize the question, tell me, was there any conversation about Kogan?
RUTIN. I do not remember.
YAROSLAVSKY. That the abbess has arrived.
RUTIN. No, here’s the thing, at Krasnaya Presnya they called “Mother Abbess” Belenkaya.
NEMOV. What was this for?
RUTIN. In all honesty, frankly, I don’t remember why I said this. But in any case not in connection with the general policy of the party. ^ NEMOV. You said that the abbess arrived and there was not a word in her presence, and that when she sat at the table, no matter how she tried to speak, everyone seemed to take water in their mouths. ^ RYUTIN. She said that now the food situation has improved due to the fact that tents have been built in the regions, it has become significantly better
sha, and that they wrote to her from home that the food situation had improved.
NEMOV. That's what you said. He explains all the food difficulties by the lack of tents. There is a lot of food, but no tents. You
he said: “And the man has the impudence to lie like that. We sit, everyone is silent, except for one bureaucrat who always agrees with her.” I don’t remember who you were talking about, who this bureaucrat is.
I think Ryutin is doing worse by denying it like that; if some of your comrades press you and confirm all this, it will be even worse. You must tell the truth, because I am convinced that other comrades will also confirm if
The Central Control Commission will take them [into circulation] properly.
n RYUTIN. That you are engaged in slander. I have a number of comrades who know my positions.
YAROSLAVSKY. Let's leave it at that. I'm Comrade Ryutin said that this was a very serious matter, about double-dealing, about the very possibility of leaving the party.
RUTIN. I'll write it all down.
NEMOV. I would like him to also say in front of you: when we were standing with you and Bubnov came up - this was the 8th or 10th time - and we were just talking about this, it was already on the eve of departure, and you gave give me your address, where to visit you, etc.
RUTIN. And you gave it to me.
NEMOV. And I gave too. And Comrade approached. Bubnov, and you said: “with people like this, I always fully support the party line, and I don’t show it. I’ll go up to him, I need to find out something.”
RUTIN. Of course, double-dealing.
NEMOV. What did you tell me?
RUTIN. I just went up to Bubnov and asked him about it.
NEMOV. You said: “I always support the party line with such people, you need to keep your ears open.”
SHKIRATOV. Already considered you one of my own?
RUTIN. Slanderer.
When should I write to you?
YAROSLAVSKY. Today.
RUTIN. I'm somewhat upset. I don't know. I'll try to write within 24 hours. Obviously, write by hand.
YAROSLAVSKY. Better by hand, of course. It's better not to give it to others.
RUTIN. Until this matter is sorted out, I will not be able to work. Shvedchenkov went on vacation, there is a lot of work, but my internal state is like this, I’m telling you now.
YAROSLAVSKY. We'll figure it out one of these days.
RUTIN. I am extremely worried about work, but I simply won’t be able to work. Let me at least tell Sutyrin that the matter is with the Central Control Commission.
SHKIRATOV. Why would he say this? !£
RUTIN. Say that I won’t go [to work] for a few days. ABOUT-
SHKIRATOV. We'll be done within two days.
RGASPI. F. 589. Op. 3. D. 9355 (T. 3). L. 191-211. | [Script. Typescript. Directed Transcript]^
Anfert"evI. A. "Takoj otvet mog by byt" ponat kak nezelanie otvecat" Central"noj kontrol"noj Y
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Anfert"ev I. A. Stenogramma zasedania Prezidiuma CKK VKP(b) from 23 sentabra 1930 g. -g
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Starkov B. Delo Rutina // Oni ne molcali. M., 1991. S. 145-178.
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s s References
§ Anfertyev I. A. “Such a response could be understood as a reluctance to answer the Central Control Commission.” About the persecution by Irkutsk party officials of the “disgraced” candidate member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, M. N. Ryutin. 1929 // Historical and archive. 2010. No. 2. P. 177-185.
^ Anfertyev I. A. Transcript of the meeting of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on September 23, 1930. The activities of M. N. Ryutin against the regime of I. V. Stalin // Clio. 2004. no. 4 (27). pp. 33-45.
Power and opposition. Russian political process of the 20th century. M., 1995. p^ Documents testify. From the history of the village on the eve and during collectivization of 1927-1932. M., 1989.
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History of Stalinism: a repressed province. M.: ROSSPEN, 2011. How the NEP was broken. Transcripts of the plenums of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) 1928-1929: In 5 volumes. M., 2000. Maslov N. A stunning document of the era of Stalinism // News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1990. No. 12. P. 200-202.
About the case of the so-called “Union of Marxists-Leninists” // News of the CPSU Central Committee. 1989. No. 6. P. 104.
Letters from I.V. Stalin to V.M. Molotov. 1925-1936. Collection of documents / Compiled by: L. Kosheleva, V. Lelchuk, V. Naumov, O. Naumov, L. Rogovaya, O. Khlevnyuk. M., 1995. Ryutin M. Party and the working class. M., 1924. Ryutin M.N. Party unity and discipline. M.-L., 1926. Ryutin M.N. Smenovekhites and the proletarian revolution. Rostov-on-Don, 1924. Soviet leadership. Correspondence. 1928-1941 M., 1999.
Stalin and Kaganovich. Correspondence. 1931-1936 / Compiled by: O. V. Khlevnyuk, R. W. Davis, L. P. Kosheleva, E. A. Rees, L. A. Rogovaya. M., 2001.
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Khlevnyuk O.V. Politburo. Mechanisms of political power in the 30s. M., 1996. Khlevnyuk O.V. Master. Stalin and the establishment of the Stalinist dictatorship. M.: ROSSPEN, 2010. £ Central Committee of the CPSU, CPSU (b), RCP (b), RSDLP (b): Historical and biographical reference book / Comp. Yu. V. Goryachev. M.: Parade Publishing House, 2005. ~
A small circle of Ryutin's supporters helped publish these documents and discussed them at a meeting in August 1932. As a result, the Union of Marxists-Leninists was created and its leaders were elected. Next, it was decided to distribute the union’s program documents among party members; Some have heard about these documents, including Zinoviev and Kamenev.
Later, members of the union were arrested and expelled from the party. Among those expelled were Zinoviev and Kamenev (for the second time), because they knew about the existence of the union, read its documents, but did not report this to the highest party bodies. In October 1932, members of the union were sentenced to prison. Ryutin received the longest sentence - 10 years. 5 years later, at the height of the terror, Ryutin and other former members of the Union of Marxists-Leninists were sentenced to death and executed. But in 1932, the death penalty for opposition activities in the party had not yet been introduced.
At this point, the Ryutin case comes into contact with the Kirov case. As we already know, in 1932 Stalin allegedly demanded at a meeting of the Politburo the execution of Ryutin. There are, however, allegations that Kirov and other "moderate" members of the Politburo disagreed with Stalin on this issue. Realizing that the majority of the Politburo did not support him, Stalin immediately conceded. It is said that Stalin, however, never forgave Kirov for the opposition in this matter. It says the following:
It is reported that the debate was very tense. Stalin supported the GPU proposal<...>I don’t remember exactly how the votes in the Politburo were divided then. I only remember that Kirov spoke most definitely against the execution, and he managed to attract the majority of the Politburo members with him. Stalin was careful enough not to bring matters to an acute conflict. Ryutin's life was saved then...
Later historians often turned to this story. Conquest states that “Kirov is said to have spoken out sharply against the execution of Ryutin,” in which he was supported by Ordzhonikidze, Kuibyshev, Kosior and Kalinin. Only Kaganovich remained completely on Stalin’s side, while the rest showed indecisiveness. As Koquest continues, “this story was unofficial for a long time, but now Moscow is confirming it.”
But if we study the sources that Conquest refers to (except for the “Letter of an Old Bolshevik”), we will find that he uses data from Alexander Barmin (see Chapter 6) - an article published in the Literary Gazette, as well as a novel (! ), published in Moscow in 1987. He probably considers the Literaturnaya Gazeta article to be confirmation “in official Soviet literature.” This article was written by Arkady Vaksberg, a journalist who has written extensively on historical topics, who, however, is in no way an “official” source of any data; He also does not cite any sources. Vaksberg's article is a typical retelling of rumors on this topic that spread during the era of glasnost in the Soviet Union.
Volkogonov is also inclined to believe in this version. He even quotes Kirov’s objection: “You can’t do this. Ryutin is not a lost man, but a deluded one<...>The devil knows who didn’t have a hand in this letter.” At the same time, Volkogonov also does not cite the source of this statement. The discussion that allegedly took place at the Politburo is covered in detail by the Russian historian B. A. Starkov. According to him, Stalin’s strongest argument was the report on the GPU, indicating the growth of terrorist sentiments among workers, peasants and especially students. Similar sentiments were also expressed in a number of individual acts of terror directed against local party workers and representatives of the Soviet government. Since 1928, such reports were sent only to Stalin. He categorically forbade Yagoda to inform the rest of the Politburo members about the real situation in the country. At the Politburo meeting at which the Ryutin case was discussed, Stalin argued that it would be politically wrong and illogical to severely punish the perpetrators of terrorist acts, and defended those whose political sermons created the basis for such acts. Instead of repelling minor scattered attacks, it was necessary to eliminate the key figure behind them. According to Stalin, Ryutin's platform was just a pretext for removing him from the post of party leader.
Starkov believes that the members of the Politburo did not agree with Stalin. The discussion about Ryutin's fate became increasingly heated. Kirov, who was supported by Ordzhonikidze and Kuibyshev, spoke out most passionately and purposefully against the death sentence against Ryutin. Even Molotov and Kaganovich did not support Stalin, but when this issue was put to a vote, they abstained. A somewhat mysterious source of information about the opposition of Kirov and others to Stalin in this case, which Starkov refers to, is the so-called “Collection of the Central State Archive of Ordinance of the USSR. Information about the Soviet Union". But using this link from Starkov, it turned out to be impossible to find any specific source of data that would confirm the words of the historian.
Early years and revolution
Born into a peasant family in the Irkutsk province.
After his release, he worked as an economist at the Soyuzelectro enterprise. In 1932, together with V.N. Kayurov, M.S. Ivanov, P.A. Galkin and several other Bolsheviks with pre-revolutionary experience, he organized, or rather, proclaimed, the “Union of Marxists-Leninists” and tried to unite all opposition forces around it. In his address “To all members of the CPSU(b)” (1932), Ryutin accused I.V. Stalin of perverting Leninism and usurping power. In his extensive manuscript “Stalin and the Crisis of the Proletarian Dictatorship,” he gave even harsher assessments of Stalin’s activities. Here Ryutin already recognized the correctness of the Left Opposition in matters of internal party life and, since Stalin’s methods of collectivization, “liquidation of the kulaks as a class” and the adventuristic pace of industrialization were also unacceptable to the left, he believed that he had created a unifying platform.
However, the oppositionists were reluctant to make contact with Ryutin, not trusting him as a recent “militant” of the Stalinist faction; even many “rightists,” such as Stan and his associates, preferred the “Trotskyists” - the underground organization of I. N. Smirnov. Thanks to the denunciation of one of the members of the “Union,” Ryutin’s small organization was arrested by the OGPU very soon, already in September 1932, which led to the arrests of many oppositionists who had the carelessness to familiarize themselves with Ryutin’s manuscript, including Zinoviev, Kamenev, Stan.
Arrest and imprisonment
In September 1932, Ryutin was arrested in connection with the case of the Union of Marxists-Leninists; During interrogations, he behaved extremely courageously, taking all the blame upon himself: “There were no inspirers behind me and there aren’t any. I myself was the inspirer of the organization, I stood at its head, I alone wrote the entire platform and appeal.” At a special meeting at the OGPU, Ryutin was sentenced to death penalty, but Kirov, Ordzhonikidze (whom Ryutin sharply criticized in his manuscript), S. Kosior, and Chubar stood up for him. On October 11, 1932, the board of the OGPU of the USSR sentenced to 10 years in prison on charges of participation in the revolutionary revolution. right-wing organizations. All of Ryutin’s accomplices received 5 to 10 years in prison. He was held first in the Suzdal political detention center, then in the Verkhneuralsk political detention center.
Death
In the summer of 1936, Ryutin was returned to Moscow in connection with the Moscow trials that were then being prepared. He was kept in an internal NKVD prison. However, he refused to answer the investigator’s questions and sign pre-prepared “interrogation protocols” despite cruel torture and promises of freedom. Tried to commit suicide.
On January 10, 1937, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR sentenced Ryutin to death (the sentencing process lasted 25 minutes). Shot on the same day in the VKVS building. Together with Ryutin, 11 previously repressed supporters were also shot, including A. Kayurov, Ivanov and others.
Ryutin's wife, Evdokia Mikhailovna, died in 1947 in a camp in Kazakhstan, son Vasily was shot in
Birthday February 01, 1890
Soviet political and party leader, one of the few who tried to organize real resistance
Early years and revolution
Born into a peasant family. Graduated from the Irkutsk Teachers' Seminary (1908).
In the revolutionary movement since 1912, member of the RSDLP since 1913. During the First World War, he graduated from the Irkutsk school of warrant officers and served in Harbin.
In 1917, Chairman of the Council in Harbin. In 1918-1919, commander of the troops of the Irkutsk Military District, from 1920 on party work in Siberia and Dagestan. From March 1924 in Moscow, he worked as head of the propaganda department of the Moscow Committee, secretary of the Krasnopresnensky district party committee. In 1928-1930, deputy editor of the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper. In 1930, member of the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council.
Fighting the opposition
In 1924-1927, Ryutin actively supported Stalin in the fight against Trotsky and his supporters, against the “new” and united opposition, and led brigades of militants who dispersed opposition meetings and demonstrations. A. Barmin recalled: “One of the secretaries of the Moscow district committees, named Ryutin, proposed creating combat groups armed with batons and whistles, which were supposed to drown out the speeches of opposition speakers. Other militant groups, on orders from the Central Committee, were to disperse unofficial meetings of party members.”
At the XV Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Ryutin devoted most of his speech to the opposition; characterizing the opposition, in accordance with party guidelines, as a “social-democratic deviation,” Ryutin said: “This system of our views does not allow us to have a social-democratic deviation flourish within our Leninist party... It would be a mistake, it would be the funeral of the party in the first place.” category, if we accepted this document as a basis, if we agreed to an agreement with the opposition... This would be the beginning of the collapse of the party, the victory of the Trotskyist line, this would be the legalization within the party of the right to factions, shades and shades, to fight the party, to take party differences into the street. The party will not agree to this.” “If you put your services to the party and to the working class on one side of the scales,” Ryutin said further, “and on the other side of the scales everything that you have done and committed during these two years, the second side of the scales will knock, it will win, and in settlements with you, all your services to the working class have long been erased from the board, from the board of history... Trotskyism and Leninism cannot live together, they are incompatible elements. Therefore, choose: either Trotskyism, but together with Trotsky, outside the party gates, or Leninism, then leave the Trotskyist system of views outside the party gates.”
At the same congress, he was first elected as a candidate member of the Central Committee.
"Union of Marxists-Leninists"
However, in 1928, Ryutin, like many Moscow workers, did not accept Stalin’s policies in the countryside and the methods of industrialization of the country and supported the right opposition. Unlike the leaders of the opposition, after their defeat he did not renounce his views, looked for like-minded people in the party, and in the fall of 1930, after the denunciation of A. S. Nemov, by decision of the Central Control Commission he was expelled from the CPSU (b) “for treacherous double-dealing behavior and an attempt at underground propaganda of the law.” -opportunistic views” and on November 13 was arrested on charges of counter-revolutionary agitation and spent several months in Butyrka prison.
The circumstances surrounding Ryutin's release from prison are interesting. Since he steadfastly denied his guilt during interrogations, V.R. Menzhinsky was forced to turn to Stalin with a request to clarify the future fate of Ryutin, citing the fact that he was “posing as an innocently offended person.” “In my opinion, we need to let him go,” was Stalin’s answer. On January 17, 1931, a Special Meeting at the OGPU acquitted Ryutin for lack of proof of the charges against him.
After his release, he worked as an economist at the Soyuzelectro enterprise. In 1932, together with V.N. Kayurov, M.S. Ivanov, P.A. Galkin and several other Bolsheviks with pre-revolutionary experience, he organized, or rather proclaimed, the “Union of Marxists-Leninists” and tried to unite all opposition forces around it. In his address “To all members of the CPSU(b)” (1932), Ryutin accused I.V. Stalin of perverting Leninism and usurping power. In his extensive manuscript “Stalin and the Crisis of the Proletarian Dictatorship,” he gave even harsher assessments of Stalin’s activities. Here Ryutin already recognized the correctness of the Left Opposition in matters of internal party life and, since Stalin’s methods of collectivization, “liquidation of the kulaks as a class” and the adventuristic pace of industrialization were also unacceptable to the left, he believed that he had created a unifying platform.
